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INTRODUCTION
In an era of televised trials, computerized jury lists, and
transnational teleconferences, one aspect of judicial administra-
tion remains fixed in the eighteenth century: the geographic
scope of the subpoena power. A state court will compel attend-
ance only of a witness who is served with a subpoena while
physically present in the state in which the court sits.1 Regard-
less of the distance between the witness and the courthouse,
the amount of contact the witness has with the state, or the
need for live testimony, the states uniformly and steadfastly
have refrained from exercising extraterritorial subpoena
power.2 Instead, they have clung to an antiquated view of state
court power: that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and
authority over persons.., without its territory."
An examination of the ever-expanding scope of state court
personal jurisdiction reveals the irony of this self-imposed limi-
tation on subpoena power.4 In early America, a court's jurisdic-
tion, like its subpoena power, was rigidly limited to the
territory of the state. In 1877, the United States Supreme
Court declared in Pennoyer v. Neff - that a state court could
not "extend its process beyond [the] territory [of the state]" be-
cause such an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction would in-
terfere with "the independence of the State in which the
persons are domiciled. '6
1. For a discussion of state subpoena statutes, see infra Part III. A.
2. For purposes of this Article, the word "extraterritorial" means beyond
the boundaries of the state in which a state court sits, or beyond the bounda-
ries of the judicial district in which a federal district court sits.
3. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
4. See infra Part II.
5. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
6. 1I at 722-23.
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This view of personal jurisdiction - steeped in the imagery
of state sovereignty and the language of international law -
did not survive the twentieth century. As corporations prolifer-
ated and modern technology made interstate travel more con-
venient and less expensive, courts changed their conception of
state power to compel a defendant to appear in a distant forum.
By 1945, the narrow view of jurisdiction expressed in Pennoyer
gave way to a far more expansive view, which recognized the
state's authority to reach all persons having sufficient contact
with the state such that an assertion of jurisdiction over them
would "not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice.' "7
State legislatures were eager to provide their citizens with
local fora in which to sue nonresident defendants. Indeed,
many states adopted statutes authorizing assertions of personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents engaged in specified in-state ac-
tivities even before International Shoe Co. v. Washington.8
The Supreme Court's adoption of the "minimum contacts" for-
mulation, however, spurred the states to adopt comprehensive
"long-arm" statutes.9
The universality and comprehensiveness of long-arm stat-
utes, now taken for granted by litigants in both state and fed-
eral courts,10 reveal little concern by the states that an
assertion of extraterritorial personal jurisdiction will interfere
with the sovereignty of sister states, create insurmountable en-
forcement problems, or cause undue inconvenience to nonresi-
7. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
8. For a discussion of pre-International Shoe jurisdictional statutes and
the Supreme Court decisions upholding them, see infra note 82 and accompa-
nying text.
9. Long-arm statutes authorize courts to assert personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants who have specified contacts with the forum. See J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 139 (1985).
10. Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "all
process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial
limits of the state in which the district court is held, and, when authorized...
by these rules, beyond the territorial limits of that state." FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f).
Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules provides that "whenever a statute or rule of
court of the state in which the district court is held provides... for service of
a summons... upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state, ....
service may ... be made under the circumstances and in the manner pre-
scribed in the statute or rule." FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e). Read together, these rules
allow federal litigants to take advantage of state long-arm statutes. See gener-
ally 4A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 1126
n. 6 (1987) (stating that "[flederal diversity courts are bound by the [state]
courts' construction of their own substitute service rules and statutes").
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dent defendants. Yet precisely these concerns - or worse still,
mere inertia - influence the states to limit their subpoena
power to the territory of the state.
The states' failure to exercise extraterritorial subpoena
power has not made the testimony of out-of-state witnesses to-
tally unavailable at trial. To compensate for the lack of extra-
territorial subpoena power, the states have adopted complicated
statutory schemes that permit a litigant to take a deposition in
the nonresident witness's home state11 and introduce the tran-
script into evidence in the trial state.' 2
Although these "compensatory" statutory schemes purport
to assure that the testimony of material nonresident witnesses
will be available at trial, at least in written form, they provide
no guarantee because the trial state must rely on the coopera-
tion of the witness's home state to obtain the deposition testi-
mony. Even if the compensatory schemes assured the
availability of deposition testimony at trial, however, they
would remain inadequate. Not only are they cumbersome,
time-consuming, and expensive, but they also deprive litigants
in civil cases of the opportunity to offer at trial the live testi-
mony of nonresident witnesses who refuse to appear volunta-
rily. Although a videotape deposition may afford the jury the
opportunity to observe the appearance and demeanor of an ab-
sent witness, the tape remains "frozen" as of the time of the
deposition. "Surprises," however, invariably occur at trial that
were not and often could not have been anticipated at the time
of the deposition. If the witness is beyond the subpoena power
of the court, a litigant cannot obtain her testimony regarding
the new material.
The states' reasons for failing to assert extraterritorial sub-
poena power do not justify these "costs." Neither the potential
infringement of other states' sovereignty nor the risk of incon-
venience to nonresident witnesses renders all assertions of ex-
traterritorial subpoena power unconstitutional. The belief that
the present system is adequate fails to appreciate both the supe-
riority of live testimony and the cumbersome nature of the ex-
isting compensatory statutes. Concerns that extraterritorial
subpoenas might not be enforceable are unfounded, given the
11. For purposes of this Article, the phrase "home state" means the state
in which the witness resides.
12. See infra Part III. B. For purposes of this Article, the phrase "trial
state" means the state in which the underlying action is pending.
1989]
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efficacy of the contempt process and other remedies against re-
calcitrant witnesses.
The states' failure to exercise extraterritorial subpoena
power under any circumstances is both anachronistic and detri-
mental to the quality of justice administered by state courts.
Consistent with the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, states can assert subpoena power over nonresident
witnesses if the assertion comports with "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."'1 3 Given that a subpoena bur-
dens an out-of-state witness far less severely than a summons
burdens a nonresident defendant,14 and that the burdens a sub-
poena imposes are far less likely to be affected by intervening
state lines,15 the amount of contact required for a state to assert
subpoena power over an out-of-state witness (if any contact is
required at all)16 is certainly less than the amount required to
assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Not
only can states assert extraterritorial subpoena power, but they
should assert such power because live testimony at trial im-
proves the quality of justice rendered.
Part I of this Article describes the historical development
of the subpoena and demonstrates that the geographic reach of
the early English subpoena was the same as the reach of the
writs used to obtain personal jurisdiction over defendants. Part
II traces the dramatic expansion of state court personal juris-
diction in the United States, and suggests that a parallel expan-
sion in state court subpoena power should have occurred. Part
II also analyzes the kinds of burdens nonresident defendants
face and explains how a jurisdictional analysis should weigh
those burdens. Part III reveals that the states have not ex-
panded the scope of their subpoena power beyond the territory
of the state. Part IV, which attempts to explain this reluctance,
explores and refutes three reasons the states may have for fail-
ing to exercise extraterritorial subpoena power. To assess
whether the test for determining the constitutionality of an as-
sertion of personal'jurisdiction could be modified to gauge the
validity of an assertion of extraterritorial subpoena power, Part
IV compares the kinds of burdens nonresident witnesses face
with those nonresident defendants bear. Finally, Part V pro-
13. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
14. See infra Parts IV. A. 2. a. and e.
15. See infra Part IV. A. 2. a.
16. See infra Parts IV. A. 2. a. and e., Part V. B. 3.
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poses three possible models the states could adopt to expand
the reach of their subpoena power.
I. THE SUBPOENA POWER IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
This part of the Article places the subpoena power in his-
torical perspective, demonstrating that the reach of both the
early English subpoena and the initial process used to obtain
personal jurisdiction over defendants were limited to the same
geographic territory. This parallel suggests that if the scope of
the court's personal jurisdiction were to expand, so could the
reach of its subpoena power.
A. ORIGINS OF THE SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM
In medieval England, trials were conducted by battle and
ordeal - witnesses had no role. The common law courts thus
had no need for subpoena power. With the legal renaissance of
the thirteenth century, trial by jury replaced the older, more
primitive modes of proof.17 The early jurors were selected
from the immediate neighborhood of the incident giving rise to
the action, and were supposed to have either first-hand knowl-
edge of the event or conduct a private inquiry to ascertain the
facts.31 Because the jurors themselves had or could obtain all
the information they needed, the testimony of witnesses at trial
continued to be unnecessary.
Jurors were free to consult other persons to gain informa-
tion, and no rules governed the information-gathering process.
Given this lack of regulation, the litigants exerted enormous
pressure on the jurors and those from whom the jurors sought
information. Complaints of bribery, intimidation, jury-packing,
and partiality mounted in the fourteenth and fifteenth centu-
ries19 amid further concerns of perjury and tampering with
evidence.2 0
To combat these evils, the common law courts greatly en-
larged the offense of maintenance.2 1 A person could be prose-
17. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 341 (7th ed. 1956).
18. Id. at 332-33; 9 id. at 131 (3d ed. 1944); accord S. LANDSMAN, THE An.
VERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 11 (1984).
19. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 169 (4th ed.
1948).
20. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 334-35. Concerns about perjury
and tampering with evidence continue to exist today.
21. The offense of maintenance proscribed "upholding" a party to a suit
"by word, action, writing, countenance, or deed." 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra
19891
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cuted for giving unsolicited testimony, or even for just standing
with a stranger in court.22 Thus, while the jury was free to go
to a prospective witness's home and ask him what he knew
about a particular matter, the witness risked an action for
maintenance if he voluntarily approached a juror to share the
same information.2 3 As a result, witnesses were reluctant to
appear in court voluntarily.24
Witnesses also hesitated to appear in chancery proceedings
and testify voluntarily for fear of maintenance actions.25 Dur-
ing the late fourteenth century, the reticent witness problem
was solved: John of Waltham, the chancery clerk, invented the
subpoena.26 Waltham created the new chancery writ by adding
to the language of an older writ, "quibusdam certis de causis"
(appear for certain reasons), the new words "et hoc sub poena
centum librorum nullatenus omittas" (and then under penalty
of a hundred pounds for failure to appear).27 With this sub-
poena ad testificandum, the chancellor summoned the prospec-
tive witness to appear and testify sub poena, or under penalty.23
Because "what a man does by compulsion of law cannot be
called maintenance," 29 a witness under subpoena could testify
note 17, at 398 (5th ed. 1942) (quoting E. COKE, SECOND PART OF INSTITUTES OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 212 (Brooke 5th ed. 1797)).
22. Id. In the middle of the fifteenth century, Fortescue expressed great
suspicion of volunteer witnesses. H. POTTER, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 213 (2d ed. 1943) (citing Y.B. 21 Edw. 4,
M. pl. 1 (1481)).
23. T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 19, at 410; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRI-
ALS AT COMMON LAW § 2190, at 64 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
24. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 130-31.
25. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2190, at 65 n.18. An early petition in
chancery requested a subpoena for a witness because "the same David will
gladly knawelygge the treweth of the same matiers, bot he wald have a
manndement fro yowe, for the cause that he shuld noght be haldyn parciall in
the same matier." 1 CALENDARS OF PROCEEDINGS IN CHANCERY xix (1450-60),
quoted in 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2190, at 65 n.18 and J. THAYER, PRE-
LIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 129 (1898).
26. See, e.g., T. PLUCKNEIT, supra note 19, at 177-78, 644-45; 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 23, § 2190, at 65 n.19 (quoting 1 CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE LORD
CHANCELLORS 259 (4th ed. 1856)). Not all scholars agree that Waltham in-
vented the subpoena; indeed, some scholars have documented the use of the
subpoena before 1375. See, e.g., T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 19, at 177-78 n.7,
644-45; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2190, at 68 n.28 (citing D. KERLY, HIS-
TORICAL SKETCH OF THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY
45 (1890)).
27. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2190, at 65-66 n.19.
28. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 19, at 170-71.
29. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2190, at 64 (quoting Littleton, who ar-
gued Y.B. 28 Hen. 6, fo. 6, pl. 1 (1450)).
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without fear of prosecution.
The common law courts were slow to follow the chancery
and exercise subpoena power. Only as the sixteenth century
approached did they recognize that jurors could not decide all
questions of fact from their own knowledge and needed the tes-
timony of witnesses. 30 Parliament enhanced the need for the
oral testimony of witnesses by enacting legislation that re-
quired oral testimony to secure convictions for treason.31 In
light of this growing need for the testimony of non-juror wit-
nesses and the witnesses' reluctance to appear voluntarily, Par-
liament enacted the Statute of Elizabeth in 1562,32 investing the
common law courts with the subpoena power.33
The Statute of Elizabeth imposed a penalty of ten pounds
upon any person who refused to attend when served with com-
pulsory process to testify, and created a private cause of action
against the recalcitrant witness in favor of "the party grieved"
for the "loss and hindrance that the party which procured the
said process shall sustain, by reason of the non-appearance of
the said witness. ' 34 Although the Statute implicitly authorized
the courts to compel the attendance and testimony of unwilling
witnesses, Parliament in fact adopted it for a far more limited
purpose: to enable those willing to testify, but afraid to come
forward, to appear "unmolested by the apprehension of mainte-
nance proceedings. '3 5 In response to the Statute, ordinary wit-
nesses appeared and testified more frequently, and their
testimony became the chief source of the jury's information.3 6
30. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 131.
31. See 1 Edw. 6, ch. 12, § 22 (1547) and 5 & 6 Edw. 6, ch. 11, § 12 (1552),
cited in 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 185 n.2.
32. 5 Eliz., ch. 9 (1562).
33. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 184-85; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note
23, § 2190, at 64-65.
34. 5 Eliz., ch. 9, § 12 (1562). The Statute of Elizabeth also increased the
penalty for subornation of perjury, id. at §§ 3-5, and created the statutory of-
fense of perjury. Id at §§ 6-7. For a discussion of the Statute, see Blair v.
United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*369; J. CHrITY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 501 (Riley's ed.
1819); 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 131; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 23,
§ 2190, at 65-67.
35. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2190, at 66. The Statute's provision for
civil actions against recalcitrant witnesses if they did not appear was designed
to counteract their fear that they would be sued for maintenance if they did
appear. Id.
36. Id. By the end of the sixteenth century, trials were held in which wit-
nesses were summoned to give testimony before the judge and jury and face
cross-examination by the opposing party's counsel. See Sir Thomas Smith's
description of a trial by jury in 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 648-49; H.
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B. TERRITORIAL REACH OF THE SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM
The subpoena ad testificandum had limited reach.3 7 A
subpoena thus could compel the attendance of only those per-
sons who could be served personally within the jurisdiction of
the court issuing the subpoena.38
The jurisdiction and subpoena power of the inferior courts
were quite limited.3 9 If a witness lived beyond the county in
which the inferior court sat, the witness could be compelled to
appear only if the party seeking his testimony applied to the
crown office, which could subpoena a witness found anywhere
in England. 40 Even the broad reach of the King's courts' sub-
poena failed to ensure that witnesses residing outside England
could be compelled to testify.41
POTTER, supra note 22, at 213; see generally 9 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 17,
at 184-85 (noting increased use of oral testimony of witnesses at trial). By the
middle of the seventeenth century, witnesses and jurors were regarded as so
distinct that a juror possessing relevant information had to be examined in
open court under oath, and could not simply convey what he knew to his fel-
low jurors behind closed doors. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 336. By
1816, courts considered it reversible error for a judge to direct jurors to find a
verdict on the basis of their own knowledge. Id.
37. It was "inevitable that the judicial machinery should be localized in its
impact" given the local nature of community life in early England. Note, Com-
pelling the Testimony of Absent Witnesses, 43 HARV. L. REV. 121, 122 (1929)
[hereinafter Harvard Note]. Because early jurors were required to render ver-
dicts based on their own personal knowledge, all trials were held in the county
in which the incident underlying the suit occurred. Werner, Dropping the
Other Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of Presence-Oriented Jurisdic-
tion, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 565, 568-69 (1979).
38. 3 H. STEPHEN, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 157 (21st ed.
1950); Harvard Note, supra note 37, at 122.
39. The writs of subpoena ad testificandum issued by the clerk of the
peace in the sessions (a court that heard criminal cases) and by the assize at
the assizes (a court of very limited civil jurisdiction) were compulsory only
within the county in which they were granted. J. CHrrlv, supra note 33, at
496. For a discussion of the jurisdiction and procedure of the sessions and the
assizes, see 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 292-94.
40. J. CHITrY, supra note 34, at 497.
41. Blackstone recognized that the common law courts' lack of power to
compel the examination of witnesses abroad, even on written interrogatories,
was a "want" of the judicial system. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COIMENTARIES *383;
see also Burns v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. 1, 10, 73 P. 597, 600 (1903) ("Black-
stone mentions as one of the defects in the administration of justice in the
common-law courts the want of power to examine witnesses abroad"). Black-
stone also was troubled by the courts' inability to authorize taking depositions
of elderly witnesses or persons going abroad to perpetuate their testimony. 3
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *383. These deficiencies were rectified to
some extent by statutes authorizing the taking of depositions "of any wit-
nesses," 1 Will. 4, ch. 22, § 2 (1830), and the issuance of commissions for taking
[Vol. 74:37
SUBPOENA POWER
C. TERRITORIAL REACH OF THE SUBPOENA AD RESPONDENDUM
AND THE CAPIAS
The link between the geographic scope of the court's juris-
diction and its subpoena power can be seen even more clearly
in the development of the subpoena ad respondendum, which
chancery used to compel a respondent to appear and defend
under threat of penalty.4 Respondents failing to honor the
subpoena ad respondendum faced a series of harsher processes,
the first of which was a writ of attachment. That writ was in
the nature of a capias directed to the sheriff, commanding him
to attach or arrest the respondent and bring him into court.43
The common law courts used similar writs to compel the de-
fendant's attendance.44
Statutes greatly expanded the availability of the writ of ca-
depositions of witnesses beyond the courts' jurisdiction. 6 & 7 Vict., ch. 82, § 5
(1843).
In 1805, the subpoena power of the superior courts was expanded dramati-
cally by a statute empowering the courts to compel the testimony of witnesses
in criminal prosecutions from any part of the United Kingdom. 45 Geo. 3, ch.
92, § 3 (1805). If a witness who had been tendered the requisite fees did not
appear, the court issuing the subpoena could certify the default to the court
where the witness was found, and that court could punish the default. Id.; see
also J. CHrfrY, supra note 34, at 501 (stating that the King's Bench "was em-
powered to punish the witness the same as if he had disobeyed a subpoena is-
sued out of that court, provided the expenses have been tendered"). Kingdom-
wide subpoena power for civil actions was not codified until 1854, when Parlia-
ment passed 17 & 18 Vict., ch. 34 (1854). This Act provided that in any action
pending in the common law superior courts in Westminster or Dublin, or in
the Court of Session or Exchequer in Scotland, the forum court could issue a
subpoena ad testificandum beyond its jurisdiction to compel the attendance of
a witness anywhere in the United Kingdom. Id. The preamble to the statute
recognized that
great Inconvenience arises in the Administration of Justice from the
Want of a Power in the Superior Courts of Law to compel the Attend-
ance of Witnesses resident in One Part of the United Kingdom at a
Trial in another Part, and the Examination of such Witnesses by
Commission is not in all Cases a sufficient Remedy for such
Inconvenience.
17 & 18 Vict., ch. 34 (1854).
42. See 9 W. HOLDSWORLTH, supra note 17, at 340; T. PLUCKNETT, supra
note 19, at 644-45.
43. 9 W. HoLDsWoRTH, supra note 17, at 348-49.
44. As in chancery, the capias was available only if less severe measures
failed to induce defendant's attendance. In early medieval times, even if writs
of attachment for the defendant's property failed to procure his appearance,
the common law courts could issue a writ of capias ad respondendum for the
defendant's arrest only in actions for breach of the peace. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 17, at 250; R. MiLAR, CrVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
HIsTORIcAL PERSPECTIVE 74-75 (1952). The absence of the arrest sanction in
actions not involving a breach of the peace meant that defendants with little
1989]
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pias in the late thirteenth and mid-fourteenth centuries.45 By
Blackstone's time, a capias was available "upon almost every
species of complaint. ' 46 Indeed, even by the late sixteenth cen-
tury, the courts would issue the capias at the commencement of
the action even if less severe writs had not been tried, employ-
ing the fiction that the less drastic efforts failed to obtain the
defendant's appearance.47
Thus, the defendant in early England often was arrested
before any proof was offered against him.48 Because the courts
predicated jurisdiction on physical power over the defendant,49
the geographic reach of initial process, like the reach of sub-
poena power, was limited to the territory in which the court
sat.50
or no property to attach had little or no incentive to appear. They thus devel-
oped "great contempt of the law." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *281.
45. In an effort to instill respect for the law and ensure that all defend-
ants were held responsible for the injuries they caused, Parliament passed leg-
islation in the late thirteenth and mid-fourteenth centuries authorizing the
common law courts to issue writs of capias to arrest defendants in actions on
the account, in debt and detinue, and in all actions on the case. 3 W. BLACK.
STONE, COmMENTARiES *281-82; 9 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 17, at 250; R.
MILLAR, supra note 44, at 74-75. See 52 Hen. 3, ch. 23 (1267); 13 Edw. 1, ch. 2
(1285); 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, ch. 17 (1350); 19 Hen. 7, ch. 9 (1503).
46. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *282.
47. Id. at *281-82; 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 250; R. MILLAR,
supra note 44, at 74-75.
48. In the early eighteenth century, Parliament began to realize that
while it may have made sense to arrest defendants after the less severe writs
had failed to procure their attendance, it was unduly harsh to arrest them on
the fiction that the other methods had failed. Thus, in a series of statutes en-
acted between 1725 and 1852, Parliament abolished the use of the capias and
replaced arrest with service of a summons. See 12 Geo. 1, ch. 29, §§ 1-2 (1725);
5 Geo. 2, ch. 27, § 4 (1732); 2 Will. 4, ch. 39 (1832); 1 & 2 Vict., ch. 110, § 2
(1838); 15 & 16 Vict., ch. 76 (1852); see also 9 W. HOLDsWORTH, supra note 17,
at 251-53 (stating that although courts theoretically required personal appear-
ance, it existed only in contemplation of law); R. MILLAR, supra note 44, at 76-
78 (discussing England's gradual abolition of arrest as a means of guaranteeing
defendant's presence at trial).
49. R. MILLAR, supra note 44, at 75-76; Miller, Implementing Current The-
ories of Jurisdiction, Venue and Service of Process -Proposals for Revision of
the Ohio Statutes, 29 OHio ST. L.J. 116, 119 (1968); T. PLUCKNETT, supra note
19, at 366-67; Sinclair, Service of Process: Rethinking the Theory and Procedure
of Serving Process under Federal Rule 4(c), 73 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1189 (1987);
Werner, supra note 37, at 570.
50. "All of England was considered to be a single jurisdiction and, except
for trial, all proceedings in any action brought in one of the three superior
courts took place at Westminster.... [T]he writ could be served upon the de-
fendant in any county in England in which he was found." Werner, supra
note 37, at 568 n.22. See also 3 W. BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *384-85 (stat-
ing that "the King's [officials] drew the cognizance of the cause from the
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II. THE EVOLVING SCOPE OF STATE COURT
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The American colonies adopted both the premise that per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant was based on physical
presence 5 ' and the corollary that the scope of a court's sub-
poena power and its jurisdictional authority were coextensive.52
Curiously, however, state court approaches to personal jurisdic-
tion and subpoena power developed quite differently in the
years following the formation of the union. The scope of state
jurisdiction has expanded quite dramatically; states will assert
jurisdiction even over nonresident defendants who would suffer
"meaningful inconvenience," so long as the assertion comports
with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."53
Despite this remarkable expansion of personal jurisdiction and
the relative lack of "meaningful inconvenience" a nonparty wit-
ness typically suffers when subpoenaed to testify,5 4 the states
have refused to expand the reach of their subpoena power.
A. SERVICE OF PROCESS IN EARLY AMERICA
During the eighteenth century, American states adopted
procedures similar to those used in England for serving defend-
ants with initial process and obtaining personal jurisdiction
county court, though they could have summoned a jury from any part of the
kingdom, yet they chose to take the cause as they found it"); supra note 39
(describing limited reach of writs). Even today, a public officer's authority to
make an arrest in a criminal action is generally limited geographically. See,
e.g., People v. Martin, 225 Cal. App. 2d 91, 93, 36 Cal. Rptr. 924, 926 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1964) (reasoning that "[als a general principle... a public officer...
has no official power to arrest offenders beyond the boundaries of the county
or district for which he is appointed"); State v. Cohen, 73 N.J. 331, 342, 375
A.2d 259, 264 (1977) (stating that "police officers can normally exercise the
powers inhering in their office only within the confines of the jurisdiction
which employs them").
51. Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of
Quasi In Rem and In Personam Principles, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1147, 1157; Wer-
ner, supra note 37, at 571.
52. Harvard Note, supra note 37, at 123. Post-colonial courts adhered to
these views. See, e.g., Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Johnson, 72 Miss. 333, 335-36,
17 So. 2, 3 (1895) (holding that the witness "was without the jurisdiction of the
court, and beyond the reach of its process," so any attempt to subpoena him
would have been in vain); State v. Murphy, 48 S.C. 1, 3, 25 S.E. 43, 44 (1896)
(stating that "there is no authority for the issuance of compulsory process for a
witness out of the jurisdiction of the courts of this state. Such a writ would be
wholly nugatory beyond the limits of the state, and, of course, could be ig-
nored and disobeyed by all persons with impunity .....
53. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
54. See infra Parts IV. A. 2. a. and e.
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over them.55 In time, state legislatures recognized the severity
of commencing a civil action by arrest and abolished its use.5 6
As the incidence of arrest diminished, the capias became a
"meaningless surviv[or]" 57 of an earlier era, replaced in many
states by a summons.5 8
The change from capias to summons had two collateral
consequences. Although the capias had been directed to the
sheriff or other state officer, the summons was directed specifi-
cally to the defendant. Additionally, although the capias had to
be served by the public official to whom it was directed, the
summons typically could be served by any adult not a party to
the action.5 9
These changes, and the more fundamental change from
arrest to service, presaged a change in the scope of state court
personal jurisdiction. The public officer, whom the capias di-
rected to arrest the defendant, could act only within the state
that granted him authority.60 When the summons replaced the
capias, arrest no longer was necessary. The "adult" authorized
to serve the summons could do so anywhere, not only within
the territory in which the court sat. Thus, the change from ca-
pias to summons, and the concomitant change in the personnel
serving the process, made the assertion of personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant at least a theoretical possibility.
These changes, however, did not effect an immediate in-
crease in the scope of state court personal jurisdiction; other
considerations prevented such an expansion. The states had
imported more from England than just the capias; they had
adopted the common law maxim that a court could acquire per-
sonal jurisdiction only over a person served within the territory
in which the court sat.6 ' As the Supreme Court demonstrated
55. Sinclair, supra note 49, at 1189.
56. R. MILLAR, supra note 44, at 79-81. See supra note 48.
57. R. MILLAR, supra note 44, at 80.
58. Id. at 80-81.
59. IML at 86-87. But see the original version of Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 4(c), which required that service of a summons be "made by a United
States marshal, by his deputy, or by some person specially appointed by the
court." FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c), 308 U.S. 645, 664 (1933). Rule 4(c) was amended in
1980 to permit service by any person who would be authorized by the state
courts of general jurisdiction where the district court is held or where service
is made. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c). See 2 J. MooRE & J. LucAs, MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE % 4.01[1] (2d ed. 1988).
60. See supra note 50.
61. See Kalo, supra note 51, at 1157; Werner, supra note 37, at 571. But
see Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV.
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in Pennoyer v. Neff, 62 this maxim was not rejected with the ab-
olition of the capias.
B. PENNOYER v. NEFF AND THE HORIZONTAL
SOVEREIGNTY RATIONALE
The facts of Pennoyer v. Neff are familiar to all students of
early American civil procedure.6 3 The Pennoyer Court was
asked to consider the validity of a default judgment rendered
by an Oregon state court against a nonresident who was served
by publication. In an opinion by Justice Field, the Supreme
Court concluded that the Oregon court had failed to acquire ju-
risdiction over the nonresident.64 Drawing on international law
principles, 65 the Court likened the state to an independent sov-
ereign, which "possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty
over persons and property within its territory,"66 and lacks "di-
rect jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without
its territory. '67
From this analogy between state and sovereign nation, the
Court concluded that "[p]rocess from the tribunals of one State
cannot run into another State, and summon parties there domi-
ciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings against
them."68 Service of process beyond a state's boundaries and
within the territory of another state would infringe upon the
other state's sovereignty. Because the nonresident defendant in
Pennoyer had not been personally served with process within
the state of Oregon, and because Oregon's process was ineffec-
tive outside Oregon, the judgment against him was void.
Although this "horizontal" or interstate sovereignty ration-
ale6 9 for limiting jurisdiction may have been persuasive in the
241, 258 (stating that American jurisdictional theory was fashioned from Con-
tinental, rather than common law, sources).
62. 95 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1877).
63. For colorful discussions of the facts, see Perdue, Sin, Scanda, and
Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered,
62 WAsH. L. REV. 479, 480-90 (1987); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of
an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 44 n.53 (1978).
64. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734.
65. Justice Field cited H. WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL LAW pt. 2, ch. 2 (8th
ed. 1866) and J. STORY, COMIENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN
AND DOiESTIc ch. 2 (7th ed. 1872). Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
66. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
67. Id.
68. Id at 727.
69. The Pennoyer Court was concerned with "horizontal" sovereignty, the
relationship between two or more sovereign states. "Vertical" sovereignty re-
fers to the relationship between the forum state and the defendant.
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international arena from which it was borrowed, its application
is far less compelling in the interstate setting. If a court of a
foreign nation issued process beyond its boundaries, and the
country into which the process ran viewed the extraterritorial
service as an encroachment on its sovereignty, an international
political problem could arise. The states of the union, however,
chose to "form a more perfect Union"70 and institutionalized
mechanisms for resolving disputes among themselves. The
Supreme Court or Congress can resolve political differences
among the states.71 Furthermore, unlike sovereign nations,
states need not rely on comity for the enforcement of their
judgments in other states; the full faith and credit clause72 re-
quires each state to honor the other states' judgments.7 3 Be-
cause no international crisis would develop if one state issued
its process into the territory of another state, Pennoyer's
wholesale importation of international law's sovereignty ration-
ale was problematic from the start.
C. INTERNATIONAL SHOE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPANSION
OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Two changes in nineteenth century life forced the Court to
bend the rigid rules adopted in Pennoyer: the proliferation of
corporations74 and the increase in interstate travel.75 As for-
Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due Process and Political Theory, 39 U. FLA. L.
REV. 293, 295 (1987).
70. U.S. CONST. preamble.
71. Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdic-
tion: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REV. 429, 453-54 (1981); Oxman, The Choice Be-
tween Direct Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evidence Abroad. The
Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 733, 746-47
(1983).
72. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
73. Gottlieb, In Search of the Link Between Due Process and Jurisdiction,
60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1291, 1294-95 (1983); Jay, supra note 71, at 453-54; Kurland,
The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction
of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 585 (1958); Perdue, supra note 63, at 502
n.151.
74. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 422 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (commenting on "the vast expansion
of our national economy" and noting "the frequency with which foreign corpo-
rations actively pursue commercial transactions throughout the various
States"); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355 (1882) (noting "[t]he great increase
in the number of corporations of late years, and the immense extent of their
business"); Kurland, supra note 73, at 578; see also H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER,
LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 12 (3d ed. 1983) (discussing the proliferation of cor-
porations and the concomitant development of American corporate law).
75. The invention of the automobile and the construction of a transna-
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eign corporations and nonresident motorists entered new states
and caused injuries, lawmakers wanted to assert regulatory au-
thority over the tortfeasors and provide their citizens with a lo-
cal forum in which to sue the nonresidents. A changing
economy and an increase in travel thus spurred the states to as-
sert jurisdiction over persons who could not be served while
physically present in the state. These assertions laid the
grour~dwork for early challenges to Pennoyer's strict territorial
view of jurisdiction.76
It was not until International Shoe Co. v. Washington,7
7
however, that the Supreme Court fundamentally changed the
jurisprudence of jurisdiction. In International Shoe, the Court
considered whether the State of Washington could assert per-
sonal jurisdiction over a Delaware corporation doing substantial
business in Washington. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Stone began by noting that "[h]istorically the jurisdiction of
courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de
facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his presence
within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to
its rendition of a judgment personally binding him.17 8 The
Court then noted the significant change in the form of initial
process and method of service used to commence actions:
[n]ow that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal
service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he
be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain mini-
tional railroad system facilitated interstate travel in the years following Pen-
noyer. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 202 (1977). The invention of
the telephone in 1876 also may have contributed to the increase in interstate
transactions and the attendant need for a more expansive doctrine of state
court personal jurisdiction. 28 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 497-98 (15th ed.
1976).
76. See, e.g., Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 628 (1935) (upholding the
constitutionality of an Iowa statute that authorized service of process on an in-
state agent of a securities business to obtain personal jurisdiction over the non-
resident principal); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927) (upholding the
constitutionality of a Massachusetts nonresident motorist statute); Kane v.
New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 169 (1916) (upholding the constitutionality of a New
Jersey nonresident motorist statute); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 353-57
(1882) (upholding the constitutionality of a Michigan statute authorizing ser-
vice of process on "any officer, member, clerk, or agent" of a foreign corpora-
tion doing business within the state to obtain personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident principals); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 408
(1856) (upholding the constitutionality of an Ohio statute providing that ser-
vice of process upon the agent of a foreign corporation would constitute service
upon the corporation itself).
77. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
78. Id at 316 (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733).
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mum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."79
With these words, the International Shoe Court revolution-
ized state court jurisdiction. Rather than requiring the defend-
ant's physical presence in the state at the time of service or
resorting to the fiction of consent, the Court gauged "the qual-
ity and nature of the [defendant's] activity in relation to the fair
and orderly administration of the laws which it was the pur-
pose of the due process clause to insure."' 0 Rather than dwell-
ing on the status of the states as independent sovereigns, the
Court focused on the station of the defendant, and made an "es-
timate of the inconveniences"8 1 the defendant would suffer if
compelled to defend in a distant forum.
D. THE STATES' EAGER RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL SHOE:
LONG-ARM STATUTES
Before International Shoe, Pennoyer's strict territorial
view of state court jurisdiction constrained the states.
Although some state legislatures had enacted statutes that au-
thorized their courts to assert personal jurisdiction over nonres-
ident defendants in specified circumstances, such statutes were
limited in scope.5 2 Furthermore, these statutes typically re-
quired that the defendant be served, in person or through an
agent, within the state, thereby fostering the belief that a state
79. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
80. Id- at 319.
81. Id. at 317 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d
Cir. 1930)).
82. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 11079 (1927) (current version at IOWA R. Civ. P.
56(f),(g)), quoted in Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 625 (1935) (stat-
ute authorized service of process on an in-state agent of a securities business to
obtain personal jurisdiction over the nonresident principal); MASS. GEN. L., ch.
43, § 2 (1923) (current version at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 3A (Law. Co-op.
1986)), quoted in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 354 (1927) (nonresident mo-
torist statute); MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 6544, 6550 (1871) (current version at
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.1920, 600.1923 (West 1981)), cited in St. Clair v.
Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1882) (statute allowed service of process on the agent
of a foreign corporation doing business in Michigan to obtain jurisdiction over
the corporation itself or over its nonresident principal). For a complete list of
the nonresident motorist statutes in effect as of 1947, see Knoop v. Anderson,
71 F. Supp. 832, 836-37 (N.D. Iowa 1947). For a general discussion of nonresi-
dent motorist statutes and the judiciary's response, see Dambach, Personal Ju-
risdiction: Some Current Problems and Modern Trends, 5 UCLA L. REv. 198,
199-211 (1958); Note, Nonresident Motorist Statutes - Their Current Scope, 44
IOWA L. REv. 384 (1959). See also Kalo, supra note 51, at 1166-76 (discussing
evolution of consent and implied consent theories).
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court's process could not issue extraterritorially.8 3
The state legislatures responded eagerly to International
Shoe by adopting far more comprehensive statutes that allowed
for extraterritorial service of process. Illinois, the first state to
adopt a comprehensive long-arm statute, authorized its courts
to assert specific personal jurisdiction84 over nonresident de-
fendants who transacted business within the state, committed a
tortious act8 5 within the state, owned real property within the
state, or contracted to insure a person, property or risk located
within the state.8 6 Within six years of the adoption of the Illi-
nois statute, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws approved a long-arm statute for adoption by
the states.8 7
83. See supra note 82 (citing statutes).
84. "Specific jurisdiction" refers to "the power to adjudicate with respect
to issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that estab-
lishes jurisdiction to adjudicate." von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Ad-
judicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136, 1144-64 (1966).
"General jurisdiction" refers to the "power to adjudicate any kind of contro-
versy when jurisdiction is based on relationships, direct or indirect, between
the forum and the person or persons whose legal rights are to be affected." Id,
at 1136, 1136-44. See generally Brilmayer, Haverkamp, Logan, Lynch, Neu-
wirth & O'Brien, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEx. L. REV. 723,
727-72 (1988) [hereinafter A General Look] (examining the meaning of general
jurisdiction); Brilmayer, Colloquy: Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction,
101 HARv. L. REV. 1444, 1444-50 (1988) (discussing the usefulness of the terms);
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count Due Process Limitations on State Court Ju-
risdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77, 80-81 (noting the contacts supporting general
jurisdiction); Richman, Part I - Casad's Jurisdiction in Civil Actions, Part II
- A Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction Between General and Spe-
cific Jurisdiction (Book Review), 72 CALiF. L. REV. 1328, 1336-46 (1984) (ex-
amining cases satisfying neither general nor specific jurisdictional tests);
Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 614-43
(1988); Twitchell, Colloquy: A Rejoinder to Professor Brilmayer, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1465, 1465-70 (1988).
85. For a tortuous interpretation of the phrase "tortious act," see Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 436, 176 N.E.2d
761, 763 (1961).
86. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956). The Illinois legisla-
ture amended the statute in 1967 to include jurisdiction over claims against
former Illinois residents for alimony, support, or property division. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(e) (Smith-Hurd 1967) (current version at ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110, para. 2-209 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988)).
87. UNIF. INTERSTATE AND INT'L PROC. ACT, 13 U.L.A. 355 (1986) [herein-
after UNIF. PROC. ACT]. The Uniform Procedure Act, which was approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Bar Association, id, at 355 historical note, authorized state courts to
assert personal jurisdiction over persons domiciled in, organized under the
laws of, or maintaining a principal place of business in the state, id. § 1.02, 13
U.L.A. at 359, and over persons who commit one of several enumerated acts
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Although many states enacted statutes modeled after Illi-
nois's long-arm statute"" or adopted the Uniform Procedure
Act,8 9 others adopted more general and potentially more ex-
pansive statutes. For example, the California legislature pro-
vided that "[a] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on
any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or
of the United States." 90 Rhode Island's long-arm statute au-
thorized jurisdiction over persons who have "the necessary
minimum contacts with the state of Rhode Island."91 All states
adopted at least one statute that allowed assertions of personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. 92
States seized the opportunity afforded them by Interna-
tional Shoe to assert personal jurisdiction over defendants be-
yond their boundaries. They adopted these statutes without
any apparent concern that an assertion of jurisdiction by one
state over a defendant in another state would infringe upon the
sovereignty of that other state. They adopted these statutes
without any apparent concern that a summons served beyond
the borders of the state would be unenforceable. And they
adopted these statutes without any apparent concern that un-
scrupulous plaintiffs would use them to force innocent defend-
ants to travel long distances to defend against frivolous claims.
The states resolved, assuaged, or disregarded each of these po-
tential concerns. None blocked the legislative expansion of
state court personal jurisdiction.
E. INSURANCE CORP. OF IRELAND AND THE ULTIMATE
REJECTION OF THE HORIZONTAL SOVEREIGNTY
RATIONALE
Challenges to assertions of jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants under the newly-adopted long-arm statutes gave the
Supreme Court numerous opportunities to refine the "mini-
within the state. Id. § 1.03, 13 U.L.A. at 361-62. The Uniform Procedure Act
also authorized assertions of jurisdiction "on any other basis authorized by
law." Id. § 1.06, 13 U.L.A. at 381.
88. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193 (West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-10-91 (Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b) (1983).
89. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-4-101 to 16-4-108 (1987); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 13-421 to 13-434 (1981); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 223A, §§ 1-14 (Law. Co-
op. 1986); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.1852, 600.2114a, 600.2118a (1981); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5321-5329 (Purdon 1981); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5,
§§ 4901-4943 (1967 & Supp. 1989).
90. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1982).
91. R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-5-33 (1985).
92. See infra Appendix Part I.
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mum contacts" test and to rethink the role of horizontal sover-
eignty in the due process calculus. Although the Court in
International Shoe concluded that fairness and reasonableness,
rather than sovereignty, should limit state court jurisdiction,93
some language in the opinion suggested the continued vitality
of Pennoyer's sovereignty rationale.94 In a series of opinions
following International Shoe, the Court continued to grapple
with this sovereignty issue.
The Court twice expressly revived the horizontal sover-
eignty rationale for limiting state court jurisdiction. In Hanson
v. Denckla,95 the Court concluded that restrictions on state
court jurisdiction "are more than a guarantee of immunity
from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence
of territorial limitations on the power of the respective
States."96 In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,97 the
Court emphasized that the "minimum contacts" test not only
"protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a
distant or inconvenient forum,"9 8 but "acts to ensure that the
States through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits
imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a fed-
eral system." 9 9
In fleshing out this "preservation of sovereignty" function,
the World-Wide Volkswagen Court stated:
[t]he Framers... intended that the States retain many essential at-
tributes of sovereignty, including . . . the sovereign power to try
93. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
94. The Court recognized that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment "does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment
in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state
has no contacts, ties, or relations." Id. at 319. It also understood that the rea-
sonableness of an assertion of jurisdiction should be assessed "in the context of
our federal system of government," id at 317, and it acknowledged that the
due process clause ensures not only fairness, but also the "orderly administra-
tion of the laws." 1d. at 319. But see Lewis, The Three Deaths of "State Sover-
eignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal
Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 707 (1983) [hereinafter Three
Deaths] (concluding:
[Tihe quoted passages do not even suggest that the interests of the fo-
rum or of any other state may substitute for the defendant's forum
contacts, or that a forum which is fair in light of the parties' interests
will be precluded from adjudicating by notions of sovereignty or state
interest.)
95. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
96. Id. at 251.
97. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
98. Id. at 292.
99. Id.
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causes in their courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied
a limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister States - a limitation
express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment. 00
Although World-Wide Volkswagen's unabashed resurrec-
tion of Pennoyer set the new high water mark for the horizon-
tal sovereignty rationale, the Court retreated only two years
later in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee.10 The Ireland Court reviewed a sanction imposed
by a district court on defendants for failure to comply with an
order compelling them to respond to a discovery request. 02
The discovery request sought information regarding the de-
fendants' contacts with the forum. The Court considered
whether, as a sanction for failure to comply, the district court
could deem the recalcitrant parties' contacts with the forum as
sufficient to support an assertion of personal jurisdiction. 0 3 In
concluding that it could, the Court differentiated between sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, an article III limitation that "functions
as a restriction on the federal power and contributes to the
characterization of the federal sovereign,' 0 4 and personal juris-
diction, a due process clause limitation that "represents a re-
striction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as
a matter of individual liberty."'' ° 5
The Ireland Court attempted to synchronize its articulation
of personal jurisdiction, which seriously de-emphasized state
sovereignty, with the Court's prior exhortations on the subject:
100. Id at 293 (emphasis added).
101. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
102. Id at 695.
103. "[Ifn the absence of a federal rule or statute establishing a federal ba-
sis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction, the personal jurisdiction of the
district courts is determined in diversity cases by the law of the forum State."
Id at 711 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing, inter alia, Arrow-
smith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 1963)). Justice Powell
stated that "as a result of the District Court's dependence on the law of Penn-
sylvania to establish personal jurisdiction... its jurisdiction in this case nor-
mally would be subject to the same due process limitations as a state court."
Id at 712. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e), 4(f) (explaining how to serve par-
ties not found within the state where the district court sits and discussing ter-
ritorial limits on service); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 10, §§ 1067.1,
1075 (1988) (discussing modern notions of personal jurisdiction and issue of
which law governs amenability to suit); Welkowitz, Beyond Burger King: The
Federal Interest in Personal Jurisdiction, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 2-21 (1987)
(discussing current limits on personal jurisdiction and the role of Rule 4 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
104. Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702.
105. Id.
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It is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal juris-
diction, as applied to state courts, reflects an element of federalism
and the character of state sovereignty vis-a-vis other States .... The
restriction on state power described in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individ-
ual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause
is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the
Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore,
if the federalism concept operated as an independent restriction on
the sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to waive the
personal jurisdiction requirement .... 106
Thus, the Ireland Court finally put to rest Pennoyer's horizon-
tal sovereignty rationale. Concern for the defendant's "individ-
ual liberty interest," and not for other states' "status as coequal
sovereigns," underlies constitutional limits on state court
jurisdiction.10 7
F. BURDENS ON DEFENDANTS AND THE ROLE OF CONTACTS IN
THE PosT-IRELAND ERA
Because International Shoe's "minimum contacts" test for
limiting state court jurisdiction reflects concern for the sover-
eignty considerations that Ireland unequivocally rejected, 0 8 the
Supreme Court should formulate a new jurisdictional test. 0 9
106. 1&c at 702-03 n.10 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980)).
107. See generally Braveman, Interstate Federalism and Personal Jurisdic-
tion, 33 SYRACUSE L. REv. 533, 540-54 (1982) (discussing the Supreme Court's
emphasis on interstate federalism); Gottlieb, supra note 73, at 1299 (noting
that "sovereignty does not have a place in the original design of the due pro-
cess clause"); Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A
Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112, 1120-42 (1981) (arguing that ju-
risdiction should not be limited by federalism concerns); Three Deaths, supra
note 94, at 718-27, 735-36 (discussing Ireland's rejection of the sovereignty ra-
tionale). At a minimum, Ireland repudiated horizontal, or interstate, sover-
eignty as a rationale for limiting state court jurisdiction. Some scholars
maintain that sovereignty (at least "vertical" sovereignty, or the state's author-
ity over individuals who have connections with the state) must continue to in-
form due process calculations, lest "the forum reasonableness required by the
due process clause becomes nothing more than a constitutionalized version of
forum non conveniens." Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism
in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEx. L. REV. 689, 707 (1987); see also
Brilmayer, supra note 69, at 295-99 (explaining the vertical approach to state
sovereignty); Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63
WASH. U.L.Q. 377, 383-407 (1985) (arguing that states assert jurisdiction only
over nonresidents having liability-related contacts with the state). See infra
note 262 and accompanying text for the argument that Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977), undermined the proposition that vertical sovereignty is a suffi-
cient source of jurisdictional authority.
108. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., the tests proposed by Abrams & Dimond, Toward a Constitu-
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Rather than focusing on the defendant's contacts with the fo-
rum state, the new test should ask whether the defendant
would suffer any "meaningful inconvenience"L0 if required to
litigate in the forum. Only if the defendant would face mean-
ingful inconvenience should a court examine the defendant's
contacts with the forum.
Two inquiries define the parameters of this proposed juris-
dictional test: what burdens facing a nonresident defendant
constitute "meaningful inconvenience" of a constitutional di-
mension; and, in the post-Ireland era, how might the defend-
ant's contacts with the forum state justify an assertion of
jurisdiction despite these burdens.
The nonresident defendant in a civil action faces two dis-
tinct kinds of burdens: universal and state-specific.11' The de-
fendant bears universal burdens regardless of the state in
which she is sued. Universal burdens vary as a function of the
defendant's personality, the complexity of the case, the distance
between the defendant and the forum, and other factors apart
from the state in which the suit is commenced. These burdens
include the anxiety of being accused of wrongdoing, the fear of
tional Framework for the Control of State Court Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 75, 95-109 (1984); Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdic-
tion, 68 IowA L. REV. 1015, 1050-65 (1983); Lewis, A Brave New World for Per-
sonal Jurisdiction- Flexible Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV.
1, 26-65 (1984); Perdue, supra note 63, at 508-19; Three Deaths, supra note 94,
at 727-42; Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of
State Courts: Time for Change, 63 OR. L. REv. 485, 522-27 (1984); see also Bur-
stein v. State Bar of California, 693 F.2d 511, 517-18 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that
"the standard must be simply 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice,' with 'contacts' viewed as a way of demonstrating whether the stan-
dard is satisfied").
110. See infra note 122.
111. The distinction between "universal" and "state-specific" burdens mod-
ifies the distinction between "nongeographical" and "geographical" burdens
made in W. Luneburg, The Burdens of Territorial Jurisdiction: An Analysis
and a Commentary on the Burger King and Shutts Cases 22-34 (Nov. 1985)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author). Here, the critical question
is whether an intervening state line determines the magnitude of the burden.
In Professor Luneburg's manuscript, the determinative factor was whether the
burden facbd by the nonresident defendant differed in quality or magnitude
from the burden a forum resident would bear if sued on a similar claim in the
same court. Notwithstanding this difference, many of the following ideas re-
garding litigation burdens and how a jurisdictional analysis should weigh them
have been drawn from Professor Luneburg's manuscript. See also Redish,
supra note 107, at 1135 (identifying litigation inconvenience burdens). But see
Stein, supra note 107, at 760 (arguing that "[i]f the forum has a significant in-
terest in regulating the conduct complained of in the lawsuit, the burden on
either party should not divest it of its sovereign prerogative").
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liability, the cost of retaining an attorney, the time required to
respond to interrogatories and document demands, the time
needed to attend depositions and the trial, and the potential ex-
pense of satisfying a money judgment or complying with a judg-
ment granting equitable relief.
Although the magnitude of some of these universal bur-
dens may vary depending on where the defendant is sued, the
magnitude is determined primarily by factors other than the
state of the forum. For example, because attorneys in one part
of the country may charge more than attorneys in another part,
an Iowan sued in New York may have to pay more in attorneys'
fees than she would if sued on the same claim in Iowa. Like-
wise, the Iowa defendant will pay more to travel to the New
York courthouse than she would to travel to the Iowa court-
house. These universal burdens, however, are only quantita-
tively, not qualitatively, more "burdensome" than those the
defendant would bear if sued at home. It is the distance be-
tween the home state and the forum, rather than the incidence
of intervening state lines, that affects the magnitude of the uni-
versal burdens.
The magnitude of state-specific burdens, however, directly
depends on the state in which the suit is commenced. 112 These
burdens include the inability to subpoena nonresident wit-
nesses,1 3 the inability to join as third-party defendants persons
who are beyond the jurisdictional reach of the forum," 4 "unfa-
vorable" procedural laws the forum will apply,1 15 and "unfavor-
able" substantive laws the forum probably will apply.116 The
112. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 301
(1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that "the constitutionally significant
'burden' to be analyzed relates to the mobility of the defendant's defense").
113. See generally infra Part III. A. (discussing statutes limiting subpoena
power).
114. See 4A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 10, § 1127 (1988); cf. FED.
R. Crv. P. 4(f) (authorizing service on third-party defendants and "necessary"
parties "at all places outside the state but within the United States that are
not more than 100 miles from the place in which the action is commenced,"
notwithstanding intervening state lines).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971); see also
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 108 S. Ct. 2117, 2121-26 (1988) (upholding forum's ap-
plication of its own statute of limitation).
116. The Supreme Court has imposed few constitutional constraints on the
ability of a forum state to apply its own substantive law in resolving claims
against nonresident defendants, even in controversies with which the forum
has only a minimal connection. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.
302, 308 (1981); see also A General Look, supra note 84, at 725 & n.19 (stating
that a choice of law decision receives only minimal constitutional scrutiny);
Redish, supra note 107, at 1140 (noting that a state needs only a minimal con-
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state in which the action is commenced determines the magni-
tude of these burdens.117
The defendant will face burdens of both varieties regard-
less of where the plaintiff commences the suit, and the defend-
ant can count on being sued somewhere.118 A defendant
therefore may defeat the forum's assertion of jurisdiction only
if the incremental burdens she would suffer if forced to defend
there, rather than in a more convenient forum, render the as-
sertion of jurisdiction unreasonable. 119
The defendant almost always will suffer the fewest univer-
sal burdens if sued in her home state. 20 The court thus should
consider the difference between the universal burdens the de-
fendant would suffer if sued at home and those she would suf-
fer if forced to defend in the plaintiff's chosen forum (the
"universal differential"). 2 1
nection). But see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-23 (1985)
(holding that application of Kansas law to a nationwide class action would be
unfair where most royalty claims related to land located outside Kansas). One
could argue that jurisdictional analysis should not consider the "burdensome-
ness" of "unfavorable" substantive law, as such burdens should be addressed
directly by the adoption of more rigorous choice-of-law analyses in forum
courts. It seems naive, however, to ignore the reality that a decision upholding
personal jurisdiction invariably will expose the defendant to the forum's sub-
stantive law, which may be "unfavorable."
117. The possible prejudice a defendant may face if sued in a state court
outside her home state is an additional, difficult to categorize, burden. It
would seem that the equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses
would protect against this burden more appropriately than the due process
clause. Furthermore, the defendant should be able to alleviate this burden by
removing the action to federal court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(a) (1982 &
Supp. 1989).
118. If the plaintiff's suit is dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction by
state A, the plaintiff is likely to refile in State B, where the court has jurisdic-
tion over the defendant. Thus, the defendant will not be able to avoid the bur-
dens of suit altogether.
119. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1940); Red-
ish, supra note 107, at 1135-37.
120. Attorneys' fees may be higher in the defendant's home state, but vir-
tually all other universal burdens should be lower in the defendant's home
state than in the forum (provided the home-state courthouse is closer to the
defendant's home than any other state's courthouse). Cf. World-Wide Volks-
wagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 301 n.1 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(reasoning that "a courtroom just across the state line from a defendant may
often be far more convenient for the defendant than a courtroom in a distant
corner of his own State").
121. Given that the defendant would suffer differing magnitudes of univer-
sal burdens depending upon where in her home state the plaintiff filed suit,
the formula should take as its baseline the universal burdens the defendant
would suffer in the most convenient forum in her home state. Thus, in calcu-
lating the universal burdens to determine whether a court in Camden, New
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The defendant might suffer fewer state-specific burdens if
sued in a state other than either the original forum or her home
state (for example, in the state where all relevant witnesses re-
side). The court therefore should consider the difference be-
tween the magnitude of the state-specific burdens the
defendant would suffer if sued in the state where these burdens
would be fewest and those she would suffer in the forum (the
"state-specific differential").
The universal differential alone rarely should result in
"meaningful inconvenience"'122 
- inconvenience of a constitu-
tional dimension. Air travel, telephones, fax machines, and
other burden-reducing technologies are readily available and
such "progress in communications and transportation has made
the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome."'123
Because other universal burdens are unlikely to differ dramati-
cally by forum,24 the universal differential rarely should be
determinative.125
Jersey, could assert personal jurisdiction over a Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania na-
tive, the court should consider the difference between the universal burdens
the defendant would suffer if sued in Pittsburgh (not Philadelphia), and those
she would suffer if sued in Camden. Thus constructed, the formula would al-
low even an in-state defendant to argue that the universal burdens she would
suffer if sued in a distant forum within her home state would constitute
"meaningful inconvenience." See infra note 125.
122. "Of course, relatively minor differences in the level of convenience
should not be sufficient to justify a dismissal. Due process should be held to
bar a state's exercise of jurisdiction only if meaningful inconvenience can be
demonstrated." Redish, supra note 107, at 1137. See also World-Wide Volks-
wagen, 444 U.S. at 301 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he burden, of
course, must be of constitutional dimension").
123. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1957)). See also McGee, 355 U.S. at 222-23 (stating that
"modern transportation and communication have made it much less burden-
some for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in eco-
nomic activity").
124. The psychological factors are unlikely to vary widely. The degree of
anxiety a defendant feels from the threat of judgment is unlikely to depend
upon which state will issue the decision. To paraphrase Professor Silberman,
the defendant is more likely to be concerned with whether she will be hanged
than with where. Silberman, supra note 63, at 88.
125. As Justice Brennan has argued, "it would not be sensible to make the
constitutional rule turn solely on the number of miles the defendant must
travel to the courtroom." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 301 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). If universal burdens alone created meaningful inconvenience,
one would expect defendants to challenge the constitutionality of assertions of
jurisdiction even by their home states' courts if sued in a distant county. Such
challenges, however, have been exceedingly rare. See Aguchak v. Montgomery
Ward Co., 520 P.2d 1352, 1357 (Alaska 1974); see also Stein, supra note 107, at
760-61 (noting the "total irrelevance of due process to intrastate assertions of
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The state-specific differential, however, may cause "mean-
ingful inconvenience." The inability to obtain the testimony of
necessary witnesses may deprive the defendant of a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. The imposition of punitive damages, if
none would be available in another forum, may be of enormous
significance. Even procedural laws such as the statute of limi-
tations126 may be outcome-determinative 2 7 These are the bur-
dens that motivate defendants to challenge the personal
jurisdiction of the plaintiff's chosen forum.
If the sum of the universal differential (probably small)
and the state-specific differential (potentially large) does not
constitute meaningful inconvenience, the defendant should be
subject to the forum's jurisdiction regardless of the existence of
"minimum contacts" with the state. Ireland's rejection of hori-
zontal sovereignty strongly implies that the due process clause
permits a state to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent who would not be inconvenienced. 28 The potential in-
fringement on the sovereignty of the defendant's home state is
irrelevant for due process purposes.
If, however, the sum of the universal and state-specific dif-
ferentials would constitute meaningful inconvenience, the fo-
rum must ask whether it may impose these burdens on the
defendant consistent with "traditional notions of fair play and
jurisdiction"). But see Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Per-
sonal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 47 (1984) (argu-
ing that "[i]f fairness to defendants in terms of the site of litigation warrants
constitutional protection, it does not seem appropriate to ignore such unfair-
ness just because the defendant should reasonably anticipate litigation in an-
other portion of a very large state").
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142(1) (1971).
127. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); see also Sun Oil Co. v.
Wortman, 108 S. Ct. 2117, 2120-21 (1988) (holding that the forum state properly
may apply its own statute of limitations to claims governed by the substantive
law of other states where its own statute of limitations would allow the claim);
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 773 (1984) (noting that the fo-
rum was the only state where plaintiff's claim would not have been time-
barred).
128. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's
decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985) cemented
this conclusion:
[T]he Due Process Clause need not and does not afford [absent class
plaintiffs, who shoulder few litigation burdens] as much protection
from state-court jurisdiction as it does [defendants] .... [A] forum
State may exercise jurisdiction over the claim of an absent class-ac-
tion plaintiff, even though that plaintiff may not possess the mini-
mum contacts with the forum which would support personal
jurisdiction over a defendant.
See infra Part IV. A. 2. e.
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substantial justice."'129 In answering this question, courts
should measure the defendant's contacts with the forum to de-
termine whether subjecting her to the "meaningful inconven-
ience" of the forum would be fair and reasonable. 130
Courts have used contacts to justify assertions of jurisdic-
tion over nonresident defendants under at least three theories.
First, courts have used contacts to demonstrate a consensual re-
lationship between the defendant and the forum - that the de-
fendant purposefully has taken advantage of forum law and
therefore may be subjected to the burdens of defending
there.131 Second, courts have relied on the defendant's contacts
with the forum to invoke a tort-like or regulatory justification
for jurisdiction - that the defendant has caused injury in the
forum state and therefore may be subjected to its regulatory
129. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
130. Notwithstanding its rejection of the horizontal sovereignty rationale,
the Ireland Court was reluctant to discard the "minimum contacts" test alto-
gether. Indeed, in the same footnote in which it rejected the sovereignty ra-
tionale, the Court reiterated the "requirement that there be 'minimum
contacts' between the nonresident defendant and the forum State." Insurance
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03
n.10. Some scholars have argued that the "minimum contacts" test has out-
lived its usefulness, and have suggested alternative tests. See supra note 109;
see also Redish, supra note 107, at 1115, 1138-40 (suggesting that a court should
consider the burdens on the defendant, the burdens a denial of jurisdiction
would impose on the plaintiff, and the forum state's interest in applying its
own law).
131. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)
(concluding that "we find... a total absence of those affiliating circumstances
that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction");
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1957) (stating that "it is essential... that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the priv-
ilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws"). Due process "allows potential defendants to
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where
that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit." World-Wide Volk-
swagen, 444 U.S. at 286. See also Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S.
102, 109-13 (1987) (plurality opinion) (reiterating "purposeful availmdnt" ra-
tionale); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977) (noting that plaintiff failed
to demonstrate that defendants "'purposefully avail[ed themselves] of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum'" (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S.
at 253)); Stein, supra note 107, at 714, 735-38 (noting the contradiction between
courts' statements that "consent or exchange" are the "dominant, if not exclu-
sive, jurisdictional justifications," and their actual reliance on regulatory justi-
fications for jurisdiction, and critiquing courts' reliance on constructive
consent and quasi-contract as justifications for jurisdiction); Lewis, supra note
109, at 18-22 (arguing that the Supreme Court's "invariable insistence on pur-
poseful, beneficial contacts misapprehends the limited function of a claim-re-
lated contacts test," which instead should predict the defendant's expectation
of being subject to suit in the forum).
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authority.13 2 Third, to the extent the defendant's contacts with
the forum have been "continuous and systematic," the courts
have treated the defendant as a "local," who may be subject to
forum law because she has "the chance to influence local polit-
ical processes."'1 33 If, based on any of these theories, the non-
resident defendant's contacts with the forum render an
assertion of jurisdiction reasonable, the defendant may be com-
pelled to defend there even if she would suffer "meaningful
inconvenience."
This new jurisdictional test extends International Shoe: it
not only allows jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who
have sufficient contacts with the forum, but also allows jurisdic-
tion over defendants who lack contacts with the forum but who
nevertheless would suffer no meaningful inconvenience if com-
pelled to defend there.
This analysis, which dramatically departs from the horizon-
tal sovereignty rationale for limiting personal jurisdiction, also
supports extraterritorial subpoena power. Because the due pro-
cess clause is the sole limit on both state subpoena power and
personal jurisdiction,'3 states could expand their subpoena
132. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
313 (1950) (stating that "the interest of each state in providing means to close
trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the super-
vision of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish beyond
doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants, resi-
dent or nonresident"); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223
(1940) (stating that "[ilt cannot be denied that California has a manifest inter-
est in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers
refuse to pay claims"); see also Stein, supra note 107, at 747 (stating that "juris-
dictionally significant contacts.., are those that demonstrate a forum state
interest in regulating the conduct at issue in the underlying cause of action").
133. A General Look, supra note 84, at 733. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446-48 (1952) (reasoning that it would
be "fair" to subject the company to suit in Ohio, even on claims not arising out
of the company's Ohio activities, given the great extent to which the president
and general manager conducted the company's nationwide operations out of
Ohio); see also Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462-63 (1940) (allowing general
jurisdiction over nonresident domiciliary); cf Helicopteros Nacionales de Co-
lombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984) (stating that "mere purchases,
even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to warrant a State's as-
sertion of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a cause
of action not related to those purchase transactions").
134. Other constitutional provisions limit the subpoena power in additional
respects. For example, if a state were to assert subpoena power in a discrimi-
natory manner, the power would be restrained by the equal protection clause
or the privileges and immunities clause. Similarly, if a state were to subpoena
an unreasonably broad array of documents, its power would be limited by the
fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
[Vol. 74:37
SUBPOENA POWER
power to reach nonresident witnesses who would suffer no
meaningful inconvenience if compelled to testify in the trial
state. Indeed, the recent jurisdictional cases suggest that even
witnesses who would suffer meaningful inconvenience could be
compelled to testify if they had sufficient contact with the trial
state. The next section of this Article demonstrates, however,
that the states uniformly and steadfastly have refrained from
asserting any subpoena power beyond their boundaries.
III. THE STAGNANT SCOPE OF STATE COURT
SUBPOENA POWER AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF "COMPENSATORY" STATUTORY
SCHEMES
A. THE SUBPOENA STATUTES
The contrast between the states' approaches to personal ju-
risdiction and subpoena power is stark: every state has adopted
a long-arm statute authorizing assertions of personal jurisdic-
tion over nonresident defendants, but not a single state has
adopted a statute authorizing assertions of extraterritorial sub-
poena power over nonparty witnesses. 135
See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-54 (1950). But a
simple assertion of extraterritorial subpoena power, which creates no distinc-
tions and solicits no documents, is limited in its geographic reach only by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Note, Criminal Proce-
dure: Constitutionality of the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Wit-
nesses From Without a State in Criminal Proceedings, 46 CALIF. L. REV. 625,
628-30 & n.29 (1958) [hereinafter California Note].
135. But see the statutes discussed infra Part III. A. 3. Given the Article's
focus on state authority to compel witnesses to appear and give oral testimony
at trial, only those statutes authorizing the issuance of subpoenas ad testifi-
candum are discussed; statutes authorizing the issuance of subpoenas duces te-
cum issued to compel the production of documents or other tangible things are
not considered. As a general rule, subpoenas duces tecum, like subpoenas ad
testificandum, have been restricted to the territory of the state. See, e.g.,
ARIz. R. Civ. P. 45(b), (d); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.410(b), (c); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 45(b),
(e); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1101 (Smith-Hurd 1983). See also 5A J.
MOORE & J. LucAs, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE % 45.09 (2d ed. 1989) (noting
territorial limits on subpoena duces tecum). But see Helge v. Druke, 136 Ariz.
434, 437, 666 P.2d 534, 537 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that subpoena duces tecum
served in Arizona compelled witness to produce records located in California).
Although Part III focuses on the geographic scope of the subpoena power,
it should be noted that some states have imposed other, nongeographic limits
on the availability of trial subpoenas. For example, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-43-
203 (1987) and KY. R. CiV. P. 45.05(2) preclude the issuance of a subpoena to
compel a witness to testify at trial if she already gave a deposition and the dep-
osition may be used as evidence. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-9-101 (Supp. 1988) ex-
empts government officers, judicial officers and clerks, legislators, doctors,
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The states have taken three approaches to defining the ge-
ographic reach of their courts' subpoena power.136 Some states
have limited assertions of subpoena power to a restricted geo-
graphic territory within the state. A majority of the states have
authorized statewide subpoena power. Finally, a few states
have purported to authorize assertions of extraterritorial sub-
poena power. A closer look at the third type of provision, how-
ever, reveals that the states actually have not authorized any
extraterritorial subpoena power, or have done so only with re-
spect to party witnesses already subject to jurisdiction.
1. Statutes Authorizing the Issuance of Subpoenas Within a
Restricted Geographic Territory
Several states restrict the reach of their courts' subpoena
power to an area even more circumscribed than the state.1 3 7
lawyers, dentists, and jailers from trial subpoena; such persons are, however,
subject to deposition subpoena.
136. Every state has enacted at least one statute or rule of court authoriz-
ing its trial courts to issue subpoenas compelling witnesses to appear and tes-
tify. In fact, most states have four separate statutory provisions authorizing
the issuance of subpoenas: (1) compelling witnesses to testify at trials or judi-
cial proceedings in civil actions, see infra Appendix Part II; (2) compelling wit-
nesses to testify at depositions in civil actions, see infra Appendix Part I1; (3)
compelling witnesses to testify at trials or judicial proceedings in criminal
cases, see infra Appendix Part IV; and (4) compelling witnesses to testify at
depositions in criminal cases, see infra Appendix Part VI. Because the sixth
amendment right to confront adverse witnesses precludes the admission of
deposition transcripts in most criminal cases, such depositions are rarely
taken. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); Stores v.
State, 625 P.2d 820, 822-24 (Alaska 1980); National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws, Report of the Committee on Securing Compulsory
Attendance of Non-Resident Witnesses 358-59 (1922) [hereinafter National
Conference Report], reprinted in 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2195e; R.I. R.
CRIM. P. 15 reporter's notes.
In addition to the four statutory provisions described above, all states ex-
cept Nebraska have adopted "helping" statutes, discussed infra Part III. B. 2.,
authorizing the issuance of subpoenas to compel the attendance of in-state wit-
nesses for depositions that will be used at trials or proceedings pending else-
where. See infra Appendix Part IX.
137. See infra Appendix Parts II. A. and III. A., B. and C. Some of these
states limit the reach of the subpoena power in civil cases to an area more cir-
cumscribed than the entire state, while allowing statewide subpoena power in
criminal cases. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-43-211 (1988); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 1, § 5102 (1987); IowA R. CRIM. P. 14(3); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1901 (1985);
OR. REV. STAT. § 136.557 (1987); VT. R. CRIM. P. 17(e); see also D.C. R. CRIM. P.
17(e)(2), discussed infra at notes 165-73 and accompanying text (subpoena di-
rected to witness in felony case may be served at any place within United
States). This difference may reflect the states' recognition of the constitu-
tional imperative that defendants in criminal cases be afforded the opportunity
to confront the witnesses against them, and to compel the testimony of wit-
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Some of these states use county lines to limit the distance a wit-
ness may be compelled to travel to testify at trial. Nebraska,
for example, provides:
[w]itnesses in civil cases cannot be compelled to attend a trial in the
district court out of the state where they are served, nor at a distance
of more than one hundred miles from the place of their residence, or
from the place where they are served with a subpoena, unless within
the same county.1 38
Similarly, many states use county lines to limit the distance
witnesses may be compelled to travel to attend depositions. 39
For example, the Arkansas rule provides that a "witness sub-
poenaed under this subdivision [relating to deposition subpoe-
nas] may be required to attend an examination only in the
county where he resides, or is employed, or transacts his busi-
ness in person, or at such other convenient place as is fixed by
an order of court."'140
Presumably, states employ the county-delimited subpoena
statutes to protect non-party witnesses from inconvenience, but
the statutes are poorly tailored to further that purpose. Non-
party witnesses face differing degrees of inconvenience, de-
pending upon the size of the county in which they reside, work,
or receive service of process.
nesses in their favor. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 16
(1968, amended 1989); IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 13; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13; see
also infra note 220 (noting that states should not necessarily be willing to im-
pose the same inconvenience on witnesses in civil cases as on witnesses in
criminal cases). But compare ALA. CODE § 12-21-246(b) (1986); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1330 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 715
(1969), which respectively provide that a witness in a criminal case cannot be
compelled to travel more than 100 miles from her residence, 150 miles from
her residence, or outside the county of her residence or place of service, unless
the person seeking her appearance submits an affidavit swearing to the mate-
riality of the witness's testimony, with ALA. R. Civ. P. 45(e); CAL. CIv. PRoc.
CODE § 1989 (West 1983); and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2004.1(E) (Supp.
1989), which contain no such restrictions for witnesses in civil cases.
138. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1227 (1985).
139. See infra Appendix Part III. A. Some of the states using the county
line as a proxy for the convenience of the witness also distinguish between res-
idents of the state and nonresidents who happen to be served with a subpoena
there. The Montana provision is typical:
[A] resident of the state may be required to attend an examination
only in the county wherein he resides or is employed or transacts his
business in person, or at such other convenient place as is fixed by an
order of court. A nonresident of the state may be required to attend
in any county of the state wherein he is served with a subpoena or at
any other convenient place as is fixed by order of court.
MONT. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2). See infra Appendix Part III. B.
140. ARK. R. Civ. P. 45(d).
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Several states have avoided this problem by adopting stat-
utes that limit the number of miles a witness may be compelled
to travel to testify at trial 41 or to attend a deposition.14 For
example, Massachusetts provides that "unless the court orders
otherwise, a resident of this Commonwealth shall not be re-
quired to attend an examination at a place more than 50 airline
miles distant from either his residence, place of employment, or
place of business, whichever is nearest to the place to which he
is subpoenaed."'143
Statutes that limit the number of miles a witness may be
compelled to travel protect witnesses from inconvenience bet-
ter than county-based statutes. They determine the distance a
non-party witness reasonably can be expected to travel, and
they protect non-party witnesses from any further inconven-
ience. These statutes render the vagaries of county size
irrelevant.'"
2. Statutes Authorizing Statewide Subpoena Power
A substantial majority of states empower their courts to is-
sue trial subpoenas to witnesses found anywhere within the
state.145 The Pennsylvania statute is typical: "[e]very court of
141. See infra Appendix Part II. B.
142. See infra Appendix Part III. C.
143. MASS. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2). The portion of the Massachusetts rule limit-
ing the distance a nonresident may be compelled to travel to attend a deposi-
tion incorporates a county-based test:
A nonresident of the Commonwealth when served with a subpoena
within the Commonwealth may be required to attend only in that
county wherein he is served, or within 50 airline miles of the place of
service, or at such other convenient place as is fixed by an order of
court.
Id.
144. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 45(d)(2) advisory committee notes on 1985 amend-
ments (stating that "under today's conditions there is no sound reason for dis-
tinguishing between residents.., and nonresidents, and the Rule is amended
to provide that any person may be subpoenaed to attend a deposition within a
specified radius from that person's residence, place of business, or where the
person was served").
145. See infra Appendix Part II. B. Interestingly, several states that pres-
ently sanction statewide subpoena power formerly provided that a witness
could not be compelled to testify outside the county in which she resided or in
which she was served, or more than a specified number of miles from her resi-
dence or the place of service. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-180(b) (1986) (super-
seded by ALA. R. CIV. P. 45); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4076 (1978) (repealed
1980); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1989 (West 1980) (amended 1981); LA. CODE
CIv. PRoc. ANN. art. 1352 (West 1960) (amended 1961); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 390 (West 1981) (repealed 1984); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.56.010 (1963)
(amended 1963).
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record shall have power in any civil... matter to issue subpoe-
nas to testify... into any county of record of this Common-
wealth .. .6. 4 Many states accomplish the same end by
prescribing the entire state as the territory in which the sub-
poena may be served.1 47 For example, the Alaska rule provides
that "a subpoena requiring the attendance of a witness at a
hearing or trial may be served at any place within the state."l 4S
Some states likewise provide that deponents may be re-
quired to attend depositions anywhere within the state. 49
Although few in number, these states apparently have con-
cluded that the flexibility and ease gained by parties and their
counsel in taking discovery outweigh the slight difference in in-
convenience to the witness occasioned by statewide, as opposed
to county-wide, subpoena power for depositions. 50
3. Statutes Purporting to Authorize Extraterritorial
Subpoena Power
Although the vast majority of states provide for either
statewide subpoena power or something even more restrictive,
several jurisdictions have enacted statutes that, at first blush,
appear to expand their courts' subpoena power beyond state
borders. Four kinds of provisions deserve mention.
Six states have enacted subpoena statutes that authorize
service of a subpoena "in the same manner" as a summons.' 5'
146. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5905 (Purdon 1982). See infra Appendix
Part II. B. 1.
147. See infra Appendix Part II. B. 2.
148. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 45(e).
149. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1989 (West 1983); DEL. SUPER. CT.
Cirv. R. 45(d); R.I. R. Cirv. P. 45(c), (d); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-18-7 (1985).
150. Two of the states providing for statewide subpoena power to compel
attendance at depositions - Delaware and Rhode Island - are relatively
small states.
151. See IND. R. Civ. P. 45(C) (stating that "service [of a subpoena] may be
made in the same manner as provided in Rule 4.1" (which discusses methods
of serving process on an individual)); LA. CODE CIV. PRoc. ANN. art. 1355
(West 1984) (stating that "a subpoena shall be served... in the same manner
and with the same effect as a service of... a citation"); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. &
R. 2303 (McKinney 1989) (stating that "a subpoena shall be served in the same
manner as a summons"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 15-6-45(c) (1988) (author-
izing service of a subpoena "in the same manner as a summons is served,
excepting that no service by publication is authorized"); UTAH R. Civ. P. 45(c)
(stating that "a subpoena may be served as provided in Rule 4(d) for the ser-
vice of process" (which provides for service of process in other states and for-
eign countries)); W. VA. R. CiV. P. 45(c) (stating that "service of a subpoena...
shall be made in the same manner provided for service of process under Rule
4(d)(1)(A)" (which discusses methods of serving process on an individual)).
1989]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
All of these states have long-arm statutes, which authorize ser-
vice of a summons outside the state if the state otherwise has
jurisdiction over the defendant. 152 These subpoena statutes
therefore would appear to authorize extraterritorial subpoena
power over witnesses who have sufficient contact with the trial
state to be subject to its personal jurisdiction.
In fact, however, courts have refused to read these statutes
so broadly. New York courts, for example, have declined to in-
terpret the New York statute as authorizing extraterritorial
subpoena power, and have held that "had the legislature in-
tended to enlarge the power of the Court by permitting it to
subpoena persons not found in the state, it would have said so
clearly."153
One interpretation reconciles the plain language of such
provisions with the courts' restrictive reading: the section au-
thorizing service of a subpoena "in the same manner" as a sum-
mons may control only the method of service (service in-hand
or by mail, for example) and not the geographic reach of the
152. See infra Appendix Part I.
153. Beach v. Lost Mountain Manor, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d 563, 564-65, 279
N.Y.S.2d 93, 94-95 (Sup. Ct. 1967); accord DuPont v. Bronston, 46 A.D.2d 369,
371, 362 N.Y.S.2d 471, 473 (App. Div. 1974); Israel Discount Bank Ltd. v. P.S.
Prods. Corp., 65 Misc. 2d 1002, 1003, 319 N.Y.S.2d 554, 555 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Sie-
mens & Halske v. Gres, 37 A.D.2d 768, 768, 324 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (App. Div.
1971) (per curiam). This restrictive interpretation is supported by § 2-b of the
New York Judiciary Law, enacted contemporaneously with the Civil Practice
Law and Rules, which grants courts of record the power "to issue a subpoena
requiring the attendance of a person found in the state." New York Judiciary
Law § 2-b, quoted in Beach, 53 Misc. 2d at 565, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 94 (emphasis in
original).
Although the courts' construction of the New York statute may seem un-
duly restrictive, it is consistent with the approach taken by two other states
having similar service-of-a-subpoena like service-of-a-summons provisions.
Utah and West Virginia statutes authorize service of a subpoena in "the same
manner provided for service of process," and explicitly provide that "a sub-
poena may [only] be served at any place within the State." W. VA. R. CIv. P.
45(c); see also UTAH R. Civ. P. 45(c), (e). These statutes support the New York
courts' conclusion that the phrase "in the same manner" does not refer to the
territorial reach of the process.
One could, however, read the Utah and West Virginia statutes in such a
way as to undermine the New York courts' construction of the New York stat-
ute. Because the Utah and West Virginia legislatures specifically added that
"a subpoena may [only] be served at any place within the State," they may
have believed that in the absence of such qualifying language, the service-of-a-
subpoena like service-of-a-summons provision would have authorized extrater-
ritorial subpoena power. Since the New York legislature did not add the quali-
fying language, the New York statute should be read as authorizing
extraterritorial service.
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subpoena.154 Thus interpreted, statutes authorizing service of a
subpoena "in the same manner as a summons" do not authorize
extraterritorial subpoena power at all.155
The Colorado and North Dakota rules of criminal proce-
154. Such a construction would be consistent with the construction the
lower federal courts have given Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e). Rule
4(e) provides, in pertinent part:
[W]henever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district
court is held provides... for service of a summons.., upon a party
not an inhabitant of or found within the state ... service may... be
made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the
statute or rule.
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e) (emphasis added). The phrase "under the circumstances"
has been construed as limiting the scope of a federal district court's personal
jurisdiction to that of a state court in the state in which the federal court sits
when the defendant has been served in accordance with a state long-arm stat-
ute. See, e.g., DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1266-67 (5th Cir.
1983); Burstein v. State Bar of California, 693 F.2d 511, 523 (5th Cir. 1982); see
also 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MInLER, supra note 10, § 1075 (interpreting Rule 4(e)'s
phrase "under the circumstances"). The unstated corollary to this construction
of "under the circumstances" is that the phrase "in the manner" refers only to
the method of service of process.
155. Two of the other service-of-a-subpoena like service-of-a-summons stat-
utes require further discussion. The Indiana provision, which authorizes "ser-
vice [of a subpoena] . . . in the same manner as provided in Rule 4.1 [for
serving process on an individual]," then states:
[A] subpoena may be served at any place within the state; and when
permitted by the laws of the United States, this or another state or
foreign country, the court upon proper application and cause shown
may authorize the service of a subpoena outside the state in accord-
ance with and as permitted by such law.
IND. R. Civ. P. 45(C), 45(E) (emphasis added).
The notes and annotations following the provision do not reveal any "laws
of the United States, [Indiana] or another state or foreign country," that actu-
ally "authorize the service of a subpoena outside the state." Thus, Indiana's
promise of extraterritorial subpoena power has yet to bear fruit. See infra
notes 156-60 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado and North Dakota
rules).
The Louisiana statute provides that "a witness, whether a party or not,
who resides or is employed in this state may be subpoenaed to attend a trial or
hearing wherever held within this state." LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1352
(West 1984) (emphasis added). Because Louisiana authorizes service of the
subpoena in "the same manner and with the same effect as a service of... a
citation," LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1355 (West 1984), and since its long-
arm statute permits out-of-state service of a citation upon a defendant over
whom the court has personal jurisdiction, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:3201,
13:3204 (West 1968 & Supp. 1989), these provisions appear to allow for out-of-
state service of a subpoena upon a nonresident who works in the state. Still,
the Official Revision comments to art. 1355 suggest that the subpoena statute
incorporates by reference arts. 231-65, which pertain to methods of service of
process only, rather than the long-arm provisions found in sections 13:3201 and
13:3204. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1355 official revision comments (West
1984).
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dure adopt a second type of extraterritorial subpoena statute.
These rules provide that a trial subpoena in a criminal case
may be served anywhere in the state,156 and that "[s]ervice on a
witness outside this state shall be made ... as provided by
law.'u 5 7 Although these provisions imply that extraterritorial
subpoena power may be available in certain circumstances, in
fact the states never have asserted such power.15 A North Da-
kota Supreme Court case suggests that the only way to compel
attendance of an out-of-state witness, even in a criminal case, is
through the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses
From Without a State in Criminal Proceedings,' 5 9 which re-
quires reliance on the subpoena power of the state in which the
witness resides. 60 Colorado and North Dakota rules thus make
only empty promises of extraterritorial subpoena power.
Several states have enacted a third type of extraterritorial
subpoena statute, authorizing their courts to compel parties,
even nonresidents, to attend depositions in the state. For ex-
ample, a Kansas statute provides that "a party or employee of a
party, whether a resident or nonresident of the state, may be
required by order of the court to attend an examination at any
place designated by the court.' 6 ' Some of these statutes reach
156. COLO. R. CRiM. P. 17(e)(1); N.D. R. CRM. P. 17(e)(1).
157. COLO. R. CpxiM. P. 17(e)(2); N.D. R. CRim. P. 17(e)(2).
158. The notes and annotations following the sections reveal no "law" that
actually allows for such extraterritorial service, or any case effecting such ser-
vice. Id.
159. 11 U.L.A. 5 (1974) [hereinafter UNiF. ACT TO SECURE ATTENDANCE].
See infra Appendix Part V.
160. State v. Larson, 277 N.W.2d 120, 122-23 (N.D. 1979). Cf. COLO. R.
CRim. P. 17(e)(1), (2) cross references (stating that the procedure for summon-
ing witnesses from other states to testify is determined by Colorado's codifica-
tion of the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance, which also requires judicial
reliance on subpoena power of the nonresident witness's home state).
161. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-245(e)(2) (1983). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110A, para. 203 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988) (stating that a plaintiff, whether or
not an Illinois resident, may be required to appear for a deposition in the
county in which the action is pending; the court may order a party, whether or
not an Illinois resident, to appear in Illinois "or elsewhere"); IND. R. TRIAL P.
45(D)(2) (stating that a nonresident plaintiff may be required to attend a depo-
sition at her own expense in the county in Indiana in which the action was
commenced or in a county fixed by the court); MD. R. Civ. P. 2-413(b) (stating
that a party may be required to attend in the county in which the action is
pending); MD. R. CIv. P. 2-510(a) (a party over whom the court has acquired
jurisdiction may be required by subpoena to attend a deposition). For a discus-
sion of the Illinois statute, see Johnston, Discovery in Illinois and Federal
Courts, 15 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1, 42-43 (1982).
In the absence of statutory provisions specifically authorizing courts to re-
quire nonresident parties to appear in the trial state for depositions, state
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only nonresident plaintiffs, and may be premised on a waiver
theory: a person who commences an action in a distant forum
waives any right to object to the taking of discovery in that fo-
rum.162 To the extent, however, that these statutes require
nonresident defendants to appear for depositions in the trial
state, they recognize that a person already subject to the court's
personal jurisdiction should be subject to the court's subpoena
power as well.163
courts have concluded that they lack the authority to compel even nonresident
parties to attend depositions in the state. See, e.g., People ex reL Prince v. Gra-
ber, 397 Ill. 522, 526-27, 74 N.E.2d 865, 867 (1947) (stating that court lacked
power to compel nonresident plaintiff to appear for deposition or to testify at
trial); Season-Sash Mfg. Co. v. Pancake, 421 N.E.2d 652, 653 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981) (reasoning that statute providing that nonresident plaintiffs could be re-
quired to give deposition in state did not authorize issuance of subpoena to
compel in-state attendance of nonresident defendant); Equitable Life Assur-
ance Soc'y v. Hardin, 166 Ky. 51, 60-61, 178 S.W. 1155, 1158-59 (1915) (holding
that officers and agents of corporate defendant residing outside Kentucky
could not be compelled to give deposition testimony in Kentucky; corporate
defendant could not be compelled to produce documents in Kentucky); Chee-
ver v. Scott, 38 N.H. 32, 33-34 (1859) (holding that defendant, a New York citi-
zen, could not be compelled to give deposition in New Hampshire, where
action was pending); Siemens & Halske v. Gres, 37 A.D.2d 768, 768, 324
N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (App. Div. 1971) (per curiam) (stating that court lacked
power to subpoena nonresident judgment debtor to testify about her assets);
Israel Discount Bank Ltd. v. P.S. Prods. Corp., 65 Misc. 2d 1002, 1003-04, 319
N.Y.S.2d 554, 555-56 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (stating that court lacked power to sub-
poena nonresident judgment debtor); Grumme v. Vuxton, 1 Pa. D. & C. 3d
456, 459-61 (Dist. Ct. 1976) (emphasizing that court had no "physical" power to
compel nonresident defendant to appear in state for deposition, but court had
power to impose sanctions on party over whom it had jurisdiction if the party
refused to participate in discovery). But see Allen v. American Land Research,
95 Wash. 2d 841, 850-51, 631 P.2d 930, 936 (1981) (holding that court had "con-
tinuing jurisdiction" over the parties for purposes of enforcing the judgment).
162. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 203 supplement to historical and
practice note (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); cf N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 3110(1)
practice commentary C3110:7 (McKinney 1970) (stating that "even if the non-
resident party is the plaintiff .... the court will adjust disclosure requirements
to balance justice on both sides"). For a discussion and rejection of the theory
that a plaintiff who seeks redress for physical or mental injuries "waives" his
right to claim the "inviolability of his person," see Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379
U.S. 104, 113-14 (1964) (discussing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941)).
163. Interestingly, most of the statutes cited supra note 161 do not actually
authorize assertions of extraterritorial subpoena power. They instead author-
ize the trial court to "order" the nonresident party to appear in the trial state.
The states' willingness to authorize these extraterritorial orders with respect
to parties may prove useful in explaining their hesitancy to subpoena nonparty
witnesses found outside their borders. State sovereignty and interstate feder-
alism must not be the concerns underlying the states' general reluctance, for
such concerns are implicated even when the witness is a party. Concerns
about the enforceability of extraterritorial subpoenas and the convenience of
the witness, however, are greater (though by no means insurmountable) when
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Finally, the District of Columbia has adopted the most au-
dacious subpoena provisions. The District of Columbia rule au-
thorizing the service of subpoenas in civil trials provides that a
subpoena may be served anywhere within the district, and at
any place even outside the District within twenty-five miles of
the place of hearing or trial.-64
The District of Columbia rule authorizing the service of
subpoenas in criminal actions is even bolder, allowing service in
felony cases "at any place within the United States."'1 65 These
rules, which invest the Superior Court of the District of Colum-
bia with the subpoena power Congress granted when it enacted
section 11-942 of the D.C. Code, 166 unabashedly authorize asser-
the witness is a stranger to the action rather than a party. See infra Parts IV.
A. and C.
164. D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 45(e); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-942(a)
(1981) (substantially identical to Rule 45(e)).
165. D.C. R. CRiu. P. 17(e). The criminal rule was designed to give the Su-
perior Court "the same subpoena power conferred on the Federal district
courts." S. REP. No. 91-405, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1969); Christian v. United
States, 394 A.2d 1, 42 (D.C. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Clark v. United States,
442 U.S. 944 (1979); accord H.R. REP. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 138
(1970). Prior to the adoption of the District of Columbia Court Reform and
Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (1970) (codi-
fied as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to -2504 (1981 & Supp. 1988)), the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia had jurisdiction over
all felonies committed within the District of Columbia (except where the de-
fendant was less than eighteen years of age), including those committed in vio-
lation of "local" law. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 392 n.2 (1973);
D.C. CODE ENCYCLOPEDIA ANN. §§ 11-521(a)(2), 11-1551(a)(2) (West 1966)
(amended 1970); Note, Legislative History of the District of Columbia Courts,
20 AM. U.L. REV. 657, 663 (1971). Thus, even a defendant charged with a viola-
tion of the District of Columbia Code would be tried by a United States Dis-
trict Court with nationwide subpoena power. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(e)(1). When
Congress revamped the District of Columbia court system in 1970, it vested the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia with exclusive jurisdiction over vir-
tually all criminal cases, including felonies, brought under laws applicable ex-
clusively to the District. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 392 n.2 (citing D.C. CODE
ENCYCLOPEDIA ANN. §§ 11-502(3), 11-923(b) (West Supp. 1970)) (current ver-
sion at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-502(3), 11-923(6) (1989)). Because nationwide
subpoena power previously had been available in criminal prosecutions for vio-
lations of District of Columbia law, Congress "allow[ed] the superior court to
have the same means of compelling witnesses as [previously had been] avail-
able in local felony trials held in the U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia." S. REP. No. 91-405, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1969); accord H.R. REP.
No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1970).
166. Section 11-942(a) provides that "[a] subpoena [issued by the clerk of
the Superior Court] may be served at any place within the District of Colum-
bia, or at any place without the District of Columbia that is within twenty-five
miles of the place of the hearing or trial specified in the subpoena." D.C.
CODE ANN. § 11-942(a) (1981). Section 942(b) provides that "[a] subpoena in a
criminal case in which a felony is charged may be served at any place within
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tions of extraterritorial subpoena power over non-party
witnesses.
At least one District of Columbia decision suggests that its
extraterritorial subpoenas are enforceable. In the case of In re
Ragland,167 a witness was served in Philadelphia with a District
of Columbia subpoena, requiring her to testify at a criminal
trial in the District of Columbia. When the witness failed to
appear, the District of Columbia court held her in criminal con-
tempt.16 8 Although the opinion upholding the conviction for
criminal contempt does not discuss how the witness was noti-
fied of the contempt proceeding or how the conviction would be
executed, it demonstrates the efficacy of contempt as a mecha-
nism for enforcing extraterritorial subpoenas. 169 Granted, the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia is not a state court
and may have fewer problems enforcing extraterritorial sub-
poenas than state courts.17 0 Nevertheless, because District of
Columbia courts are more like state trial courts than federal
district courts,' 7 ' the enforceability of their extraterritorial sub-
poenas implies the enforceability of extraterritorial subpoenas
issued by the states.
Similarly, because the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment measures both the scope of the District of Colum-
bia courts' jurisdictional reach and the scope of state court ju-
the United States upon order of a judge of the court." D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-
942(b) (1981).
167. 343 A.2d 558 (D.C. 1975). This is the only case identified in the anno-
tations following the District of Columbia subpoena provisions that sheds any
light on the enforceability of extraterritorial subpoenas.
168. Id. at 559.
169. See infra Part IV. C.
170. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia was created by Con-
gress, see District of Columbia Court.Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (1970) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 11-101 to -2504 (1981 & Supp. 1988)), and may have greater enforce-
ment authority than the state trial courts. See, e.g., D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P.
4(f) (authorizing extraterritorial service of order of commitment for civil
contempt).
171. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia is an article I court
rather than an article III court. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-101(2)(B) (1981); see Pal-
more v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 398 (1973). The Palmore court noted that
"the focus of [the] work [of the superior court] is primarily upon cases arising
under the District of Columbia Code and to other matters of strictly local con-
cern." Id. at 407. The superior court is part of a "wholly separate court system
designed primarily to concern itself with local law and to serve as a local court
system for a large metropolitan area." Id. at 408. The superior court thus is
"the equivalent of a full-fledged state judicial system." 14 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3681 (1985).
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risdiction,172 assertions of extraterritorial subpoena power by
the states should be constitutional if the District of Columbia
provisions are constitutional. 73 Apparently, no one has chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the District of Columbia
provisions.
The District of Columbia provisions are significant both be-
cause they demonstrate Congressional understanding of the im-
portance of live testimony, even at the cost of significant
inconvenience to nonparty witnesses, and because they imply
the constitutionality and enforceability of assertions of extra-
territorial subpoena power by the states. Not a single state,
however, has followed the lead of the District of Columbia by
actually authorizing its courts to assert extraterritorial sub-
poena power over nonparty witnesses.
B. THE "COMPENSATORY" STATUTORY SCHEMES
Because the states have failed to authorize extraterritorial
subpoena power, state courts cannot compel nonresident wit-
172. The District of Columbia long-arm statute, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 13-421
to -425 (1981 & Supp. 1988), was adopted by Congress as part of the District of
Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
358, 84 Stat. 473 (1970) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to -
2504 (1981 & Supp. 1988)). In assessing the constitutionality of assertions of
personal jurisdiction pursuant to the District of Columbia long-arm statute,
both federal and District of Columbia local courts have applied the United
States Supreme Court cases defining the outer limits of state court jurisdiction
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Meyers
v. Smith, 460 F. Supp. 621, 622-23 (D.D.C. 1978); Unidex Sys. Corp. v. Butz
Eng'g Corp., 406 F. Supp. 899, 901 (D.D.C. 1976); Environmental Research Int'l
v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 810-811 (D.C. 1976) (en banc).
173. Of course, one could argue that because the District of Columbia
courts were created by Congress, they are instrumentalities of the United
States whose jurisdictional scope is limited not by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, but by the fifth amendment. See, e.g., District of Co-
lumbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 (1973) (holding that the District of Colum-
bia is not a state within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment). Because
all citizens owe allegiance to the United States, they are arguably subject to
the subpoena power of its courts (including the District of Columbia courts)
from anywhere within the territory of the sovereign. Applied to the states,
this vertical sovereignty rationale supports statewide subpoena power, but not
extraterritorial subpoena power by the state courts. See infra Part IV. A. 2. b.
for a discussion of Blackmer v. United States, 359 U.S. 1 (1959) (upholding the
Walsh Act by applying a sovereignty rationale), and the ways in which Black-
mer may be recast to support the constitutionality of extraterritorial subpoena
power by state courts. Cf Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects and Surveyors
v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600-01 (1976) (holding that residents of Puerto
Rico are protected by the due process clause of either the fifth amendment or
the fourteenth amendment); accord Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668 n.5 (1974).
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nesses to appear and testify at trial. Apparently to compensate
for this gap in judicial power and to ensure that at least the
witnesses' deposition testimony is available at trial, states have
enacted complex statutory schemes.174 Three statutory provi-
sions are necessary for a party in the trial state to depose a non-
party witness in the witness's home state and use the transcript
of the deposition as evidence at trial: the trial state must have
adopted both a "commission" statute and a "use of deposition"
statute, and the home state must have adopted a "helping"
statute. 7 5
1. Commission Statutes
The states authorize parties to an action to take pretrial
depositions of nonresident witnesses outside the state. Several
states explicitly provide that "[a] person who is not a party may
be required to attend a deposition outside of this State in ac-
cordance with the law of the place where the deposition is
held."'1 76 Most states, however, have authorized the taking of
174. Harvard Note, supra note 37, at 123-24.
175. In addition to the statutory schemes discussed infra Part III. B., the
states have enacted separate provisions enabling courts to obtain and use the
deposition testimony of out-of-state witnesses in criminal cases. See infra Ap-
pendix Parts VIII. and XI. This section of the Article will not discuss these
criminal provisions for two reasons. First, the Uniform Act to Secure Attend-
ance, discussed infra Part III. B. 4., allows the trial state to obtain the live tes-
timony of material witnesses for use in criminal cases, thereby greatly
reducing the need for deposition testimony. Second, given constitutional con-
straints, depositions in criminal cases are rarely taken or offered into evidence.
See supra note 136.
Within the civil litigation context, this section of the Article will limit dis-
cussion to statutes assuring availability of deposition testimony of nonresident
witnesses at trial. It will not consider provisions authorizing the taking of
depositions of nonresident witnesses to discover other admissible evidence.
For a discussion of such provisions, see Mullin, Interstate Deposition Statutes:
Survey and Analysis, 11 U. BALT. L. REv. 1, 7-12 (1981).
176. MD. R. Civ. P. 2-413(a)(2). See also MONT. R. Civ. P. 28(e); R.I. GEN.
LAWs § 9-18-5 (1985); TEX. R. Civ. P.188(1) (each requiring nonparties to at-
tend depositions outside state in accordance with law of state in which deposi-
tion is taken). But see IOWA R. CIV. P. 147(a), which provides that:
[O]ral depositions may be taken only in this state, or outside it at a
place within one hundred miles from the nearest Iowa point. But, on
hearing, on notice, of a motion of a party desiring it, the court may
order it orally taken at any other specified place, if the issue is suffi-
ciently important and the testimony cannot reasonably be obtained on
written interrogatories [pursuant to Rule 150].
Id. (emphasis added). In Iowa, then, parties needing the testimony of wit-
nesses residing more than 100 miles from Iowa can obtain it only through writ-
ten interrogatories unless the court makes a special finding.
At least two other states specifically provide for the taking of out-of-state
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depositions outside the trial state by enacting statutes that iden-
tify the parties before whom a deposition may be taken.177 By
including persons authorized by the laws of another state to ad-
minister oaths, these statutes implicitly recognize that deposi-
tions may be taken outside the state for use within the state.'7 8
Most of these commission statutes are modeled after Rule 28 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure179 or section 3.01 of the
Uniform Procedure Act.18 0
depositions on written interrogatories. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3108 (Mc-
Kinney 1970); Wis. STAT. § 887.26(1) (1987-88). Although the courts of both
states appear to have authority to order extrastate depositions on oral ques-
tions as well, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 3108 practice commentary C3108:2 (Mc-
Kinney 1970); Wis. STAT. § 804.03(1) law review commentaries (1987-88), the
practice commentary to the New York statute indicates that "written ques-
tions are preferred" for "reasons of economy." N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 3108
practice commentary C3108:5 (McKinney 1970).
177. These statutes will be referred to as "commission" statutes. See infra
Appendix Part VII.
178. "They may be taken wherever the party noticing the taking of the
depositions desires .... But a subpoena to require the witness to attend the
deposition will not run outside the [trial] state." ALA. R. CIV. P. 28 committee
comments to amendment.
179. Rule 28 provides, in pertinent part:
[W]ithin the United States... depositions shall be taken before an of-
ficer authorized to administer oaths by the laws of the United States
or of the place where the examination is held, or before a person ap-
pointed by the court in which the action is pending. A person so ap-
pointed has power to administer oaths and take testimony.
FED. R. Civ. P. 28(a). Rule 28(b) identifies the persons before whom deposi-
tions may be taken in foreign countries and provides for the issuance of com-
missions and letters rogatory. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b). Many, but certainly not
all, states modeling their provisions on Rule 28 have modified it to permit the
taking of depositions before officers authorized to administer oaths by the laws
of the trial state (rather than, or in addition to, the laws of the United States).
See infra Appendix Part VII. A.
180. UNiF. PRoc. AcT § 3.01, 13 U.L.A. 355, 388 (1986). Section 3.01 of the
Uniform Procedure Act provides that depositions may be taken not only
before persons authorized to administer oaths by the laws of the home state,
but also before persons commissioned by the court, pursuant to a letter roga-
tory, or before any person stipulated to by the parties.
Not all state statutes are as flexible as Rule 28 or the Uniform Procedure
Act. Some states specify with greater particularity the persons before whom
depositions may be taken. The Connecticut statute, for example, provides:
[I]n any other state.. ., depositions for use in a civil action... within
this state shall be taken before a notary public, a commissioner ap-
pointed by the governor of this state, a magistrate having power to ad-
minister oaths or a person commissioned by the court before which
such action.., is pending ....
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-148c(b) (West Supp. 1989). See also FLA. R. Civ.
P. 1.300(a); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 492.090(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 517:2 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-18-5 (1985); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 20.001(b) (Vernon 1986) (each requiring particular persons to
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Because some states will issue a subpoena to compel at-
tendance of a witness for a deposition sought by another state
only if that other state actually has issued a commission or
taken other action,18 1 many of the commission statutes allow
depositions to be taken before "a person appointed by the court
in which the action is pending," or a commissioner. 8 2 Some
state statutes provide even more explicitly for the issuance of a
commission by the trial state.'8 3
2. Helping Statutes
Even if the trial state adopts a commission statute to au-
thorize the taking of a nonresident witness's deposition in an-
other state, the trial state cannot compel that witness's
attendance or testimony without the aid of the witness's home
state. Given this limitation, and in the interest of comity, the
states have enacted statutes that permit their courts to issue
the process necessary to compel witnesses found within their
territory to appear for depositions to be used in proceedings
pending in other states. 8
4
take depositions). Other statutes are less specific than Rule 28 or the Uniform
Procedure Act. For example, the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides
that "[a) deposition shall be taken before an officer authorized to administer
oaths, who is not an employee or attorney of any of the parties or otherwise
interested in the outcome of the case." LA. CODE Civ. PROC. ANN. art. 1434
(West 1987).
181. See infra note 187. For example, the Historical and Practice Notes to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 205 provide that "counsel desiring to take deposi-
tions in another state... should examine the law of the jurisdiction in which
the depositions will be taken to ascertain whether a dedimus potestatum or
commission will be required and how to compel the attendance of witnesses."
ILL. S. CT. R. 205 historical and practice notes.
182. See infra Appendix Part VII. B; FED. R. Civ. P. 28(a) (discussed supra
note 179); UNIF. PROC. ACT § 3.01, 13 U.L.A. at 355 (discussed supra note 180).
183. ARIz. R. Civ. P. 28(a). See also infra Appendix Part VII. B. Cf VA.
SUP. CT. R. 4:3(c) (providing that "[n]o commission by the Governor of this
Commonwealth shall be necessary to take a deposition whether within or
without this Commonwealth").
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28(b) explicitly authorizes the issuance of
a commission or letters rogatory only in cases where the deposition is to be
taken in a foreign country. Several states have mirrored Rule 28 so closely
that they, too, authorize the issuance of a commission when the deposition is
to be taken in a foreign country, but fail to authorize the issuance of a commis-
sion when the deposition is to be taken in another state. See infra Appendix
Part VII. C.
184. These statutes will be referred to as "helping" statutes. See infra Ap-
pendix Part IX. For a more thorough discussion of the different varieties of
helping statutes, see Mullin, supra note 175, at 7-12.
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Many different varieties of helping statutes exist,185 includ-
ing two uniform acts.18 6 The statutes differ in four important
respects. First, although some of the helping statutes authorize
the home state court to subpoena a witness to appear for a dep-
osition for use in the trial state only if the trial state court has
certified a need for the witness's testimony or has otherwise
acted, other statutes allow for the issuance of the deposition
subpoena even in the absence of such action by the trial state
court. For example, the courts in six states are authorized to
issue a subpoena only if the trial state has issued a mandate,
185. According to one author, there are "[m]ore than thirty-three varia-
tions of foreign deposition statutes... among the fifty-one jurisdictions." Mul-
lin, supra note 175, at 3-4.
186. UNIF. FOREIGN DEPOsrnoNs AcT §§ 1-5, 9B U.L.A. 60, 60-63 (1966)
[hereinafter UNIF. DEPOSITION ACT], superseded by UNIF. PROC. AT, §§ 1.01-
6.06, 13 U.L.A. 355, 355-405 (1986 & Supp. 1989), was approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1920. It provides:
Whenever any mandate, writ or commission is issued out of any court
of record in any other state. . ., or whenever upon notice or agree-
ment it is required to take the testimony of a witness or witnesses in
this state, witnesses may be compelled to appear and testify in the
same manner and by the same process and proceedings as may be em-
ployed for the purpose of taking testimony in proceedings pending in
this state.
UNIF. DEPOSrrION ACT § 1, 9B U.L.A. 60, 62 (1966). Although the Uniform
Deposition Act was adopted by eighteen states, the Panama Canal Zone, and
the Virgin Islands as of 1966, id. at 60, it is presently in place in only ten states.
See infra Appendix Part IX. A.
The Commissioners approved the Uniform Procedure Act in 1962, which
supersedes the Uniform Deposition Act. UNIF. PRoC. ACT, 13 U.L.A. 355
(1986). It provides:
[A] court of this state may order a person who is domiciled or is found
within this state to give his testimony or statement or to produce doc-
uments or other things for use in a proceeding in a tribunal outside
this state. The order may be made upon the application of any inter-
ested person or in response to a letter rogatory and may prescribe the
practice and procedure, which may be wholly or in part the practice
and procedure of the tribunal outside this state, for taking the testi-
mony or statement or producing the documents or other things. To
the extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the practice
and procedure shall be in accordance with that of the court of this
state issuing the order. The order may direct that the testimony or
statement be given.., before a person' appointed by the court. The
person appointed shall have power to administer any necessary oath.
Id § 3.02(a), 13 U.L.A. at 391-92. Four states, the District of Columbia, and the
Virgin Islands have adopted all or part of the Uniform Procedure Act. See in-
fra Appendix Part IX. B. Of the six jurisdictions adopting the Uniform Proce-
dure Act, two have omitted section 3.02(a). See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-103
(1987); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 13-421 to -434 (1987). Oklahoma, which had adopted
the Uniform Procedure Act but later repealed most of it, has retained this sec-
tion. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1703.02 (West 1980).
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writ, dedimus potestatem, or commission.1 8 7 Both the Uniform
Procedure Act and the Uniform Deposition Act, in contrast, au-
thorize issuance of a subpoena to compel a witness in the home
state to attend a deposition there for use in the trial state even
in the absence of an order from the trial state court. 88
Second, the helping statutes require differing degrees of in-
volvement from the court in the home state. The Uniform Pro-
cedure Act, for example, requires that an application be made
to "a court" in the home state, which is authorized to order the
prospective witness to appear and testify at a deposition in the
home state. 8 9 Similarly, several other state statutes require
that the person seeking to take a deposition in the home state
petition the home state court for a subpoena.190 The Uniform
Deposition Act, in contrast, provides that the prospective wit-
ness may be compelled to testify "in the same manner and by
the same process" as witnesses whose deposition testimony is
needed for actions pending in the witness's home state.19' Be-
cause many states authorize clerks to issue deposition subpoe-
nas, no judicial action in such states is required. Other states
specify in their helping statutes that the clerk of the home state
court may issue a subpoena upon the request of a party from
the trial state.192 Several other states provide that a commis-
sioner or other person appointed by the trial state to take a
deposition in the home state shall have the authority to issue
187. ARK. R. Civ. P. 28(c) (commission); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-111
(1987) (court authorization); KY. R. Crv. P. 28.03 (commission); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 9-18-11 (1985) (commission); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 20.002
(Vernon 1986) (mandate, writ, or commission); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1248
(1973) (appointment or commission). See also Mullin, supra note 175, at 17
(discussing Arkansas, Colorado, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Ver-
mont provisions).
188. Under the Uniform Deposition Act, a notice of deposition or agree-
ment between the parties is enough to obtain a subpoena from the home state
court. UNin. DEPOSITION ACT § 1, 9B U.L.A. 60, 62 (1966). See infra Appendix
Part IX. C. Under the Uniform Procedure Act, the home state may issue a
subpoena "upon the application of any interested person or in response to a
letter rogatory ..... UNIF. PROC. ACT § 3.02(a), 13 U.L.A. 355, 392 (1986). Sev-
eral other state statutes permit the issuance of a subpoena when any officer or
person is "authorized" by the law of the trial state to take a deposition in the
home state. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 204(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1988); MCH. R. Civ. P. 2.305(E); WAsH. SUPER. CT. R. CIr. P. 45(d)(4).
189. UNIF. PROC. ACT § 3.02, 13 U.L.A. 355, 392 (1986).
190. See infra Appendix Part IX. D.
191. UNIF. DEPOSITION ACT § 1, 9B U.L.A. 60, 62 (1966).
192. See, e.g., ME. R. Civ. P. 30(h)(2); NEv. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3); S.C. R. Civ.
P. 28(d)(1); UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(h).
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subpoenas in the home state1 93
Third, at least two states assist in compelling a witness to
attend a deposition only if the state where the deposition will
be used has adopted a statute furnishing reciprocal aid.194
Finally, the helping statutes contain different choice of law
provisions governing the taking of depositions. The Uniform
Procedure Act, for example, provides that the "practice and
procedure" to be used in the taking of the deposition, although
determined by the witness's home state, may "be wholly or in
part the practice and procedure of the tribunal outside this
state."'195 The Uniform Deposition Act, on the other hand,
mandates that the home state's practice and procedure
govern.196
Despite these significant differences among the helping
statutes, one general conclusion emerges: the helping statutes
facilitate only the taking of deposition testimony in the wit-
ness's home state, and not the taking of live testimony in the
193. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.84 (West Supp. 1989); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 13-3-97 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 492.100 (Vernon 1952); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 517:18 (1974). The subpoenas issued by the commissioner or
other appointed person are enforceable by the courts in the home state. IOWA
CODE ANN. § 622.84 (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 492.270(1) (Vernon
Supp. 1989); accord Benckenstein v. Schott, 92 Ohio St. 29, 38-40, 110 N.E. 633,
635-36 (1915). If these states are the most flexible in terms of making subpoe-
nas available without the involvement of the home state judiciary, the state of
Arizona is the most stringent: it requires that the party seeking the deposition
of an Arizona witness for use elsewhere actually commence a civil action in
Arizona. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(h).
194. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-412 (1987) (stating that "[t]he privilege ex-
tended to persons in other states by § 8.01-411 [Virginia's helping statute] shall
only apply to those states which extended the same privilege to persons in this
Commonwealth"); Wis. STAT. § 887.24 (1987-88) (stating that a deposition may
be taken in Wisconsin for use in another state "provided, its laws contain pro-
visions similar to this section, requiring persons within its borders to give their
testimony by deposition in actions pending in Wisconsin"). For a discussion of
the significance of these reciprocity requirements, see infra Part IV. B. 2. c.
195. UNiF. PRoc. AcT § 3.02, 13 U.L.A. 355, 391-92 (1986). The Uniform
Procedure Act goes on to state, however, that the "practice and procedure
shall be in accordance with that of the court of [the home] state" unless the
order otherwise provides. Id.
196. UNIF. DEPOSITION AcT § 1, 9B U.L.A. 60, 62 (1966). See UNIF. PROC.
AC § 3.02 comment, 13 U.L.A. 355, 392 (1986) for a discussion of the difference
between the choice of law provisions. Compare, e.g., IDAHO R. CIv. P. 28(e)
and MONT. R. Civ. P. 28(d), permitting the issuance of a subpoena in the home
state "whenever the deposition of any person is to be taken in this state pursu-
ant to the laws of another state" (emphasis added), with UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(h),
providing that a deposition taken there for use in another state shall be taken
"in the same manner and subject to the same conditions and limitations as if
the action or proceeding were pending in this state" (emphasis added).
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trial state. There is one exception. A Wisconsin statute autho-
rizes Wisconsin courts to subpoena "any person being or resid-
ing in Wisconsin" whose testimony is needed in a civil action
pending in another state to attend the trial in such other
state.19 7 Three prerequisites must be met before a Wisconsin
court can issue such a subpoena. The trial state must certify
that the witness "is believed to be a necessary witness." The
Wisconsin court also must be satisfied that the testimony is nec-
essary. Finally and most important, the trial state must have a
statute affording reciprocal relief to Wisconsin courts that need
the testimony of nonresident witnesses. 198 Because no other
state provides reciprocal relief, the Wisconsin statute is un-
likely to have any real impact on the availability of witnesses in
civil actions pending elsewhere.
The Wisconsin statute remains noteworthy because it dem-
onstrates both the strength and singularity of Wisconsin's vi-
sion, and its limitations. Wisconsin is the only state to adopt a
helping statute that recognizes the critical importance of live
testimony in civil cases. Yet although Wisconsin presumes that
it has the power to compel in-state residents to leave the state
and travel long distances to testify elsewhere, it nevertheless
disclaims the authority to compel witnesses found elsewhere to
leave those other places and travel to Wisconsin to testify
there. This disclaimer renders Wisconsin as timid as the forty-
nine other states.
3. Use of Deposition Statutes
Because the purpose of the compensatory statutory
schemes is to obtain the testimony of out-of-state witnesses for
use at trial, the utility of such statutes would be seriously un-
dermined if the deposition transcripts of witnesses deposed out-
of-state were inadmissible in the trial state. Accordingly, the
states have adopted statutes permitting use of these transcripts
as evidence.199
Most of these "use of deposition" statutes20 0 are modeled
after Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
197. Wis. STAT. § 887.25(1) (1987-88).
198. Id The Wisconsin statute provides that it "shall not apply to any ac-
tion pending in any state... whose laws do not contain provisions... requir-
ing persons within their borders to attend for the purpose of testifying in any
civil or criminal action pending in this state." Wis. STAT. § 887.25(3) (1987-88).
199. These statutes will be referred to as "use of deposition" statutes, or
simply "use" statutes. See infra Appendix Part X.
200. See infra Appendix Part X. A.
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permits use of a deposition transcript at trial if the witness is
more than 100 miles from the place of trial, outside the United
States,20 1 or beyond the subpoena power of the court.20 2 Given
that federal district courts often have statewide and sometimes
even nationwide subpoena power,20 3 Rule 32(a) authorizes use
of a deposition transcript at trial even if the witness is within
the subpoena power of the court, provided the witness is more
than 100 miles away.20 4 The drafters concluded that a party
should have the right to subpoena an in-state witness from any-
where within the state (or the country if a federal law so pro-
vides), but should not be required to subpoena a witness who
was already inconvenienced when she gave the deposition un-
201. Most states following Rule 32(a) have adapted it to permit the use of a
deposition transcript if the witness is more than 100 miles away or outside the
state. See infra Appendix Part X. B. Some state statutes follow Rule
32(a)(3)(B) so closely that they actually provide that the deposition transcript
may be offered into evidence if the witness is more than 100 miles from the
place of trial, or outside the United States. See infra Appendix Part X. C. In
proposing to change the Massachusetts provision to allow for the admissibility
of deposition transcripts into evidence if the witness were outside the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts, rather than outside the United States, the Re-
porter commented, "[this prior language was taken from the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The amendment changes the text to 'out of the Common-
wealth' because the 'out of the United States' language is inappropriate for a
state system." MASS. R. Civ. P. 32 reporter's notes.
202. Rule 32(a) provides, in pertinent part:
At the trial ... any part or all of a deposition... may be used against
any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposi-
tion or who had reasonable notice thereof, in accordance with any of
the following provisions:
(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used
by any party for any purpose if the court finds: ... (B) that the
witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place of
trial or hearing, or is out of the United States, unless it appears
that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering
the deposition; or .. . (D) that the party offering the deposition
has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by sub-
poena; or (E) upon application and notice, that such exceptional
circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of jus-
tice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testi-
mony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to
be used.
FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a).
203. Rule 45(e)(1) authorizes the federal district courts to exercise state-
wide subpoena power if a statute in the state in which the court sits so allows,
and nationwide subpoena power if a federal statute so allows. FED. R. Civ. P.
45(e)(1).
204. Rule 32 also allows for the use of the deposition transcript in "excep-
tional circumstances," even if the deponent is within the subpoena power of
the court. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(E).
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less the witness is relatively close to the courthouse.20 5 States
modeling their "use" statutes on Rule 32 similarly have shown
concern for the witness's convenience by allowing the use of
the deposition transcript even if the witness is within the sub-
poena power of the court, provided the witness is more than
100 miles away.20 6
Although many states have adopted this 100-mile conven-
ience test, several states permit the use of the deposition tran-
script only if the witness is outside the state or beyond the
subpoena power of the court.20 7 These states have placed a
higher value on live testimony at trial. In all events, the states
have recognized that the limited reach of their subpoena stat-
utes necessitates the taking of some testimony by deposition
and accordingly have authorized the introduction of this deposi-
tion testimony into evidence.
4. Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses From
Without a State in Criminal Proceedings
All fifty states have adopted the Uniform Act to Secure the
205. As Judge Edelstein concluded:
The drafters apparently had two related objectives in designing the
100 mile rule [Rule 32(a)(3)(B)] as it now stands. One was to permit
deposition use when a witness was beyond the subpoena power of the
court. The other was to permit deposition use when the deponent
would be unduly inconvenienced by requiring his presence at trial,
even if the deponent was subject to subpoena power. The drafters
presumably felt that it would be too burdensome to require a depo-
nent beyond the distance of 100 miles to appear at trial.
United States v. IBM, 90 F.R.D. 377, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
206. Some states allow a court to use a deposition transcript as evidence if
the deponent is (or resides) outside the county in which the court sits. See,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-32(a)(3)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110A, para. 212(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1985); Mo. R. Crv. P. 57.07(a)(3) (out of
county or more than 40 miles from place of trial); OHIO R. Civ. P. 32(A)(3)(b);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3209 (A)(3)(b) (West Supp. 1989); WASH. R. CIV. P.
32(a)(3)(B) (if witness resides out of the county and more than 20 miles from
the place of trial); W.VA. CODE § 57-4-4 (1966) (unless court orders otherwise);
Wyo. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B). These states demonstrate even greater solicitude
for the witness's convenience.
Several other states have expressed special consideration for certain
classes of "important" people - such as doctors, judges, lawyers, and experts
- by authorizing the use of their deposition transcripts as evidence without
regard to their distance from the courthouse. See infra Appendix Part X. D.
207. See, e.g., MD. R. Civ. P. 2-419(a)(3); MAss. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B); N.J.
R. Civ. P. 4:16-1(c); R.I. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(3)(ii); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 15-
6-32(a)(3)(B) (Supp. 1988); VT. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(E); W. VA. R. Civ. P.
32(a)(3)(B). Cf. TEx. R. Civ. P. 207(1)(a), which authorizes the use of a deposi-
tion transcript as long as it is admissible under the Rules of Evidence; the un-
availability of the witness is not a prerequisite.
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Attendance of Witnesses From Without a State in Criminal
Proceedings,208 which enables their courts to obtain live testi-
mony of out-of-state witnesses in criminal cases.20 9 This stat-
ute permits a court of record to certify under seal that a
criminal prosecution is pending in the court or that a grand
jury investigation has commenced or is about to commence,210
and that a person outside the state is a material witness whose
presence is required for a specified number of days.21' The trial
state court presents the certificate to any judge of the court of
record in the county in the state where the witness is found.21
Upon receipt of the certificate, the judge in the witness's
home state sets a time and place for a hearing, and orders the
prospective witness to attend. If, after the hearing, the home
state judge concludes that the witness is material, necessary,
will not suffer undue hardship if required to attend and testify
in the criminal proceeding in the trial state,2 1  and will be pro-
tected by the trial state from arrest and service of process, 214
208. UNIF. ACT TO SECURE ArENDANCE, supra note 159. See infra Appen-
dix Part V. For a general, but somewhat dated, discussion of the law, see An-
notation, Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses From Without a
State in Criminal Proceedings, 44 A.L.R.2d 732 (1955; Later Case Service 1980
& Supp. 1988). See also MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 12 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (au-
thorizing Massachusetts courts to subpoena witnesses found in Massachusetts
to testify at a criminal trial in an adjacent state or in Maine if the trial state
certifies a need for such witnesses' testimony).
209. UNIF. ACT TO SECURE ATTENDANCE, supra note 159, § 3, 11 U.L.A. at
17. With the exception of the Wisconsin helping statute, discussed supra notes
197-98 and accompanying text, there are no comparable provisions in the civil
setting.
210. Several states will order witnesses within their boundaries to leave
the state and testify elsewhere for a criminal trial but not a grand jury investi-
gation. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-3005(1) (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6642
(1974); WYO. STAT. § 7-11-404(a) (1977).
211. UNIF. ACT TO SECURE ATTENDANCE, supra note 159, §§ 2, 3. To take
advantage of the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance, the trial state must adopt
a law ensuring that its courts provide similar assistance to the home state. Id.
Because all fifty states have adopted the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance,
see infra Appendix Part V, the reciprocity requirement should not pose a
problem to any state.
212. The certificate "may include a recommendation that the witness be
taken into immediate custody and delivered to an officer of [the trial] state to
assure his attendance [there]." UNIF. ACT TO SECURE ATrENDANCE, supra note
159, § 3.
213. At least one state limits the distance a witness may be compelled to
travel to testify to 1000 miles. See IDAHO CODE § 19-3005(1) (1987).
214. Some states permit their judges to compel a witness to leave the state
to testify elsewhere only if she will be protected from process in both the trial
state and in any other state through which she may be required to pass in the
ordinary course of travel. See infra Appendix Part V. A. Since section 4 of
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the home state judge may issue a subpoena directing the wit-
ness to attend and testify in the trial state.2 1 5 The statute re-
quires the trial state to pay the witness's travel expenses and a
daily attendance fee. 216 If the witness fails to honor the sub-
poena, the home state court may impose punishment. 217 If af-
ter entering the trial state, the witness fails to attend and
testify as directed by the home state subpoena, the trial state
may impose punishment.2 18
The Uniform Act to Secure Attendance is of great rele-
vance for several reasons. First, in adopting the statute, the
states have proceeded on the assumption that they lack the au-
thority to compel unilaterally the appearance of a necessary
out-of-state witness; they must turn to other states for aid.2 1 9
the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance guarantees witnesses protection from
arrest and service of process in connection with matters arising before en-
trance into the state, both in the trial state when the witness enters to testify,
and in other states while en route to the trial state pursuant to a subpoena,
even this more rigorous requirement should not pose a problem. UNIF. ACT TO
SECURE ATrENDANCE, supra note 159, § 4.
215. Id § 2. If the trial court's certificate recommends that the witness be
taken into immediate custody, the home state judge may
in lieu of notification of the hearing, direct that such witness be forth-
with brought before him for said hearing;, and the judge at the hear-
ing being satisfied of the desirability of such custody and delivery, for
which determination the certificate shall be prima facie proof of such
desirability may, in lieu of issuing subpoena or summons, order that
said witness be forthwith taken into custody and delivered to an of-
ficer of the requesting [trial] state.
I& § 2.
216. Id § 2. The Uniform Act to Secure Attendance requires the trial state
to pay the witness 10c per mile travelled to and from the courthouse, and a
daily attendance fee of $5. Id Several states have increased these amounts, or
substituted the cost of round-trip airfare for the mileage compensation. See in-
fra Appendix Part V. B. At least one state has reduced the amounts required
to be paid as travel and attendance fees. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-8-3 (1984 &
Supp. 1988) (5c per mile and $2 per day). A third group of states incorporate
by reference other statutory provisions for fees and allowances. See infra Ap-
pendix Part V. C. As early as 1959, Justice Douglas noted that the statutory
provisions for compensation were woefully inadequate. See New York v.
O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 18 n.6 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
217. UNIF. ACT TO SECURE ATTENDANCE, supra note 159, § 2.
218. Id § 3.
219. See, e.g., People v. DuBose, 10 Cal. App. 3d 544, 549, 89 Cal. Rptr. 134,
137 (Ct. App. 1970); Mafnus v. State, 149 Ga. App. 286, 287 n.1, 254 S.E.2d 409,
411 n.1 (Ct. App. 1979); People v. Carter, 37 N.Y.2d 234, 240, 371 N.Y.S.2d 905,
910 (1975); see also supra notes 197-98 (discussing Wisconsin's civil statute).
Many courts have noted explicitly that the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance
does not extend the jurisdiction of any state, but instead depends upon princi-
ples of comity for its effectiveness. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 83 Ariz. 248, 251,
320 P.2d 446, 448, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 922 (1958); Contee v. State, 229 Md. 486,
492, 184 A.2d 823, 826 (1962), cert denied, 374 U.S. 841 (1963); Massachusetts v.
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Thus, even the states' boldest efforts belie their timidity in ex-
ercising subpoena power. Second, notwithstanding their as-
sumption that they cannot assert extraterritorial subpoena
power, the state legislatures and courts have been willing, in
the criminal context at least, to require witnesses to travel
thousands of miles to testify in another state. Hence, concern
for the inconvenience of non-party witnesses cannot be the sole
impediment to assertions of extraterritorial subpoena power.220
Third, several state courts and the United States Supreme
Court have upheld the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance in
the face of state and federal constitutional challenges.221 Thus,
Klaus, 145 A.D. 798, 801-02, 130 N.Y.S. 713, 717 (App. Div. 1911); State v.
Blount, 200 Or. 35, 50, 264 P.2d 419, 426, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 962 (1954). But
see Van Oosting v. Duber Indus. Sec., Inc., 57 Cal. App. 3d 376, 129 Cal. Rptr.
173, withdrawn, 57 Cal. App. 3d 376, 129 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1976) (reasoning that
the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance "is considered a part of California
court's process. The court's process, therefore, reaches into every state that
has the Uniform Act"). Although published in the advance sheets and avail-
able on LEXIS (States library, Cal. file), the Van Oosting opinion was with-
drawn from the bound volume by order of the California Supreme Court. 57
Cal. App. 3d 376, 129 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1976).
The states may have adopted the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance
rather than extraterritorial subpoena statutes to assure the nonresident wit-
ness a home state forum in which to challenge the subpoena. See infra note
273 and accompanying text.
220. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the states should be will-
ing to impose such inconvenience on witnesses whose testimony is needed in
civil cases. The Committee on Securing Compulsory Attendance of Non-Resi-
dent Witnesses of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws stated:
[I]t would not be wise to attempt to provide by uniform legislation for
the compulsory attendance of non-resident witnesses in civil cases.
While unquestionably at times cases arise in which the personal at-
tendance of witnesses in civil cases is highly important, and their ab-
sence interferes with the proper administration of justice, yet in the
large majority of cases statutes which provide for the taking of deposi-
tions of non-resident witnesses, which are in force in most of the
States, would seek to afford sufficient protection to the rights of the
litigants.
National Conference Report, supra note 136, at 358-59 (emphasis in original).
See infra Part IV. B.
221. New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 3-12 (1959); People v. Cavanaugh, 69
Cal. 2d 262, 265-66, 444 P.2d 110, 112-13, 70 Cal. Rptr. 438, 440-41 200 (1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969); In re Saperstein, 30 N.J. Super. 373, 380-81,
104 A.2d 842, 846-47 (App. Div.), certific. denied, 15 N.J. 613, 106 A.2d 41, cert
denied sub nom. Saperstein v. New York, 348 U.S. 874 (1954); In re Cooper, 127
N.J.L. 312, 313, 22 A.2d 532, 532 (1941); Massachusetts v. Klaus, 145 A.D. 798,
799, 130 N.Y.S. 713, 714-17 (App. Div. 1911). But see Massachusetts v. Klaus,
145 A.D. 798, 807, 130 N.Y.S. 713, 722 (1911) (Laughlin, J., dissenting) (conclud-
ing that statute violates privileges and immunities clause); In re Pennsylvania,
45 Misc. 46, 46, 90 N.Y.S. 808, 808 (Sup. Ct. 1904) (concluding that statute vio-
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as the following section of this Article will demonstrate, the ar-
gument that the Constitution prohibits the states from requir-
ing a witness in one state to appear and to testify in another
state must be rejected.222
IV. ADDRESSING THE STATES' RELUCTANCE
TO EXERCISE EXTRATERRITORIAL
SUBPOENA POWER
In light of both the historical linkage between the scope of
state court personal jurisdiction and subpoena power, and the
enormous expansion of personal jurisdiction, one would have
expected state legislatures to authorize their courts to assert
extraterritorial subpoena power. The states have not done so.
Three concerns or beliefs may underlie the states' reticence.2 23
First, the states may fear that assertions of extraterritorial sub-
poena power would violate the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, either because they would interfere with
the sovereignty of other states, or because they would unduly
inconvenience nonresident witnesses. 224 Second, the states may
believe that the deposition testimony made available by the
compensatory statutes is an adequate substitute for the live tes-
timony of nonresident witnesses. Third, the states may ques-
tion their ability to enforce extraterritorial subpoenas. None of
these concerns or beliefs should preclude all authorizations of
extraterritorial subpoena power.225
lates due process clause); In re Alien, 49 Pa. D. & C. 631, 638-39 (Dist. Ct. 1944)
(concluding that statute violates privileges and immunities clause and due pro-
cess clause). See infra Part IV. A. 2. c., for a discussion of the constitutionality
of the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance.
222. Even if the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance is constitutional, it
does not necessarily follow that a state's assertion of extraterritorial subpoena
power would pass constitutional muster. See infra Part IV. A. 2. c., for a dis-
cussion of the differences between the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance and
an extraterritorial subpoena statute, and for an argument in favor of the con-
stitutionality of the latter.
223. The author has no definitive proof that these concerns or beliefs in
fact underlie the states' reluctance to authorize extraterritorial subpoena
power, but they are legitimate concerns that would help explain the states'
reticence.
224. Solicitude for the convenience of nonparty witnesses alone probably
does not underlie the states' failure to assert extraterritorial subpoena power,
for it would not justify affording nonresident witnesses complete protection
from inconvenience while exposing resident witnesses to considerable incon-
venience. See infra text accompanying note 248.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 82-92.
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A. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXTRATERRITORIAL
SUBPOENA POWER
1. State Sovereignty Concerns
Any concern that assertions of extraterritorial subpoena
power would unconstitutionally infringe upon the sovereignty
of other states is both inconsistent with the states' willingness
to assert long-arm jurisdiction and ill-founded as a matter of
constitutional law. First, the states have not hesitated to assert
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. The states
eagerly responded to the International Shoe decision, and en-
acted wide-reaching long-arm statutes. In doing so, they dis-
played no concern that reaching into another state's territory
and compelling a person found there to defend against a law-
suit in the forum state would interfere with or infringe upon
the sovereignty of the defendant's home state. Decades of ex-
perience with long-arm statutes have given the states no reason
to reassess their initial rejection of other states' sovereignty as
a restraint on their jurisdictional reach. One would expect,
then, that the states also would reject state sovereignty as a
reason for limiting the geographic scope of their subpoena
power.226
Second, the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, which restricts the geographic scope of both state court
jurisdiction and state court subpoena power, "makes no men-
tion of federalism concerns." 227 As Ireland finally settled, the
due process clause "represents a restriction on judicial power
not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual lib-
erty. ' 228 If it were otherwise, a person served with an extrater-
ritorial subpoena would be unable to appear and to waive the
constitutional objection, for "[i]ndividual actions cannot change
the powers of sovereignty." 229 But just as an individual may ap-
pear voluntarily and defend an action in a forum that lacks per-
sonal jurisdiction,230 a person may appear and testify despite
226. As demonstrated supra Part II. B., concerns for the sovereignty of
other states are far less compelling in the domestic context than in the inter-
national setting.
227. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982).
228. Id. at 702. See supra Part II. E.
229. Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703 n.10.
230. See, e.g., Naccarato v. Kot, 124 A.D.2d 365, 365-66, 507 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309
(App. Div. 1986); Smalls v. Weed, 291 S.C. 258, 260, 353 S.E.2d 154, 156 (Ct.
App. 1987); see also Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703 (stating that "regardless of the
power of the state to serve process, an individual may submit to the jurisdic-
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the invalidity of the summoning subpoena.231 Thus, under ex-
isting precedent, the states should not be constitutionally pre-
cluded from asserting extraterritorial subpoena power "'by
their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.' "232
2. Concerns for the Convenience of Nonresident Witnesses
The states may have a related concern that assertions of
extraterritorial subpoena power would violate the constitu-
tional rights of nonresident witnesses by depriving them of lib-
erty or property without due process of law. Just as the due
process clause protects the defendant from the "burdens of liti-
gating in a distant or inconvenient forum, '2 33 it protects a non-
party witness from the burdens of testifying in a distant or
inconvenient court.2 4
In light of the states' willingness to compel nonresident de-
fendants to travel great distances to defend lawsuits in the fo-
rum state, their concern for nonresident witnesses must turn
on the witnesses' perceived lack of culpability in the underlying
matter.235 Although legitimate, this concern for the conven-
ience of "innocent" nonresident witnesses should not inhibit
the states from asserting extraterritorial subpoena power in all
circumstances.
Indeed, the conclusion that an innocent nonresident wit-
ness may suffer some inconvenience if subpoenaed by the trial
state cannot dispose of the constitutional question, because all
witnesses, including resident witnesses,2 36 suffer some incon-
tion of the Court by appearance") (citing McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91
(1917)).
231. Pulley v. United States, 532 A.2d 651, 652-53 (D.C. 1987); In re Hall,
296 F. 780, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
232. Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702-03 n.10 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980)).
233. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
234. See supra note 134.
235. Of course, at the commencement of the action, when jurisdictional is-
sues typically are resolved, the defendant has not yet been found culpable. In
fact, she may be as "innocent" as the nonparty witness. Nevertheless, the
states have been willing to compel nonresident defendants charged by plain-
tiffs with wrongdoing to appear and defend in distant fora.
236. As the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court noted
when it upheld a predecessor statute to the Uniform Act to Secure
Attendance:
[A]ny witness subpoenaed to attend a trial within the state is in the
same sense [as the nonresident witness] deprived of his liberty, but we
have never heard it suggested that the provisions of law providing for
the summoning of witnesses and for enforcing their attendance were
unconstitutional and void.
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venience. Yet it is axiomatic that citizens have a duty to testify
in both civil and criminal trials, even at the cost of material sac-
rifice, lost time, or invaded privacy.23' Citizens owe this duty
not to the individual litigants, but to the system of justice. 238
The duty is not defined by state lines, but has no inherent geo-
graphic boundaries.2 39
The constitutional inquiry thus is not whether the nonresi-
dent witness will be inconvenienced by the assertion of sub-
poena power, for certainly she will be, but whether the
inconvenience is meaningful enough to constitute a deprivation
of liberty or property without due process of law. Judicial deci-
sions that consider the constitutionality of extraterritorial sub-
poena power and other assertions of extraterritorial authority
cast light on this question. First, however, one must consider
the kinds of burdens a witness would face if compelled to tes-
tify in another state.
a. Burdens on the Nonparty Witness
Like the nonresident defendant compelled to defend in a
distant forum, the nonparty witness compelled to testify
Massachusetts v. Klaus, 145 A.D. 798, 803, 130 N.Y.S. 713, 716 (App. Div. 1911).
See infra text accompanying note 248. See also New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S.
1, 7 (1959), in which the Supreme Court rejected a claim that the Uniform Act
to Secure Attendance violated the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment, stating:
Florida undoubtedly could have held respondent within Florida if he
had been a material witness in a criminal proceeding within that
State. And yet this would not have been less of a limitation on his
claim of the right of ingress and egress than is an order to attend and
testify in New York.
237. See, e.g., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1976);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345-46 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 688 (1972); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281-82 (1919); 5A J.
MOORE & J. LucAs, supra note 135, at para. 45.03; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note
23, § 2192, at 70-72.
238. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 23, § 2192, at 72-73.
239. New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1959) (stating that "[t]here is
no constitutional provision granting [a citizen] relief from [his] obligation to
testify even though he must travel to another State to do so"); Massachusetts
v. Klaus, 145 A.D. 798, 801, 130 N.Y.S. 713, 715 (App. Div. 1911) (stating that
"[n]or is the duty to give evidence, or the power to compel it to be given lim-
ited to causes pending in the courts of this state"). But see Blair v. United
States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919) (noting that "the giving of testimony and the
attendance upon court or grand jury in order to testify are public duties which
every person within the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform
upon being properly summoned") (emphasis added).
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outside her home state faces two kinds of burdens.240 The wit-
ness's universal burdens include the anxiety of having to testify
in public, perhaps against a friend or even a dangerous crimi-
nal, and the time required to prepare for trial, including the
time required to meet with counsel, travel to and from the
courthouse, and testify or wait to testify. Almost all of the bur-
dens a nonparty witness bears are universal.
The witness may face a few state-specific burdens, result-
ing typically from the imposition of "unfavorable" procedural
laws by the trial state.241 For example, state laws regarding
compensation for time and reimbursement for travel expenses
vary, so a witness called to testify in one state could receive
more money per day and per mile than if called to testify only
a few miles away in a different state.24 Because the states' re-
imbursement statutes do not differ dramatically,243 this state-
specific burden should be slight. Similarly, state laws regarding
240. For a more complete discussion of the difference between universal
and state-specific burdens, see supra Part IL F.
241. See supra note 115.
242. All of the subpoena statutes allow for reimbursement of travel ex-
penses and provide some (typically nominal) compensation for the time the
witness must spend getting to and from the courthouse and testifying. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-19-131 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.142 (West 1979).
243. Most of the statutes provide for only a nominal witness fee, ranging
from $1.50 per day to $36 per day, and reimbursement for travel at rates rang-
ing from 5c per mile to roundtrip airfare. See infra Appendix Part V. B. Even
if a witness were required to attend for three days, the state-specific differen-
tial resulting from this variance among state laws would amount to approxi-
mately $100, an amount not likely to constitute "meaningful inconvenience."
A larger differential could result if airfare were considerably more costly than
5p per mile.
Unlike most states, Minnesota requires the party subpoenaing a nonparty
"professional" witness to pay "reasonable compensation for the time and ex-
pense involved in preparing for and giving such testimony." MINN. R. Civ. P.
45.06. The Advisory Committee Note, following the Minnesota Rule, states
that:
[Tihe Rule is intended to prevent a party from obtaining expert testi-
mony or opinions through use of the subpoena power without special
compensation. The Committee concluded that non-parties should not
be drawn into litigation involuntarily and without compensation
merely because they may have some expertise useful to one or more
of the parties.
Id advisory committee note.
As Wigmore suggests:
[That] the ordinary witness should be paid more than the nominal
dollar - i.e., should be fully indemnified for sacrificing his day's live-
lihood in order to perform his testimonial duty - is a plausible asser-
tion. The argument against it, that the total cost of reimbursing
highly paid citizens would be prohibitive, gives no real answer, for the
state is bound to supply the necessities of justice however expensive.
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testimonial privilege vary,244 so a witness might be able to in-
voke the spousal privilege in one state, yet would be required to
testify against her spouse in an adjacent state that has abol-
ished the privilege.245 These kinds of state-specific burdens will
be rare because nonparty witnesses rarely care about the con-
tent of the trial state's law.
Unlike the defendant, who will face burdens of both vari-
eties regardless of the forum, the nonparty witness may be able
to avoid all burdens if the trial court lacks subpoena power
over her.2 4 6 Nevertheless, the witness can have no due process
right to avoid testifying in the most convenient forum. Thus,
the nonparty witness should be able to avoid the trial court's
assertion of subpoena power only if the incremental burdens
she would suffer if forced to testify there rather than in a more
convenient court would render the assertion of subpoena power
unreasonable.
Like the nonresident defendant, the nonresident witness
typically will suffer the fewest universal burdens if compelled
to testify at home. Therefore, in assessing the constitutionality
of an assertion of subpoena power over a nonparty witness, the
court should consider the difference between the magnitude of
the universal burdens the witness would suffer if forced to tes-
tify at home and those she would suffer in the trial court (the
"universal differential").2 47
The best answer is that the testimonial duty... is to be performed
without pay, the sacrifice being an inherent burden of citizenship.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2202, at 136.
244. State laws regarding privilege and other evidentiary questions are not
readily classifiable as substantive or procedural for choice-of-law purposes. J.
MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES AND MATERIALS 108 (2d ed. 1984).
245. The choice-of-law rules regarding privilege are somewhat more com-
plicated than this analysis suggests, as they often require consideration of the
law "of the state with the most significant relationship to the communication."
Mullin, supra note 175, at 42; See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 139 (1971); see generally Reese & Leiwant, Testimonial Privileges and
Conflict of Laws, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 91-98 (Spring 1977) (analyz-
ing the interaction of the interests of the state whose law governs the underly-
ing claim, the state having the most significant relationship to the
communication about which testimony is sought, and the trial state, when
there are differences between and among their privilege laws); Sterk, Testimo-
nial Privileges: An Analysis of Horizontal Choice of Law Problems, 61 MINN.
L. REV. 461 (1977) (discussing the complex interaction between individual in-
terests and public policies involved in any privilege determination).
246. The plaintiff is less likely to change the forum to obtain subpoena
power over a nonresident witness than to obtain personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.
247. The formula for calculating the universal differential should use as its
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An assertion of extraterritorial subpoena power, however,
would not necessarily expose a witness to greater universal
burdens than an assertion of in-state subpoena power. In other
words, the-universal differential may be negative. For example,
a Philadelphia witness compelled to travel 300 miles to Pitts-
burgh faces greater universal burdens than if compelled to
travel fifteen miles to Camden, New Jersey. State boundaries,
like county lines in the deposition context,248 provide poor
proxies for convenience.
The nonparty witness might suffer fewer state-specific bur-
dens if the suit were pending in a state other than either the
forum or the witness's home state. The court therefore should
consider the difference between the magnitude of the state-spe-
cific burdens the witness would suffer if subpoenaed in the
state in which these burdens would be fewest and those she
would suffer in the trial state (the "state-specific differen-
tial").249 If the sum of the two differentials constitutes "mean-
ingful inconvenience, '25 0 the court must consider whether the
imposition of these burdens would comport with "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."251
Because the universal differential alone rarely should re-
sult in "meaningful inconvenience" rising to a constitutional
level,25 2 and because most of the burdens the nonparty witness
suffers are universal, assertions of extraterritorial subpoena
power rarely, if ever, should be considered unconstitutional. A
review of the relevant case law supports this proposition.
b. Constitutionality of the Walsh Act
In Blackmer v. United States,25 3 the United States Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Walsh Act, which au-
thorizes federal courts to subpoena United States nationals or
baseline the burdens the witness would suffer if subpoenaed in the most con-
venient home state court. See supra note 121.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
250. See supra note 122.
251. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 122-25. The universal differential
should be even less likely to rise to a constitutional level for the nonparty wit-
ness, since all states would reimburse her travel expenses and compensate her
(at least nominally) for her time. See supra note 242. To the extent that uni-
versal burdens would impose meaningful inconvenience, the states could
amend their compensation statutes to provide more adequate compensation for
nonparty witnesses.
253. 284 U.S. 421, 438-41 (1932).
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residents living abroad.2M Blackmer, a United States citizen re-
siding in France, was served in France with two subpoenas re-
quiring him to appear at different times as a witness in a
criminal trial pending in the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia. Blackmer failed to honor the subpoenas and, after a
hearing, the District of Columbia court held him in contempt
and fined him $30,000 in each case. His property was seized to
satisfy the judgments. 55 The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia affirmed the decree.25 6
In concluding that the statute did not violate the due pro-
cess clause of the fifth amendment,2 7 a unanimous Supreme
Court resorted to a vertical sovereignty theory:258
254. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1783, 1784 (1982). The Walsh Act provides, in pertinent
part:
A court of the United States may order the issuance of a subpoena re-
quiring the appearance as a witness before it, or before a person or
body designated by it, of a national or resident of the United States
who is in a foreign country... if the court finds .. .that particular
testimony ... by him is necessary in the interest of justice, and, in
other than a criminal action or proceeding, if the court finds, in addi-
tion, that it is not possible to obtain his testimony in admissible form
without his personal appearance ....
28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (1982). At the time Blackmer was decided, the Walsh Act
only authorized a court to issue a subpoena if the nonresident United States
citizen's "attendance at the trial of any criminal action" was "desired by the
Attorney General or any assistant or district attorney acting under him."
Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 434 n.1.
255. Section 1784 provides that the court may hold the subpoenaed person
in contempt for failure to appear, and may seize the contemnor's property
within the United States to satisfy a fine of not more than $100,000, which may
be imposed after notice and a hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 1784 (1982).
256. Blackmer v. United States, 49 F.2d 523, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1931), qff'd, 284
U.S. 421 (1932).
257. Blackmer contended that the statute violated the due process clause in
five respects:
(1) that the "Congress has no power to authorize United States con-
suls to serve process except as permitted by treaty"; (2) that the Act
does not provide "a valid method of acquiring judicial jurisdiction to
render personal judgment against defendant and judgment against his
property"; (3) that the Act "does not require actual or any other no-
tice to defendant of the offense or of the Government's claim against
his property"; (4) that the provisions "for hearing and judgment in
the entire absence of the accused and without his consent" are invalid;
and (5) that the Act is "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable."
Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 436. For purposes of this Article, Blackmer's second,
fourth, and fifth contentions are the most relevant. Blackmer also argued that
the statute provided for an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the
fourth amendment, and that by making the extraterritorial subpoenas avail-
able to the prosecution but not the defense in a criminal action, the statute vi-
olated the sixth amendment. IHi at 441-42.
258. See supra note 69.
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[Blackmer] continued to owe allegiance to the United States. By vir-
tue of the obligations of citizenship, the United States retained its au-
thority over him .... Nor can it be doubted that the United States
possesses the power inherent in sovereignty to require the return to
this country of a citizen, resident elsewhere, whenever the public in-
terest requires it.259
Despite the potentially enormous universal burdens Blackmer
would suffer from being forced to travel from France to the
United States twice, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the extraterritorial subpoenas.
According to Blackmer, the due process clause contains no
absolute mileage limitation on the distance an "innocent" non-
party witness may be required to travel to fulfill her civic duty
to testify. Two factors, however, limit the applicability of
Blackmer's holding to assertions of extraterritorial subpoena
power by the states. First, Blackmer's vertical sovereignty ra-
tionale would support only assertions of subpoena power over
persons within the territory of the government that created the
court, or over citizens of the forum state. It would not support
subpoena power over persons who simply have "minimum con-
tacts" with the jurisdiction, or others over whom assertions of
extraterritorial subpoena power might be reasonable.
Second, courts should question the continued viability of
any theory predicated solely on the "power of the sovereign."
The Supreme Court in Ireland260 rejected the proposition that
a state's power to compel nonresident defendants to defend ac-
tions brought against them in the state must be limited out of
concern for the sovereignty of other states.261 Furthermore,
the Court in Shaffer v. Heitner rejected the proposition that a
state court necessarily has jurisdiction over all property within
the territory of the state.262 Read together, Ireland and Shaffer
259. Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 436-37; see also United States v. Lansky, 496 F.2d
1063, 1067 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing both Blackmer and the common law for the
proposition that a sovereign may require its citizens to return to the country
and testify).
260. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694 (1982).
261. I& at 702-03 n.10.
262. In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977), the Supreme Court held
that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction," even assertions over property
found in the state, "must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
International Shoe and its progeny." In reaching this conclusion, the Court
noted that "the theory that territorial power is both essential to and sufficient
for jurisdiction has been undermined." Id at 211 (emphasis added). Arguably,
Shcffer undermined vertical sovereignty as a sufficient justification for assert-
ing personal jurisdiction.
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render suspect the proposition that a state necessarily has unre-
strained power over all persons served while physically present
within its territory, and even over all domiciliaries, regardless
of the amount of ongoing contact they have with the state.263
Despite these limitations, Blackmer and the Walsh Act re-
263. Since Shaffer, courts have struggled in determining whether they
have personal jurisdiction over persons served with process while transiently
present in the state. See, e.g., Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264,
265-72 (5th Cir. 1985); Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42,
45-48 (3d Cir. 1985); Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F.
Supp. 305, 310-14 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Aluminal Indus. v. Newton Commercial As-
soc., 89 F.R.D. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see generally Bernstine, Shaffer v.
Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of In Personam Jurisdic-
tion?, 25 ViLL. L. REv. 38, 47-60 (1979) (discussing the "transient rule of in per-
sonam jurisdiction" in the wake of ShaSfer); A General Look, supra note 84, at
748-55 (analyzing transient jurisdiction past and present); Glen, An Analysis of
'Mere Presence" and Other Traditional Bases of Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 607, 609-14 (1979) (calling for a "fairness test" based on "purposeful pres-
ence" within the forum state rather than continued usage of the "minimum
contacts" test); Werner, supra note 37, at 585-88 (discussing Shaffer's impact
on presence-oriented justifications for jurisdiction). In light of Shaffer, some
courts have concluded that
mere service of process upon a defendant transiently present in the
jurisdiction does not vest a state with personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. Personal service within the jurisdiction is not the litmus
test for proper in personam jurisdiction. Rather, the test is whether
the defendant has had minimum contacts with the forum ....
Pitman, 626 F. Supp. at 312. See also Nehemiah, 765 F.2d at 46-47 (holding
"service on its agent within the forum" insufficient to obtain personal jurisdic-
tion over an unincorporated association); Grendene v. Brazam Int'l Trading
Corp., No. 83 Civ. 0782 (JMW), slip op. at n.1 and accompanying text (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 24, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (expressing "serious doubts
as to the validity of transient jurisdiction").
At least one court, however, has concluded that Shaffer continues to allow
states to invoke sovereignty as a basis for asserting jurisdiction over persons
within the territory. As the Fifth Circuit stated:
[W]hile the due process clause necessarily restricts the state's sover-
eign power, no case has yet held that it eliminates that power alto-
gether. That the requirement of personal jurisdiction rests in all
cases on the due process clause does not weaken the proposition that
the exercise of jurisdiction, as distinguished from its limitation, is a
sovereign act. If there is anything that characterizes sovereignty, it is
the state's dominion over its territory and those within it. Fairness
does not operate in a vacuum. To abstract it from context and elevate
it blindly over sovereign prerogatives is ultimately to free the individ-
ual from the obligations inherent in a statist system.
Amusement Equip., 779 F.2d at 270 (upholding assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion over a defendant served with process while transiently present in the
state).
Shaffer and the opinions questioning the continued viability of transient
or "tag" jurisdiction suggest that existing state subpoena statutes may be un-
constitutional to the extent they authorize subpoena power over persons only
transiently present in the state.
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main relevant to the issue of extraterritorial state court sub-
poena power. Just as the holding in Milliken v. Meyer 26 -
that a state may assert personal jurisdiction over a domiciliary
residing elsewhere - could be justified today on the theory
that the nonresident domiciliary has minimum contacts with
the forum,265 Blackmer too can be recast in light of the Interna-
tional Shoe decision. Without reference to the power of the
sovereign, courts could uphold the constitutionality of the
Walsh Act on the theory that citizens of the United States are
presumed to have sufficient contact with the country to support
assertions of subpoena power over them by the United States.
Even more generally, a court could hold that it is neither un-
reasonable nor unfair to require United States citizens residing
abroad to testify in United States courts when they will be com-
pensated for their time and travel expenses. So restated, Black-
mer would support the proposition that a state may assert
extraterritorial subpoena power over nonresidents as long as
asserting such subpoena power would not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. '266
c. Constitutionality of the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance
All fifty states have adopted the Uniform Act to Secure At-
tendance, which allows courts to require material witnesses to
attend and testify at criminal trials anywhere in the country.267
The constitutionality of the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance
was challenged in New York v. O'Neill.268 O'Neill, a citizen of
264. 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
265. See A General Look, supra note 84, at 736 (stating that "[the] unique
affiliation [domicile] ... clearly has shown the requisite level of contact").
266. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 461 (1940).
267. See infra Appendix Part V.
268. 359 U.S. 1, 3 (1959). Before the Supreme Court decided O'Neill, a
lower court in Pennsylvania found the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance un-
constitutional. In re Allen, 49 Pa. D. & C. 631, 636 (Dist. Ct. 1940). In 1911,
the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of New York Criminal Procedure Law § 618a (1902), which preceded
the adoption of the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance, but which authorized
New York courts to issue subpoenas to compel persons found within the state
to testify at criminal trials pending in bordering states if the trial states had
certified that such witnesses were material and necessary. Massachusetts v.
Klaus, 145 A.D. 798, 804, 130 N.Y.S. 713, 717 (App. Div. 1911). Like the Black-
mer Court, the Klaus court predicated its decision on the state's "absolute and
unrestrained power over its own citizens and those who may be within its bor-
ders." I& at 802, 130 N.Y.S. at 716. An earlier decision by the New York
Supreme Court, Special Term, held the statute unconstitutional because it
"would deprive the proposed witness of his liberty without due process of
law." In re Pennsylvania, 45 Misc. 46, 47, 90 N.Y.S. 808, 808 (Sup. Ct. 1904).
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Illinois, travelled to Florida to attend a convention. While
O'Neill was in Florida, a New York court certified to the Cir-
cuit Court of Dade County, Florida, that O'Neill's testimony
was needed in a grand jury investigation in New York. After
conducting a hearing, the Florida court refused to subpoena
O'Neill to appear before the New York grand jury, concluding
that Florida's version of the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance
was unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed. In
an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, the United States Supreme
Court reversed.
After rejecting the lower courts' conclusion that the statute
violated the privileges and immunities clauses of Article IV,
section 2 and the fourteenth amendment,269 Justice Frank-
furter considered the "more relevant challenge" that the Uni-
form Act to Secure Attendance denied the witness liberty
without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth
amendment.270 Relying on a vertical sovereignty rationale, the
Court noted that
the Florida courts had immediate personal jurisdiction over respon-
dent by virtue of his presence within that State. Insofar as the Four-
teenth Amendment is concerned, this gave the Florida courts
constitutional jurisdiction to order an act even though that act is to be
performed outside of the State.
A citizen cannot shirk his duty, no matter how inconve-
nienced thereby, to testify in criminal proceedings and grand jury in-
vestigations in a State where he is found. There is no constitutional
provision granting him relief from this obligation to testify even
See generally California Note, supra note 134, at 625-28 (discussing due pro-
cess role in determining state's extraterritorial power to compel witness
attendance).
269. The Supreme Court noted that the Florida statute did not discrimi-
nate against citizens of other states; it applied to all persons within Florida's
borders. It thus did not violate the privileges and immunities clause of the
United States Constitution, art. IV, § 2. Nor did the statute infringe the "right
to ingress and egress .... a privilege of national citizenship" guaranteed by the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, because it did
not "involve freedom of travel in its essential sense." ONeill, 359 U.S. at 6-7.
The Supreme Court also summarily rejected a challenge based on the in-
terstate rendition clause of the United States Constitution, art. IV, § 2, cl. 2:
The absence of a provision in the United States Constitution specifi-
cally granting power to the States to legislate respecting interstate
rendition of witnesses presents no bar. To argue from the declaratory
incorporation in the Constitution, Art. IV, § 2, of the ancient political
policy among the Colonies of delivering up fugitives from justice an
implied denial of the right to fashion other cooperative arrangements
for the effective administration of justice, is to reduce the Constitu-
tion to a rigid, detailed and niggardly code.
O'Neill, 359 U.S. at 5-6.
270. Id at 8.
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though he must travel to another State to do so.2 7 1
Like Blackmer, O'Neill upholds the constitutionality of a
subpoena that requires a nonparty witness to testify in a distant
forum, even one thousands of miles away. Neither the incon-
venience to the witness nor the witness's status as an "inno-
cent" nonparty renders the exercise of the subpoena power a
per se violation of the due process clause.
Several factors, however, limit the applicability of O'Neill
to the extraterritorial subpoena setting. First, in light of later
Supreme Court decisions, the O'Neill Court's reliance on state
sovereignty can provide only limited support for assertions of
state court subpoena power.272 Moreover, O'Neill's holding that
a state has unlimited power over all persons within the state
may not justify an assertion of subpoena power by one state
over a person physically present in another state.
Second, although not critical to the Court's decision, the
Uniform Act to Secure Attendance affords the witness a hear-
ing in the state where the witness is found before the court
may issue a subpoena commanding an appearance in the trial
state. Although the availability of this hearing certainly affords
the witness more "process" than none, such a hearing appar-
ently is not constitutionally required. If due process required
that a witness be accorded a pre-subpoena hearing in all cases,
all existing state subpoena statutes would be unconstitutional.
Given that the existing subpoena statutes appear to be constitu-
tional,2 73 the argument would have to be that because they re-
side out-of-state, nonresident witnesses have a stronger claim to
271. Id. at 8-9, 11 (citations omitted). In a strongly worded dissent, Justice
Douglas, joined by Justice Black, argued that the Uniform Act to Secure At-
tendance interfered with the "right to free ingress and egress within the coun-
try," which "has often been called a right or privilege of national citizenship"
protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the commerce clause, and the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. I- at 12-13 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas accused the Court of
grafting onto the interstate rendition clause of the Constitution a provision for
the "extradition of witnesses by the States." I& at 14.
272. This doctrinal problem is exacerbated by the fact that O'Neill was
only transiently present in Florida at the time the subpoena requiring him to
travel to New York could have been served. See supra note 263.
273. The author has found no case challenging the constitutionality of a
subpoena statute on the ground that it fails to afford the prospective witness a
hearing before the issuance of the subpoena. The witness served with a sub-
poena has the same three choices as the defendant served with a summons: (1)
appearing in the court that issued the process, however distant, and challeng-
ing the court's authority over the person; (2) appearing and defending or testi-
fying without objection; or (3) proceeding on the assumption that the court
lacks authority over the person, refusing to appear, and reserving the right to
1989]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
a pre-subpoena hearing. This argument is hardly compelling,
however, as the nonresident witness is not necessarily subject
to any more onerous burdens, nor deprived of any more liberty,
than the resident witness.2 7 4
Finally, the subpoena power exercised pursuant to the Uni-
form Act to Secure Attendance requires the witness to testify
in a criminal action, while the extraterritorial subpoena power
advocated here would be available to require a witness to tes-
tify in a civil suit. This distinction is relevant because the state
has a greater interest in securing live testimony in the criminal
setting, given the criminal defendant's constitutional right to
confront witnesses . 2 75
Nevertheless, in assessing whether an assertion of extrater-
ritorial subpoena power violates the due process clause, the dis-
tinction between criminal and civil actions is not
constitutionally significant. Although recent Supreme Court
decisions suggest that a court may consider the "state's inter-
est" in assessing the reasonableness of an assertion of personal
jurisdiction,276 the burden on the defendant remains "a primary
concern." 277 In the subpoena context, therefore, even though
the state's interest in obtaining live testimony usually will be
greater in the criminal context,278 and even though this interest
may be considered in assessing whether an assertion of sub-
poena power is constitutional, the primary concern for due pro-
cess purposes must be the burdens on the witness. Further,
from the witness's perspective, the magnitude of the burdens
challenge the court's authority over the person in a collateral proceeding. See
infra note 378.
274. See supra note 236 and text accompanying supra note 248.
275. See supra note 136.
276. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113
(1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
277. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. Indeed, it seems inconsis-
tent to state, on the one hand, that due process limitations on jurisdiction pro-
tect only "individual liberty interests," Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982), and then to
consider, on the other hand, "the forum State's interest.... the interstate judi-
cial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controver-
sies; and the shared interests of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. See
Lewis, supra note 109, at 8; Three Deaths, supra note 94, at 739-40; cf. Redish,
supra note 107, at 1139 (observing that a state's interest in the dispute "is lim-
ited primarily to having its body of substantive law control the outcome, for it
is primarily through its substantive laws that a state's policy goals are
attained").
278. See supra note 136.
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and the lack of personal culpability will be identical regardless
of whether the underlying action is civil or criminal.
d. Constitutionality of Subpoenas Served on Nonparty
Witnesses Who Have Contact with the Forum
Even if the decisions upholding the Walsh Act and the Uni-
form Act to Secure Attendance fail to resolve the issue defini-
tively, they support the proposition that assertions of
extraterritorial subpoena power by states are not unconstitu-
tional per se. Furthermore, decisions in other contexts suggest
that states may assert subpoena power at least over persons
who would be subject to the court's personal jurisdiction, but
who are not physically present when served with process. For
example, in Whitley v. Lutheran Hospital,279 the Appellate
Court of Illinois considered whether a state court that "ac-
quired jurisdiction" over a "respondent in discovery" (an indi-
vidual other than a named defendant who might have
information necessary to identify potential defendants) re-
tained jurisdiction over the respondent even after he was
named as a defendant.280 In concluding that the trial court had
retained jurisdiction, the appellate court noted that courts ac-
quire jurisdiction by service of either a summons or sub-
poena.28 ' Because the court initially had obtained jurisdiction
over the respondent by service of a notice of designation, "that
jurisdiction continue[d] until all issues of fact and law [were]
determined."28 2
The Whitley case did not involve a nonresident respondent
in discovery and therefore did not directly consider the consti-
tutionality of extraterritorial subpoena power. The court's rea-
soning, however, certainly suggests that a nonresident witness,
like a nonresident defendant, could be compelled to appear and
testify if the witness was subject to the court's personal juris-
diction. Since International Shoe, state courts have been able
to assert jurisdiction over all persons who have "minimum con-
tacts" with the state, not just those who are served with process
while physically present in the state.283
Federal courts, too, have concluded that the tests for deter-
mining whether one is subject to a court's personal jurisdiction
279. 73 Ill. App. 3d 763, 392 N.E.2d 729 (1979).
280. Id. at 764, 392 N.E.2d at 731.
281. Id. at 766, 392 N.E.2d at 732.
282. Id. at 765-66, 392 N.E.2d at 732-33.
283. See Werner, supra note 37, at 566-67.
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and whether one is within the reach of the court's subpoena
power are or should be based on contacts with the forum. For
example, in Federal Trade Commission v. Compagnie de Saint-
Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson,2 4 the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals considered the validity of service by regis-
tered mail of a subpoena issued by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) on a French corporation, which was a target of an
FTC investigation. The court
assume[d] that just as a court may not validly exert its adjudicative
authority over a defendant lacking "minimum contacts" with the fo-
rum... the FTC is subject to some limitations on its personal juris-
diction - set by the due process clause of the Constitution - which
bar it from exercising its investigative authority over a foreigner lack-
ing any contacts with the United States.
28 5
Although unnecessary to its holding in the case,28 6 the court
concluded that the constitutionality of an assertion of subpoena
power, like an assertion of personal jurisdiction, should be
gauged by the International Shoe minimum contacts test.
Thus, assertions of extraterritorial subpoena power are not un-
constitutional per se.28 7
284. 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
285. 636 F.2d at 1321 n.119.
286. This statement was dicta since the French corporation "repeatedly
conceded" its amenability to the FTC's subpoena power, and only challenged
the method of service of the subpoena abroad. Id.
287. Just as the minimum contacts test for determining the constitutional-
ity of assertions of personal jurisdiction was first developed in connection with
a corporate defendant, see supra Part II. C., a minimum contacts test for deter-
mining the constitutionality of assertions of subpoena power is being applied
in connection with corporate or agency nonparty witnesses. See, e.g., In re
Grand Jury 81-2, 550 F. Supp. 24, 27 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (holding that a federal
court in Michigan had subpoena power to require a German bank to produce
documents located in Germany because the bank had an active branch in New
York and "'purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the ... [United States]' "(quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958)); In re Arawak Trust Co. (Cayman), 489 F. Supp. 162, 165 (E.D.N.Y.
1980) (stating that "[w]ithout deciding that they mark the boundaries of Con-
gress' constitutional power, the court imputes to Congress a purpose to limit
the court's personal jurisdiction to subpoena a foreign corporation to the kinds
of circumstances discussed in International Shoe" (citation omitted)); Ghandi
v. Police Dep't of Detroit, 74 F.R.D. 115, 121 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (stating that
"where the witness named in the subpoena is a corporation, the subpoena may
be served upon an... agent of the corporation in a district within which the
corporation has sufficient presence or 'contacts' [citation omitted] to make it
amenable to service of a subpoena duces tecum"); Elder-Beerman Stores Corp.
v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 515, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (stating that
"[a] foreign corporation doing business in a district is subject to all process, in-
cluding subpoena, in the district"); Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 43 N.Y.2d 11, 15, 371 N.E.2d 453, 455, 400 N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (1977)
(holding that "a corporation doing business in New York may be subpoenaed
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e. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts
Cases already discussed suggest that an assertion of extra-
territorial subpoena power may be constitutional if the nonresi-
dent witness has sufficient contacts with the trial state such
that an assertion of personal jurisdiction over the witness
would be fair and reasonable. 28 8 It is critical to realize, more-
over, that the nonresident witness is not being sued, but only
being compelled to testify. The United States Supreme Court's
decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts289 suggests that be-
cause the burdens placed on the nonresident witness are con-
siderably less severe than the burdens placed on the
nonresident defendant, the amount of contact that the witness
must have with the trial state should be correspondingly less, if
any should be required at all.
In Phillips Petroleum the Court considered whether a
Kansas state court could assert personal jurisdiction over ab-
sent class members who had little or no contact with Kansas.290
Although class members received notice of the action, and had
an opportunity to "opt out" of the class, they were not required
to "opt in.",29 1 In considering whether Kansas could assert per-
sonal jurisdiction over nonresident plaintiffs who lacked suffi-
cient contact with the forum to justify assertions of jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants, the Court noted that "[t]he bur-
dens placed by a State upon an absent class-action plaintiff are
not of the same order or magnitude as those it places upon an
absent defendant. '292
Although a nonresident defendant typically must retain
counsel, participate in extensive and costly discovery, and risk
imposition of a judgment, which may include court costs and at-
torneys' fees, 2 93 the Court found that the class action plaintiff
to testify as a witness about a corporate transaction through its officers and
employees who have knowledge of the transaction"); LaBelle Creole Int'l v.
Attorney Gen., 10 N.Y.2d 192, 198, 176 N.E.2d 705, 708, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (1961)
(stating that "even if the [Panamanian corporation's] contacts with this State
were deemed to be less than necessary to justify the maintenance of a civil
suit. ... [the corporation] would still be amenable to the subpoena served upon
its president by the Attorney-General in connection with the investigation the
latter seeks to initiate").
288. See supra text accompanying notes 279-87.
289. 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985).
290. Id at 806.
291. Id at 801.
292. Id- at 808.
293. Id The Phillips Petroleum Court identified only the universal bur-
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"is in quite a different posture."2 94 The absent plaintiff's claim
against the defendant is a property interest protected by the
due process clause, which an adverse judgment in the class ac-
tion may extinguish, 295 but the actual burdens imposed on the
absent class member are slight. Unlike a defendant, the typical
absent plaintiff class member need not hire counsel, appear, de-
fend claims, or risk liability for attorneys' fees or costs. 296 The
Court concluded:
[b]ecause States place fewer burdens upon absent class plaintiffs than
they do upon absent defendants in non-class suits, the Due Process
Clause need not and does not afford the former as much protection
from state-court jurisdiction as it does the latter .... [A] forum State
may exercise jurisdiction over the claim of an absent class-action
plaintiff, even though that plaintiff may not possess the minimum
contacts with the forum which would support personal jurisdiction
over a defendant.
2 9 7
Although perhaps more onerous than the burdens an ab-
sent class plaintiff faces, 298 both the universal and state-specific
burdens a nonparty witness bears are far less substantial than
those borne by a defendant. In terms of universal burdens, a
nonparty witness rarely needs to retain counsel or to commit
more than a few days to the litigation. As long as the witness
complies with the subpoena and testifies truthfully, the court
cannot impose a judgment or other sanction.2 99 The witness is
even reimbursed for travel expenses and receives a per diem al-
lowance.300 The defendant, on the other hand, faces the far
dens a defendant suffers. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the state-specific burdens a defendant may suffer.
294. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 808.
295. Id at 807.
296. I. at 810.
297. I. at 811.
298. Unlike class action plaintiffs, nonparty witnesses who are not expert
witnesses receive no benefits from participation in litigation (other than the
satisfaction of seeing justice done).
299. Of course, if the witness fails to honor the subpoena, she risks a cita-
tion for contempt, see infra Part IV. C., and if she testifies untruthfully, she
risks a prosecution for perjury. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1982); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-156 (West 1958); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-33-1 (1981 & Supp.
1988); 10 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 603.02 to -.03
(2d ed. 1988). Although certainly not insignificant, these are risks the defend-
ant faces to the extent she is required to testify at trial, or is enjoined from
engaging in specified activity. These risks also may be no more significant
than the absent class plaintiff's risk that she will be barred by res judicata
from prosecuting her claim against the defendant if the defendant prevails on
the merits in the class action litigation. See supra text accompanying note 295.
300. See supra notes 242-43.
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more onerous universal burdens described by the Phillips Pe-
troleum Court.
In addition, the defendant faces significant state-specific
burdens - the application of "unfavorable" law, the inability to
subpoena nonresident witnesses, and the inability to join, as
third party defendants, persons beyond the jurisdictional reach
of the forum. The nonparty witness faces few, if any, state-spe-
cific burdens.30 ' Based on the reasoning of Phillips Petroleum,
therefore, a state could constitutionally assert extraterritorial
subpoena power over a prospective witness who had even fewer
contacts with the state than a nonresident defendant would
need to have.302
301. See supra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
302. Two cases support this conclusion. The first, LaBelle Creole Int'l v.
Attorney Gen., 10 N.Y.2d 192, 176 N.E.2d 705, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1961), involved
in-state service of a subpoena upon the president of a Panamanian corporation
with its principal place of business in Haiti. The Attorney General initiated an
investigation of the Panamanian corporation, and served the subpoena in con-
nection with the investigation. The corporation challenged the subpoena, ar-
guing that it did not "do business" in New York and therefore was not
amenable to process there. In discussing the contacts that would be required
to render the corporation subject to New York's subpoena power, the court of
appeals noted:
[E]ven if the [corporation's] contacts with this State were deemed to
be less than necessary to justify the maintenance of a civil suit, it is
our view that it would still be amenable to the subpoena served upon
the president by the Attorney-General in connection with the investi-
gation the latter seeks to initiate .... As long as [the state attorney
general] has reasonable basis for believing that the corporation vio-
lated a New York statute, he is not prevented by the due process
clause of the Federal Constitution from exercising his power of sub-
poena ....
LaBelle Creole, 10 N.Y.2d at 198, 176 N.E.2d at 708-09, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
Although the state's interest in assuring a corporation's cooperation with an
investigation may be greater than its interest in assuring a nonresident wit-
ness's appearance in a private civil action, the burden on the witness remains
the same. See supra text accompanying notes 277-78.
The second case, In re Arawak Trust Co. (Cayman), 489 F. Supp. 162
(E.D.N.Y. 1980), involved in-state service of subpoenas on a 28% stockholder of
Arawak Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd. ("Arawak"), a corporation organized
under the laws of the Cayman Islands, British West Indies, and on current and
former directors of Arawak. The subpoenas sought production of documents
in Arawak's possession before a federal grand jury. When Arawak refused to
honor the subpoenas, the government sought an order holding Arawak in con-
tempt. Arawak appeared specially "to assert that the court ha[d] no jurisdic-
tion over it and thus no authority to entertain the application." Id. at 163. In
discussing whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(e) authorizes fed-
eral subpoena power over nonresident foreign corporations, the court stated:
It is not reasonable to impute to Congress a purpose to immunize
from process non-resident foreign corporations conducting substantial
and continuing activities here.... Without deciding that they mark
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A California appellate court has suggested, however, that
the nonparty witness served with a subpoena faces greater bur-
dens than the defendant served with a summons:
[Tihe penalty for disobeying a subpoena may be much more serious
than that for not responding to a summons .... Not answering a
summons normally will produce a default judgment for the payment
of money, which may sometimes be later set aside .... Nonresponse
to a subpoena may result in money damages plus
imprisonment.30
3
Although the California court correctly noted that failure
to comply with a subpoena may be punished by contempt, it in-
correctly suggested that the punishment for contempt will inva-
riably be more severe than the punishment for failure to
comply with a summons. The default judgment against the "re-
calcitrant" defendant likely will be for a much greater amount
than the contempt fine. More significantly, the court ignored
the fact that a defendant may well be subpoenaed to testify and
then would face the same risks as the nonparty witness. Fi-
nally, the California court incorrectly focused on the conse-
quences of failure to comply with the process rather than on
the burdens of compliance itself. The latter comparison makes
more sense, given the legal obligation to comply with the pro-
cess, and the statistical probability that the recipient will
comply.
In all events, the constitutionality of an assertion of sub-
poena power must turn on the degree of inconvenience it
causes the witness, not on the incidence of state boundaries
the boundaries of Congress' constitutional power, the court imputes to
Congress a purpose to limit the court's personal jurisdiction to sub-
poena a foreign corporation to the kind of circumstances discussed in
International Shoe.... If the criteria for subpoenaing a foreign cor-
poration before a grand jury are to be less stringent than those appli-
cable to a civil summons, Congress should make that judgment.
Id. at 165 (emphasis added). The court thus contemplated that Congress could
authorize assertions of subpoena power over persons who have fewer contacts
than would be required for assertions of personal jurisdiction.
303. In re Abrams, 108 Cal. App. 3d 685, 690, 166 Cal. Rptr. 749, 753 (Ct.
App. 1980). See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d
487, 494 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (comparing the relatively benign judicial enforce-
ment powers invoked for failure to respond to service of a complaint with the
severe consequences of failure to respond to an investigative subpoena); Fed-
eral Trade Comm'n v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d
1300, 1311-12 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (describing the more severe consequences of fail-
ure to obey an investigatory subpoena); Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Feder-
ated Dep't Stores, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 515, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (noting that in
determining whether a foreign corporation does business within the jurisdic-
tion, a stricter standard might apply to nonresident witnesses as opposed to
nonresident defendants).
[Vol. 74:37
SUBPOENA POWER
alone. The due process clause does not dictate concern for the
sovereignty of the witness's home state. Further, concerns for
the nonparty witness's convenience do not justify a blanket re-
fusal to exercise extraterritorial subpoena power. So long as
the assertion of subpoena power over the witness comports
with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,"30 4
the assertion is constitutional.
B. INADEQUACIES OF THE COMPENSATORY STATUTES
Even if extraterritorial subpoena power comports with due
process, the states should hesitate to exercise it if the compen-
satory statutes already in place adequately protect litigants' in-
terests. In fact, however, the statutes fall short in at least three
respects: they deprive parties of the opportunity to obtain live
testimony at trial; they are cumbersome, expensive, and time-
consuming to use; and they vest an uninformed home state
court with "veto" power over an informed trial state court's
conclusion that a witness should be subpoenaed to attend a
deposition.
1. The Survey
To determine whether the unavailability of extraterritorial
subpoena power affects the quality of justice rendered by state
courts, the author prepared a questionnaire 30 5 and sent it to a
sample of practicing lawyers who specialize in litigation.3 06 The
questionnaire asked the lawyers whether they ever had en-
countered situations in which the attendance of a witness could
not be obtained by subpoena because the witness resided
outside the trial state, and if so, whether they had deposed the
304. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
305. See infra Appendix Part XII (reprinting the questionnaire).
306. The author mailed the questionnaire on June 23, 1988 to 133 attorneys
selected from WHO'S WHO IN AMERICAN LAw (5th ed. 1987-88). The sample in-
cluded all lawyers from either Pittsburgh or Philadelphia, Pennsylvania listing
both federal civil litigation and state civil litigation as their areas of specialty.
Of these 131 attorneys, 49 practiced in Pittsburgh and 82 in Philadelphia. Nine
of the 131 also listed criminal litigation as an area of specialty. Two additional
lawyers from Pennsylvania, practicing in neither Pittsburgh nor Philadelphia,
but listing criminal litigation as well as both federal and state civil litigation as
areas of specialty, were included in the sample. The author selected lawyers
from Pittsburgh and Philadelphia anticipating that lawyers near state borders
would encounter problems with out-of-state witnesses more frequently than
lawyers elsewhere. Both Pittsburgh and Philadelphia are relatively close to
Pennsylvania's border. Fifty-three of the 133 recipients of the questionnaire,
or 40%, provided substantive written responses. These written responses are
on file with the author.
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witness in advance of trial. The lawyers then were asked
whether they attempted to obtain the witness's live testimony
at trial even though they were authorized by statute to offer
the witness's deposition testimony into evidence, and if so, why
they attempted to obtain live testimony. Finally, the lawyers
were asked whether they would have subpoenaed the out-of-
state witness if extraterritorial subpoena power had been
available.
The responses to the questionnaire reveal that the out-of-
state witness poses a common problem in civil practice.307 In-
deed, a full 81% of the lawyers responding had participated in
at least one civil case in which at least one witness resided
outside the trial state. Although many of the respondents men-
tioned instances in which the nonresident witness resided a
substantial distance from the place of trial, 50% of those an-
swering the question about distance indicated that in their ex-
perience, at least one absent witness resided in an adjacent
state, and 18% responded that the witness was less than fifty
miles away, often "just across the river."308 Thus, even a mod-
est assertion of extraterritorial subpoena power would enable
state courts to reach a large number of out-of-state witnesses.
Of the respondents who had experienced the problem of
the out-of-state witness, a vast majority had deposed the wit-
ness.30 9 Although the survey did not directly ask about the
"compensatory" statutes, 26% of the respondents who encoun-
tered the problem of the nonresident witness actually volun-
teered that the process for taking depositions outside the trial
307. Of the 53 lawyers providing written responses to the questionnaire, 43,
or 81%, indicated that they had participated in at least one civil case in which
at least one witness resided outside the trial state. Twenty-four respondents,
or 45%, indicated that they had encountered this problem on more than one
occasion.
308. Thirty-four respondents discussed the distance between the witness's
place of residence and the courthouse where the action was pending. Seven-
teen of the 34 respondents, or 50%, indicated that in at least one case, a wit-
ness whose testimony was relevant to an action pending in Pennsylvania
resided in either Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, or West Virginia, all
states adjacent to Pennsylvania. Six of the 34 respondents, or 18%, noted that
the witness resided less than 50 miles from the courthouse, most often "just
across the river" from Philadelphia in New Jersey.
309. Of the 40 respondents who responded to the deposition question, 38, or
95%, stated that they had taken the deposition of the out-of-state witness.
Eleven of these 38 respondents qualified their responses by indicating either
that they had taken an out-of-state deposition in at least one of the cases in
which they encountered the problem of the nonresident witness, or that the
decision to take an out-of-state deposition turned on the importance of the wit-
ness's testimony.
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state was time-consuming, expensive, and cumbersome. 1 0
The greatest problem caused by the limited reach of state
court subpoenas, however, was the inability to obtain the wit-
nesses' live testimony at trial. Despite the expenditure of con-
siderable time, energy, and money to depose out-of-state
witnesses, and the ability to offer the deposition transcripts into
evidence at the trial,3 1 ' an overwhelming 97% of the respon-
dents who had deposed out-of-state witnesses indicated that
they attempted to obtain the witnesses' voluntary attendance at
trial.312 In explaining why, these lawyers expressed an overrid-
ing preference for live testimony over deposition testimony, re-
peatedly reciting that "live testimony is always better" because
of its greater impact on the jury.3 13 To the extent, then, that
310. The unsolicited comments regarding the inadequacies of the compen-
satory statutory schemes identify three related problems: expense, cumber-
some nature, and time.
Expens. The following statement is illustrative: "[I]n a smaller case ..
the cost of going out of state and paying for the other counsel to do so in order
to take a deposition of a witness is often prohibitive ... so that for all intents
and purposes, that witness is unavailable to all parties."
Cumbersome Nature: Some of the responses directly stated that it is "ex-
tremely difficult and cumbersome" to use the compensatory statutory
schemes. Others simply noted that ancillary litigation had been required to
obtain a deposition subpoena in the home state, "which should have been un-
necessary," or that a commission had been obtained from the trial court. Both
of the respondents who had used the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance in
criminal cases commented on its "unwield[iness]" and "cumbersome" nature.
See supra Part III. B. 4. A number of those who noted the cumbersome nature
of the compensatory schemes commented on the relative simplicity of the fed-
eral system, which authorizes the taking of depositions of nonresident wit-
nesses in the home state without any judicial involvement in either the home
state or the trial state. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45.
Time: Several respondents commented on how "time-consuming" it is to
depose out-of-state witnesses. With respect to the Uniform Act to Secure At-
tendance, supra Part III. B. 4., one respondent noted that criminal trials "come
up" too quickly to afford prosecutors an opportunity to take advantage of the
Act.
311. See supra Part III. B. 3. for a discussion of state statutes authorizing
the use of deposition transcripts of out-of-state witnesses at trial. See also in-
fra Appendix Part X.
312. Thirty-nine respondents answered the question regarding attempts to
obtain the witness's voluntary appearance, but one gave a nonresponsive an-
swer, and one answered "N/A" as the respondent did not take the nonresident
witness's deposition. Of the remaining 37 respondents, 36, or 97%, indicated
that they sought the voluntary attendance of the witness even though they
could have offered the transcript of the witness's deposition into evidence at
trial.
313. The following statements illustrate both the tenor and content of the
responses: "Since live testimony is always more effective in court than
'canned' deposition testimony, I have sought to have the attendance of wit-
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the lack of extraterritorial subpoena power translates into the
absence of live testimony from nonresident witnesses, 14 it neg-
atively affects the quality of justice administered by state
nesses live, especially where their testimony is significant, lengthy, or where
the witness makes a good appearance as a witness;" 'You always want a
favorable witness to be live. Depositions, even by video, are boring to a jury;"
"Reading a transcript to the jury is the least satisfactory method of persuading
the jury. In-court testimony has a far more important impact and the atten-
tion of the jury is much more focused than would be the case in reading from
a cold record." Ten respondents volunteered that even videotape depositions
are an inadequate substitute for live testimony. Four others stated, however,
that the availability of videotape depositions rendered the problem of the non-
resident witness less significant. Several others merely noted the availability
of videotape depositions.
Although virtually all respondents encountering the problem of the non-
resident witness indicated a preference for live testimony, only about a third
offered reasons for this preference. Most commonly, the respondents indi-
cated that the jury would be in a better position to assess the credibility and
demeanor of the witness. Several respondents expressed concern that the jury
would grow bored listening to a deposition transcript. Several respondents
noted that only live testimony allows a response to late-breaking develop-
ments in a case. Finally, one respondent noted that the use of deposition tran-
scripts as evidence "delays the trial because you have to go over the deposition
transcript in detail and go over objections in detail so that the trial becomes
unbelievably long and cumbersome, which is generally detrimental to the
party attempting to present that witness's testimony."
314. The lack of extraterritorial subpoena power does not always preclude
live testimony. The respondents' efforts to obtain the voluntary appearance of
nonresident witnesses occasionally were successful. Nor would the availability
of broader subpoena power necessarily translate into the presence of more live
witnesses. Several respondents who extolled the virtues of live testimony nev-
ertheless stated that they might not have subpoenaed nonresident witnesses
even if extraterritorial subpoena power had been available. The most common
reason offered was that an unfriendly witness might become even more hostile
if subpoenaed.
Although attorneys occasionally obtain live testimony without extraterri-
torial subpoena power and might not use it even when available, states are not
justified in their reluctance to authorize such power. First, states could ex-
pand the scope of their subpoena power without changing the circumstances in
which deposition transcripts could be offered into evidence. Even today, "use
of deposition" statutes often allow depositions to be offered into evidence
when the witness is within the subpoena power of the court. See supra Part
III. B. 3. Lawyers wanting to compel the attendance of out-of-state witnesses
would be able to do so. Second, the availability of subpoena power for in-state
witnesses already forces some lawyers to choose between foregoing the wit-
ness's testimony altogether and antagonizing the witness by compelling her at-
tendance. Because states have been willing to put lawyers to this choice when
the potentially hostile witness resides in-state, there is no reason for allowing
the risk of alienation to affect the availability of extraterritorial subpoena
power. Finally, if the malleability of a witness's testimony is a matter of genu-
ine concern, the states should address it directly, by enforcing more rigorously
the prohibition against perjury, rather than indirectly, by limiting the geo-
graphic scope of their subpoena power.
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courts. 3 1 5
2. An Elaboration of the Inadequacies of the Present System
This section more thoroughly discusses the two weaknesses
of the compensatory statutory schemes identified by the re-
spondents to the questionnaire: the unavailability of live testi-
mony in civil cases and the cumbersome nature of the process
for taking out-of-state depositions. This section also will ex-
amine a third problem with the current system: by mandating
reliance upon the cooperation of other states, the compensatory
statutes render trial state judges powerless to assure that a ma-
terial witness's testimony will be available even in written form
at trial.316 These problems demonstrate that the states are mis-
taken if they believe that the current system adequately pro-
tects litigants' interests and promotes justice.
a. The unavailability of live testimony in civil actions
Our civil litigation system recognizes the importance of live
testimony in many different contexts. For example, appellate
courts defer to findings of fact made by trial courts, on the the-
ory that trial court judges or jurors who actually observe the
witnesses are in a much better position to "find the facts" than
appellate court judges who see only the paper record.317 Trial
courts grant summary judgment only in cases in which "no gen-
uine issue as to any material fact" exists.318 Such a standard re-
flects the view that disputed questions of fact should be decided
at trial, where witnesses will appear live, rather than on the ba-
315. For more scientific support for the proposition that live testimony is
"better" than deposition testimony, see Williams, Farmer, Lee, Cundick,
Howell & Rooker, Juror Perceptions of Trial Testimony as a Function of the
Method of Presentation.: A Comparison of Live, Color Video, Black-and-White
Video, Audio and Transcript Presentations, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 375, 408-11
[hereinafter Juror Perceptions of Trial Testimony].
316. There is a fourth potential problem with the current system: the home
state may apply its own law regarding privilege when the witness testifies at a
deposition taken there, even though the trial state would have applied its law
if the witness had testified live at the trial. See supra note 245. A related
choice of law problem can arise regarding relevancy. See Mullin, supra note
175, at 39-42.
317. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); accord Fullenwider v. Ewing, 30 Kan. 15, 21,
1 P. 300, 304-05 (1883); King v. International Harvester Co., 212 Va. 78, 84, 181
S.E.2d 656, 660 (1971).
318. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See also, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-56(c) (1982);
IDAHO R. Civ. P. 56(c); IND. R. Civ. P. 56(c); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-256(c)
(1983).
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sis of written reviews of the discovery and ex parte affidavits.319
These expressions of preference for live testimony reflect sev-
eral independent considerations.
First, when live testimony is elicited at trial, the opposing
party has an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Cross-
examination helps educe the whole truth: it challenges a wit-
ness's recollection, consistency, and veracity.320 Although the
opportunity for cross-examination exists when depositions are
taken upon oral examination, it is reduced to a formality of
limited utility when depositions are taken on written interroga-
tories. To the extent, then, that the compensatory statutory
schemes relegate the parties to the examination of out-of-state
witnesses on written questions,321 they deprive the parties of
"one of the most potent tools in the trial of lawsuits to ascer-
tain the truth of a matter. '322
Second, even when depositions upon oral examination are
taken and offered into evidence at trial, the efficacy of the trial
process is seriously compromised. Absent live testimony, the
finder of fact cannot view the witness's appearance or de-
meanor, and is greatly disadvantaged in assessing credibility.
As Blackstone noted, the "open examination of witnesses viva
voce, in the presence of all mankind" is the only method of ex-
amination that permits "the persons who are to decide upon the
evidence [to] have an opportunity of observing the quality, age,
education, understanding, behaviour, and inclinations of the
witness. ' 323 Although videotape depositions 324 might alleviate
319. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CML PROCEDURE § 5.19, at 274-77 (3d ed.
1985).
320. See, e.g., 3 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *373; accord Wolfe v.
Wolfe, 242 Ky. 162, 164, 45 S.W.2d 1043, 1044 (1932) (reversing trial court that
decided the case on the basis of ex parte affidavits, thereby denying appellant
right to cross-examine her adversary's witnesses); State v. Huffman, 86 Ohio
St. 229, 241-42, 99 N.E. 295, 298 (1912) (stating that cross-examination is invalu-
able as a test of the accuracy, truthfulness, and credibility of testimony);
Thompson v. Thompson, 68 Pa. D. & C. 386, 391 (Dist. Ct. 1949) (noting the
"vast difference" between depositions taken with opportunity to cross-examine
and those taken on submitted interrogatories). One of the respondents to the
survey discussed in Part IV. B. 1. noted that "cross-examination of the witness
would be more effective if the witness were present in court."
321. See supra note 176 (discussing the Iowa, New York, and Wisconsin
statutes).
322. Miskelley v. Mississippi, 480 So.2d 1104, 1108 (Miss. 1985).
323. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *372-73. For discussions of the im-
portance of live testimony, see, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156-61
(1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 721 (1968); Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
324. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2025(u)(4) (West Supp. 1989); COLO.
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the "demeanor" problem to some extent,3 25 such depositions
fail to capture off-camera signs of nervousness, such as foot-tap-
ping or finger-snapping, 326 and create a host of new problems,
such as camera-induced self-consciousness or "playing to the
camera."
327
Third, unlike live testimony at trial, which incorporates all
pre-trial discovery and late-breaking trial developments, deposi-
tion testimony is "frozen" as of the time it is taken. Thus, if a
deposition is taken early in a litigation, the parties will not
have the opportunity to question the witness regarding matters
that are learned only later in the discovery process. 328
Although a second or third deposition of the same witness is
possible, the expense may be prohibitive.329 Even if the deposi-
tion is taken on the eve of trial, unanticipated developments
may occur at trial, and the parties will be deprived of an oppor-
tunity to question the deposed witness about the new
matters.330
R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 30 (Law. Co-op 1986); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 30(b)(4) (1983). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4).
325. But see Juror Perceptions of Trial Testimony, supra note 315, at 393-
96 (stating that jurors' assessments of witness honesty and friendliness were
affected by whether testimony was presented live or by color videotape); G.
MILLER, VIDEOTAPE ON TRIAL: A VIEW FROM THE JURY Box (1979) (citing em-
pirical studies finding that monochromatic videotape presentation produced
generally fewer positive ratings of the experimental witness than did the live
testimony of the witness).
326. Doret, Trial by Videotape - Can Justice be Seen to be Done, 47 TEMP.
L.Q. 228, 234 (1974), notes that if the camera is trained on the witness's head
or head-and-upper-body throughout the examination, "the juror could watch
only what was shown on the tape, and this would exercise a managing effect
on the sensory data offered the juror. Important information might be con-
veyed off-camera, which the juror would be deprived of seeing." As an exam-
ple of "body language" that the camera might miss, Doret refers to "the
telltale hand gestures of Captain Queeg, portrayed by Humphrey Bogart, in
the motion picture The Caine Mutiny." Id. at 234 n.30.
327. Id. at 245-46.
328. Graczyk, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure: Chapter 804,
59 MARQ. L. REV. 463, 502-03 (1976); see, e.g., Roche v. Massachusetts Bay
Transp. Auth., 400 Mass. 217, 219-20, 508 N.E.2d 614, 617 (1987); McGuinness v.
State, 92 N.M. 441, 442, 589 P.2d 1032, 1033 (1979). As one respondent to the
survey noted in explaining why he had tried to obtain the nonresident wit-
ness's live testimony, "[the] deposition didn't cover issues developed after [the]
deposition." Another respondent commented, "I prefer the witness to be
there. This ... allows me to add, modify or explain with additional testi-
mony." One respondent explained that while he would usually prefer live tes-
timony, he might offer a deposition transcript "if the witness . . . could be
additionally impeached by newly discovered evidence."
329. See infra Part IV. B. 2. b.
330. See, e.g., Ricketson v. Blair, 171 Ga. App. 714, 718, 320 S.E.2d 788, 791
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If an objection made during a deposition is sustained at
trial, the party offering the deposition lacks the opportunity to
cure the resulting deficiency unless the witness is present at
trial.331 Although the lawyer conducting a deposition may an-
ticipate that an objection will be sustained at trial, and may
pursue alternate lines of questioning to avoid the objection,
there simply may not be enough time to engage in substitute
lines of inquiry in response to every objection made. Most
likely, the attorney will assess the probability that the court
will sustain an objection and will conduct the examination ac-
cordingly. The fixed nature of the deposition transcript or tape
and the inability to compel the appearance of the out-of-state
witness dictate that all mistakes in the lawyer's judgment are
chastened by the loss of material testimony.
Fourth, although live testimony takes place before a judge
in a courtroom, a deposition takes place before a court reporter,
often in the witness's office or some other comfortable place.332
This difference in setting has several consequences. Although
sworn to tell the truth, the deponent may not take the oath as
seriously as a live witness who testifies under the judge's stern
eye.333 Even if the deponent honors the oath, the situs of the
examination may affect the tenor of the testimony. Because a
lawyer can schedule the time and place of a deposition to suit
the convenience of the witness and can "go off the record" to
consult with the witness or take a break, the deposition wit-
ness's comfort level may be dramatically different than if ex-
amined in court. This difference may translate into a
difference in attentiveness, concern for detail, and serious-
(1984); Ela v. Ela, 68 N.H. 312, 313, 36 A. 15, 16 (1895); Metcalf v. Gilmore, 63
N.H. 174, 186-89 (1884).
331. See Doret, supra note 326, at 237-38.
332. I& at 246; Graczyk, supra note 328, at 503. See also Thompson v.
Thompson, 68 Pa. D. & C. 386, 391-92 (1949) (noting the "unsatisfactory nature
of examination by interrogatories and cross-interrogatories"); King v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 212 Va. 78, 84, 181 S.E.2d 656, 661 (1971) (stating that dep-
ositions taken "under certain specified circumstances and conditions ... were
never intended to be substituted for the personal appearance of party litigants
or witnesses"); Bertsch v. Brewer, 97 Wash. 2d 83, 89-90, 640 P.2d 711, 714-15
(1982) (noting that witness's appearance, demeanor and behavior at deposition
could be different than at trial).
333. State v. Murphy, 48 S.C. 1, 3-5, 25 S.E. 43, 44 (1896); 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *372-73; Doret, supra note 326, at 246-47; Giffen, Missouri Dep-
ositions for Courts in Other States, 26 J. Mo. B. 395, 403-04 (1970); cf. Califor-
nia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1970) (emphasizing that live testimony is
vital because it impresses on witness "the seriousness of the matter").
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ness.334 As former Chief Justice Warren observed,
the courtroom in Anglo-American jurisprudence is more than a loca-
tion with seats for a judge, jury, witnesses, defendant, prosecutor, de-
fense counsel and public observers; the setting that the courtroom
provides is itself an important element in the constitutional concep-
tion of trial, contributing a dignity essential to the "integrity of the
trial" process.
3 3 5
The inability to compel an out-of-state witness to appear and
testify viva voce in court thus may affect the veracity, accuracy,
and consistency of her testimony.
Fifth, when a witness is examined in open court, the judge
or even the jury may ask questions, directing the course of the
examination and assuring that all relevant questions are asked
and answered.336 Even when the judge and jurors remain silent
during a witness's examination, their facial expressions and
body language may communicate something to the witness, pro-
viding positive reinforcement to the witness they perceive as
honest and direct, and negative reinforcement to the witness
they perceive as mendacious or evasive. 33 7 When a deposition
transcript is read into evidence, however, the judge and jury
have no opportunity to communicate with the witness. This
lack of interaction and involvement not only affects the wit-
ness, but also alienates and bores the jurors,338 whose confi-
dence in the legitimacy and efficacy of the fact-finding process
is critical to societal acceptance of jury verdicts.339
Finally, an inaccurate transcript or record of the deposition
will compromise the quality of justice available in the proceed-
334. The lawyer may manipulate the opportunity to offer deposition testi-
mony by "depos[ing] several experts or the same expert several times to obtain
the most persuasive performance for use at trial." Graczyk, supra note 328, at
503. As long as the witness is beyond the subpoena power of the court, the
"deposition of any witness, including the party himself, can be videotaped out
of court, under conditions which maximize the chances for an examination
favorable to the party offering the deposition, and can be freely substituted for
testimony during the trial." Id.
335. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 561 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring),
quoted in Doret, supra note 326, at 244.
336. People v. Carter, 37 N.Y.2d 234, 239, 333 N.E.2d 177, 180-81, 371
N.Y.S.2d 905, 910 (1975); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373; Doret, supra
note 326, at 250-51.
337. Doret, supra note 326, at 250.
338. See Juror Perceptions of Trial Testimony, supra note 315, at 408-09
(finding that a transcript read aloud is least interesting, most difficult to pay
attention to, and least clear method of presenting testimony); see also J.
JEANS, LITIGATION § 10.27 (1986) (suggesting that trial lawyer use another per-
son to "play" the deponent in reading deposition to help reduce tedium).
339. Doret, supra note 326, at 255.
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ing. Although this probably is much less of a problem today
than it was in the eighteenth century, when "an artful or care-
less scribe [could] make a witness speak what he never
meant,"3 0 transcription errors and inaudible tape recordings
remain a fact of life.341 Such difficulties are avoided when the
witness testifies live at trial.
b. The expense, inconvenience, and consumption of time
occasioned by the compensatory schemes
Statutory schemes enacted to ensure that the testimony of
out-of-state witnesses is available at trial, at least in written
form, have been criticized by lawyers not only because they
force attorneys to settle for written or taped testimony rather
than live testimony, but also because they entail expense, in-
convenience, and consumption of time.342 In cases where the
amount in controversy is small and all witnesses reside in-state,
a lawyer may decide to limit pre-trial discovery to interrogato-
ries and requests for the production of documents. Concluding
that it would be too expensive, relative to the amount in con-
troversy, both to take depositions and call witnesses to testify at
trial,343 the lawyer would choose the less expensive alternative
and simply call as trial witnesses persons whose depositions
have not been taken.344
If a witness resides out-of-state, however, the lawyer in the
"small" case is put to a hard choice: either incur the relatively
hefty expense of taking the witness's deposition in the witness's
340. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373.
341. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1378-79 (6th Cir.)
(stating that "typographical mistakes ... occasionally occur during the course
of stenographic transcription"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 259 (1988); United
States v. Charmer Indus., 722 F.2d 1073, 1075 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that tape
of oral argument was "inaudible or indecipherable" and motion to obtain tran-
script of argument was granted "to the extent that the tape was audible").
342. See supra note 310 (discussing responses to the questionnaire).
343. Depositions are expensive because "each party must pay for the time
that his attorney spends in connection with the deposition. In addition, a party
will have to pay for any transcriptions of the deposition which he receives and
perhaps, some witness fees and expenses." J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A.
MILLER, CrviL PROCEDURE 396 (1985). In most, if not all, cases, it would be
less expensive to forego the deposition and simply subpoena the witness to tes-
tify at trial (even taking into account the witness fees and expenses that will
have to be reimbursed).
344. This strategy may be risky because the lawyer may have problems as-
sessing the appearance the witness will make on the stand absent a deposition
beforehand. See id. at 395 (noting the utility of depositions for gauging a wit-
ness's appearance).
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home state345 or forego the testimony altogether.346 If the at-
torney decides to take the deposition, and opposing counsel
feels the need to attend the deposition to cross-examine the
witness, the expense problem is exacerbated; now two lawyers'
clients are forced to incur deposition-related expenses. To the
extent that statutory schemes require leave of court to take the
deposition or subpoena the witness in the home state,347 they
also mandate additional lawyer hours for court appearances
and additional expense.
Even when expense is not an issue, the compensatory stat-
utes make the taking of depositions of out-of-state witnesses far
more difficult and cumbersome than the depositions of in-state
witnesses. When the potential deponent resides in-state, the
procedure for obtaining a deposition subpoena is relatively sim-
ple: the lawyer seeking the deposition simply files with the
clerk a notice of deposition with proof of service. The clerk
then issues the subpoena to the lawyer, who arranges to have it
served by any adult not a party to the action.3 8
When the witness is out-of-state, however, the procedure
may be far more complicated and cumbersome. Some states re-
quire a commission from the trial state before they will issue a
deposition subpoena to compel attendance at a deposition to be
used in an action pending elsewhere.349 The party seeking the
deposition thus may have to go to court in the trial state to ob-
tain the commission, and to have the commission authenticated
to ensure that it is entitled to full faith and credit in the home
state.350 Some state statutes also require participation by the
345. If the deposition is taken outside the trial state, the attorneys' fees
will be higher as the party will have to compensate the lawyer for travel time.
346. See supra note 310 for the survey responses regarding expense. If the
state authorized extraterritorial subpoena power, the lawyer could avoid the
expense of taking the deposition, but would have to pay witness fees and
travel expenses of the subpoenaed witness. Several respondents to the survey
raised the cost of bringing the witness to the trial as a factor to be considered
in deciding whether to exercise the proposed extraterritorial subpoena power.
347. See supra notes 189-90.
348. See, e.g., ALASKA R. Civ. P. 45; ARIz. R. Civ. P. 45; ARK. R. Civ. P. 45;
COLO. R. Civ. P. 45.
349. See supra note 187 (citing statutes). The Uniform Act to Secure At-
tendance requires the court in the trial state to certify that the witness is a
"material witness." UNIF. ACT TO SEcuRE ATTENDANCE, supra note 159, § 3.
Cf. FED.R. Civ. P. 45 (requiring no judicial involvement for the issuance of a
deposition subpoena).
350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982), providing-
[the] Acts, records and judicial proceedings [of any State, Territory or
Possession] or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same
full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its
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judge in the deponent's home state before a deposition sub-
poena can issue.351 Again, the lawyer seeking the deposition
must make an appearance in court, and may even have to re-
tain local counsel in the witness's home state.352 Thus, at least
some of the compensatory statutory schemes dictate involve-
ment by two judges and four lawyers35 3 for the issuance of one
deposition subpoena.
Consumption of time is a necessary concomitant of this in-
convenient and cumbersome process. To the extent that the
statutory schemes require taking depositions that would not be
necessary if the witness were subject to the trial court's sub-
poena power, the statutes cause delay.354 The more hoops a
lawyer must go through to get a commission from the trial
state or a subpoena from the home state - the more cumber-
some the compensatory statutory schemes - the more time
wasted.
Expense, inconvenience, and consumption of time are not
the only difficulties occasioned by these statutes. If the witness
is uncooperative 355 or opposing counsel is obstreperous, a party
Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts
of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
(Emphasis added). See also Giffen, supra note 333, at 400 (discussing the au-
thentication of a dedimus under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and its resulting entitlement
to full faith and credit). Many state statutes require that foreign state judg-
ments be authenticated or certified by the trial state before they will be given
full faith and credit in the home state. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-9-232 (Supp.
1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-47-210 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-53-103 (1973);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-605 (West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-132
(1989).
351. See supra notes 189-90; infra Appendix Part IX. D; see also UNIF. ACT
TO SECURE ATENDANCE, supra note 159, § 2 (requiring that the judge deter-
mine that witness is "material and necessary" and will not be caused undue
hardship by appearance in other state before issuing subpoena).
352. ME. R. Civ. P. 30(h)(3)(vii) explicitly requires involvement of local
counsel. See also Johnston, supra note 161, at 43 (criticizing an Illinois statute
requiring leave of court to obtain a subpoena to compel a doctor's deposition,
because the statute burdens "the court, counsel and the litigants").
353. Four lawyers will be involved if both plaintiff and defendant have
their lawyers appear before the trial state judge when the request for the com-
mission is made and retain local counsel to appear before the home state judge
when the request for the subpoena is made. If the prospective witness retains
counsel, additional lawyers may be involved.
354. Most states require that a party seeking to take a deposition give rea-
sonable notice to all other parties to the action before taking the deposition.
See, e.g., COLO. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1); DEL. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1); D.C. R. CIV. P.
30(b)(1); KAN. R. Civ. P. 60-231; ME. R. CIv. P. 30(b)(1).
355. The risk that a witness will be uncooperative is enhanced if the law of
the home state does not require involvement by one of its judges. See Giffin,
supra note 333, at 396-97.
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may need to obtain relief from the home state court. Yet that
court is peculiarly ill-equipped to handle the dispute because it
has no familiarity with the pleadings, the issues, the discovery
taken to date or any other information regarding the action.356
The home state judge also has little incentive to become famil-
iar with the case, because it is not part of the regular docket
and is only before the judge on a routine discovery motion. To
the extent, then, that the compensatory statutory schemes re-
quire litigants to present disputes to uninterested judges with
little or no familiarity with their cases, the statutes relegate
parties whose actions require testimony from out-of-state wit-
nesses to second-class justice.
c. The need to rely on cooperation from other states
If the state legislatures were to authorize extraterritorial
subpoena power, a trial court could subpoena an out-of-state
witness without the help of any other state.357 Under the pres-
ent scheme, however, a trial court has far less authority. Not
only is it impotent to compel the live testimony of out-of-state
witnesses,358 but it is powerless to require the out-of-state wit-
ness to appear even for a deposition in the home state. The
compensatory statutory schemes, which purport to assure that
the testimony of out-of-state witnesses will be available at least
in written form at trial, mandate reliance on the goodwill and
cooperation of other states. Because they depend on comity,
the statutory schemes fail to deliver the testimony they prom-
ise in at least three circumstances.
First, some of the helping statutes vest considerable discre-
tion in home state judges to determine whether a particular
356. Irc
357. The trial state ultimately might need the assistance of the home state
to enforce the subpoena if the witness disobeyed it. See infra Part IV. C.
358. Even under the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance, see supra Part III.
B. 4., a trial court may certify that a witness is material and seek her attend-
ance at trial, but it is ultimately the home state's decision whether or not to
compel the witness to attend. See, e.g., United States ex rel Pennsylvania v.
McDevitt, 195 A.2d 740, 741 (D.C. 1963); In re McAuley, 63 Ohio App. 2d 5, 12-
13, 408 N.E.2d 697, 704 (1979); Ex parte Armes, 582 S.W.2d 434, 439 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1979); see also Note, Compelling an Absent Resident to Return for Wit-
ness Duty, 18 IOWA L. REV. 70, 71 (1932) (emphasizing that the Uniform Act to
Secure Attendance statutes are "inadequate in that they depend solely upon
the cooperation of the particular state to which the desired witness happens to
have gone"); Harvard Note, supra note 37, at 125 (reasoning that statutes com-
pelling return of witnesses to the trial state actually "offer but slight advan-
tages over the commission to take depositions" because cooperation of the
state where the witness is located is highly conditional).
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witness should be compelled to appear for a deposition that will
be used only in a proceeding in another state.359 Yet the home
state judge is not familiar with the case, the witness, or the un-
derlying dispute. Even if the judge in the trial state, who has
overseen the litigation since its inception, certifies that a partic-
ular out-of-state witness is material, the home state judge is
free to disagree. In that case, the trial state can offer no
recourse.
Second, if the material witness resides in Nebraska, which
does not have a helping statute, or in any state that may abolish
its helping statute, the trial state cannot obtain the witness's
testimony.360 Lawyers in states adjacent to Nebraska, who may
encounter this problem regularly, cannot even lobby their legis-
latures for relief, for the problem does not lie with their own
states' laws.
Third, because the Virginia and Wisconsin helping statutes
require reciprocity from the trial state before they will compel
a witness to appear for a deposition,36 1 and because Nebraska
will not compel witnesses to attend depositions for use in other
states, trial courts in Nebraska will be unable to obtain even
the deposition testimony of witnesses residing in Virginia or
Wisconsin.362
The latter two circumstances, which stem from Nebraska's
359. See, e.g., UNIF. DEPOSrION ACT § 1, 9B U.L.A. 60, 62 (stating that "wit-
nesses may be compelled to appear and testify"); UNIF. PROC. ACT § 3.02, 13
U.L.A. 355, 391 (stating that "[a] court... may order a person.., to give his
testimony"); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 27(c); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-148e(f)
(West Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-228(d) (1983); MONT. R. Cir. P. 28(d);
N.J. R. CIv. PRAC. 4:11-4; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-18-11 (1985); W.V. R. Civ. P.
28(d); see also UNIF. PROC. ACT, § 3.02 comment, 13 U.L.A. 355, 392 (noting ex-
plicitly that "[t]he court [in the home state] ... retains complete discretion to
frame an appropriate order"); In re Denning, 44 Del. 470, 472-73, 61 A.2d 657,
658 (1948) (holding that the court has discretion to quash subpoena even
where statute provides that the circuit court "shall order the issuance of a sub-
poena"); Mullin, supra note 175, at 30-35 (stating that home state courts are by
no means bound to compel a witness's appearance).
360. Although all of the states have adopted the Uniform Act to Secure At-
tendance for use in criminal cases, see infra Appendix Part V., Nebraska has
not adopted a helping statute for use in civil cases. See infra Appendix Part
Ix.
361. See supra note 194; see generally Harvard Note, supra note 37, at 125
& n.6 (noting that states commonly refuse to lend their courts' assistance un-
less the forum has extended reciprocal privileges).
362. As one respondent to the survey noted, "[I]f state has no reciprocity,
have neither option [sic] [i.e., cannot subpoena nonresident witness for deposi-
tion or for trial]." At least in these circumstances, lawyers and parties in Ne-
braska will be able to lobby their legislature to adopt a helping statute.
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failure to adopt a helping statute, easily could be remedied by
enactment of one statute by one state. The first situation raises
a more fundamental problem, however, which stems from the
structure of the compensatory schemes. If the trial state courts
were not required to rely on the cooperation of other states, but
could assert extraterritorial subpoena power unilaterally, the
judge most familiar with the case could order the material non-
resident witness to appear in the trial state and testify.
C. ENFORCEABILITY OF EXTRATERRITORIAL SUBPOENAS
If a state issues an extraterritorial summons, it can enforce
it by entering a default judgment against the nonresident de-
fendant. The default judgment is entitled to full faith and
credit in the defendant's home state. The states should hesitate
to authorize extraterritorial subpoenas unless they can devise a
similar method for enforcing them. States have developed at
least three sanctions for enforcing subpoenas served on in-state
witnesses. First, the recipient who fails to appear and testify
may be held in civil contempt and fined as a coercive or com-
pensatory measure, or imprisoned until the recipient agrees to
testify.36 3 Second, the witness also may be held in criminal con-
tempt, and fined or imprisoned as a punitive measure. Third,
the witness may be subject to a civil suit for damages caused by
the failure to appear and testify.364 If any of these sanctions
can be used to encourage the out-of-state witness to honor an
extraterritorial subpoena, the states should be willing to adopt
statutes authorizing assertions of subpoena power over wit-
nesses beyond their borders.
1. Civil Contempt
Failure to obey a subpoena, without adequate excuse, con-
stitutes contempt of the court that issued the subpoena.3 65 Civil
contempt is intended to coerce the recipient of the subpoena to
363. See, e.g., ALA. R. CIV. P. 37.
364. See, e.g., ARK. R. Clv. P. 37; COLO. R. Crv. P. 37.
365. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 45(f); IDAHO CODE § 19-3010 (1979); IND. R.
Civ. P. 45(f); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-245(g) (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1313 (1964); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 2.506(E) (West 1987); 8 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, supra note 10, § 2107; 9 id § 2462.
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comply, either through imprisonment 366 or coercive fines.36 7
Civil contempt also may be used to compensate the party who
subpoenaed the recalcitrant witness for any damages caused by
the witness's failure to appear, including expenses and attor-
neys' fees incurred in enforcing the subpoena.368 A party may
be held in civil contempt even if the failure to appear was not
wilful.369
As a general rule, civil contempt proceedings are a continu-
ation of the original action.370 Thus, if a person already subject
to the court's jurisdiction is charged with civil contempt, no
new process is required. Even if the alleged contemnor is now
outside the state in which the court sits or has committed a
contemptuous act beyond the court's territorial jurisdiction, the
court has jurisdiction.371 The court need only ensure that the
366. Civil contempt will be helpful in coercing the appearance and testi-
mony of a recalcitrant witness only if the trial for which she was called contin-
ues for a long enough period of time to hold a contempt hearing. For shorter
trials, civil contempt will not be available to coerce the witness's testimony,
but nevertheless may be used to compensate the party whose case was harmed
by the witness's failure to appear. In addition, the risk of a contempt citation
provides a general deterrent effect against recalcitrance.
367. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368 (1966); In re Merchants'
Stock & Grain Co., 223 U.S. 639, 641 (1912); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 336-37
(1904).
368. Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1936); Fisher v. Marubeni Cot-
ton Corp., 526 F.2d 1338, 1340-41 (8th Cir. 1975); Southern Ry. Co. v. Lanham,
403 F.2d 119, 124-25 (5th Cir. 1968); McGuffin v. Springfield Hous. Auth., 662 F.
Supp. 1546, 1548-49 (C.D. Ill. 1987); In re D.I. Operating Co., 240 F. Supp. 672,
675-78 (D. Nev. 1965); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 10, § 2960.
It is not always easy to determine whether conduct constitutes civil or
criminal contempt; some conduct can constitute both. The following distinc-
tions nevertheless have been drawn:
(1) Refusal to do an act commanded is civil contempt, while doing a
forbidden act is criminal contempt; (2) Punishment for criminal con-
tempt is unconditional while the judgment for civil contempt is condi-
tional in nature and can be terminated if the contemnor purges
himself of the contempt; (3) Civil contempt proceedings are entitled
as a part of the main cause, while criminal contempt actions are
brought in the name of the United States; and (4) The notice in a
criminal contempt proceeding must state that the proceeding is crimi-
nal in nature.
DeParcq v. United States Dist. Court, 235 F.2d 692, 699 (8th Cir. 1956). See also
11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 10, § 2960 (discussing distinctions be-
tween civil and criminal contempt).
369. McGuffin, 662 F. Supp. at 1549 (citing McComb v. Jacksonville Paper
Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949)); In re D. I. Operating Co., 240 F. Supp. at 676.
370. McGuffin, 662 F. Supp. at 1548; Hayes v. Hayes, 472 So. 2d 646, 649
(Ala. Civ. App. 1985); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 10, § 2960.
371. Sullivan v. United States, 4 F.2d 100, 100-01 (10th Cir. 1925); Binkley v.
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alleged contemnor receives notice of the contempt proceeding
and has an opportunity to be heard.37 2 The notice often is pro-
vided by an order to show cause.3 7 3 If, however, the alleged
contemnor is not already subject to the court's jurisdiction, ser-
vice of process is required.3 7 4
Application of these principles to the subpoena context is
relatively straightforward. If service of the subpoena itself
brings the witness within the court's jurisdiction, then a court
United States, 282 F. 244, 246 (8th Cir. 1922); Tilghman v. Tilghman, 57 F.
Supp. 417, 417-18 (D.D.C. 1944); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 10,
§ 2960 (citing Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 454
(1932)).
372. See, e.g., In re Green, 369 U.S. 689, 691-92 (1962) (quoting In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948)); Fisher v. Marubeni Cotton Corp., 526 F.2d 1338, 1342
(8th Cir. 1975); McGuffin, 662 F. Supp. at 1548; Miller v. Carson, 550 F. Supp.
543, 545 (M.D. Fla. 1982); SEC v. VTR, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1309, 1313 (D.D.C.
1975); People v. Razatos, 699 P.2d 970, 974 (Colo. 1985) (en banc); Eichinger v.
Wicker Enter., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 751, 752 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Adams v. Ep-
perly, 27 Ohio App. 3d 51, 52, 499 N.E.2d 374, 375 (1985).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize service of post-complaint
pleadings upon a party's counsel of record or upon a party by mail. FED. R.
CIV. P. 5(b). This portion of the rule "departs from a preliminary draft of the
rule that expressly required orders to show cause why a civil contempt order
should not issue to be served upon 'the party personally."' I.A.M. Nat'l Pen-
sion Fund v. Wakefield Indus., 699 F.2d 1254, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting 2 J.
MoORE & J. LucAs, supra note 59, 5.06 & n.3).
Of course, the states are free to impose more rigorous service require-
ments in contempt actions. See, e.g., Pork Motel, Corp. v. Kansas Dep't of
Health and Env't, 234 Kan. 374, 390, 673 P.2d 1126, 1139 (1983) (discussing
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-1204a(b) (1978), which provides that the order to show
cause "shall be served.., by the sheriff or some other person appointed by the
court for such purpose").
373. Louisiana Educ. Ass'n v. Richland Parish School Bd., 421 F. Supp. 973,
976 (W.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 585 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1978). In federal practice, as
long as the court has personal jurisdiction over the alleged contemnor, the
party seeking to have such person held in civil contempt may simply make a
motion in lieu of obtaining an order to show cause. FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1);
SEC, 410 F. Supp. at 1313.
374. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 10, § 2960. See also I.A.M.
Nat'l Pension Fund v. Wakefield Indus., 699 F.2d 1254, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(holding that proceeding is predicated on proper service); De Parcq v. United
States Dist. Court, 235 F.2d 692, 699 (8th Cir. 1956) (finding no jurisdiction be-
cause process was not served); SEC, 410 F. Supp. at 1313 (finding service un-
necessary because the court retained jurisdiction); FDIC v. Richman, 98
A.D.2d 790, 792, 470 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21 (App. Div. 1983) (noting that special pro-
ceeding required jurisdiction); Kutner, Contempt Power: The Black Robe, A
Proposal for Due Process, 39 TENN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1971) (emphasizing that juris-
diction was required to issue contempt decree). But see Consolidation Coal Co.
v. Local 1784, 514 F.2d 763, 765-66 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that personal service
of motion for contempt hearing or order to show cause was not required where
workers allegedly were violating a no-strike injunction, but some notice of the
hearing was required).
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may hold a civil contempt proceeding against the alleged con-
temnor as long as the court provides adequate notice of the
hearing. If service of the subpoena does not bring the prospec-
tive witness within the court's jurisdiction, service of process is
required. If the recalcitrant witness is out-of-state, service will
be made pursuant to the trial state's long-arm statute.
The current long-arm statutes do not explicitly authorize
extraterritorial service of process on witnesses who fail to
honor trial state subpoenas. Such service would be constitu-
tional,375 however, and states could amend or construe their
statutes to allow for it.37 6 Just as a court has personal jurisdic-
tion to try for contempt a nonresident who violates or who aids
and abets another in violating an injunction, 77 it has jurisdic-
375. If the subpoena was constitutional in the first place, then the failure
of the recipient to honor it should constitute sufficient "contact" with the issu-
ing state such that an assertion of personal jurisdiction over the recipient, for
purposes of adjudicating the contempt, would be constitutional. See supra
notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
376. The California-style long-arm statutes, which generally authorize
courts to assert personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the state
and federal constitutions, could be construed to authorize service of process in
these circumstances. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. Similarly,
the long-arm statutes authorizing jurisdiction over persons who cause "tortious
injury in this [state] by an act or omission outside this [state]" could be con-
strued to allow service of process on nonresidents who fail to honor trial state
subpoenas. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322(4) (Purdon 1981); cf.
UNIF. PRoc. AcT § 1.03(4), 13 U.L.A. 355, 362 (1986) (authorizing jurisdiction
over persons who cause tortious injury in the state by acts or omissions com-
mitted outside the state if they do business in the state).
377. See, e.g., Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 451-
52 (1932) (holding that a party who violated federal district court injunction by
action taken outside the district could be held in contempt); Waffenschmidt v.
MacKay, 763 F.2d 711, 714 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that "[n]onparties who reside
outside the territorial jurisdiction of a district court may be subject to that
court's jurisdiction if, with actual notice of the court's order, they actively aid
and abet a party in violating that order. This is so despite the absence of other
contacts with the forum."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986); Stiller v. Hard-
man, 324 F.2d 626, 628 (2d Cir. 1963) (stating that "[v]iolation of an injunctive
order [of a federal district court] is cognizable in the court which issued the
injunction, regardless of where the violation occurred"); Brooks v. United
States, 119 F.2d 636, 644-46 (9th Cir.) (reasoning that consent decree issued by
United States District Court for the District of Arizona, which regulated how
much Gila River water landowners in New Mexico and Arizona could use,
bound individual defendants and their successors in interest; successors in in-
terest residing in New Mexico could be held in contempt of court for violating
decree), cert denied, 313 U.S. 594 (1941); Teele Soap Mfg. Co. v. Pine Tree
Prods. Co., 8 F. Supp. 546, 551 (D.N.H. 1934) (holding that nonparty residing
outside the district could be held in contempt for causing corporate party to
violate injunction); State ex reL Payne v. Empire Life Ins. Co., 351 So. 2d 538,
542 (Ala. 1977) (stating that "it would anomalous.., if a nonresident [party]
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tion to try a nonresident who fails to honor a lawfully issued
subpoena.3 7 8
If the recalcitrant witness receives notice of the civil con-
tempt hearing and fails to appear, the court can impose a civil
contempt judgment in absentia.37 9 Just as a defendant in a
civil action who fails to appear and defend an action may suffer
a default judgment, so the nonparty witness who fails to honor
could... disobey the Court's lawful order and forever insulate himself from
the Court's inherent power to punish [criminal] contempt [in a separate pro-
ceeding] by merely absenting himself from the state"), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
969 (1978).
378. A recalcitrant nonresident witness wishing to raise the trial court's
lack of jurisdiction to issue the extraterritorial subpoena as a defense in the
contempt proceeding has the same opportunity to do so as the in-state recipi-
ent of an ordinary subpoena: she may dishonor the subpoena and challenge the
court's jurisdiction over her for the first time in the contempt proceeding. See,
e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932) (jurisdiction pursuant
to statute unsuccessfully challenged at contempt proceeding); Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (jurisdiction
successfully challenged on appeal of default order); United States v. Thomp-
son, 319 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1963) (stating that "a mandate is void which is
beyond the power and jurisdiction of the issuing court and.., the court may
not punish for its violation. Thus, the power and jurisdiction of the court to
issue a subpoena may be raised for the first time in a proceeding to punish for
contempt .... ") (citations omitted); Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 278 F.Supp. 794,
802 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (holding that court may not punish for violation of order it
lacked jurisdiction to issue); see also United States Catholic Conference v.
Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2268, 2270 (1988) (stating that "a
nonparty witness can challenge the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction
in defense of a civil contempt citation"); cf Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388
U.S. 307, 319 n.14 (1967) (implying that one may challenge the court's jurisdic-
tion to issue an injunction for the first time at the contempt hearing).
Although Wright and Miller generally suggest that a witness "should not
be permitted to disregard a subpoena that he has not challenged by a motion
to quash," 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MIL.ER, supra note 10, § 2462, they do not specif-
ically consider the witness's right to raise jurisdictional objections in a collat-
eral proceeding.
379. See Watkins v. Rives, 125 F.2d 33, 39, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (upholding
civil contempt decree notwithstanding contemnor's failure to appear or show
cause at hearing); Teele Soap, 8 F. Supp. at 550-51 (reasoning that although
nonparty individual causing corporate party to violate injunction resided
outside the district, and therefore could not be arrested and brought before the
district court, he nevertheless could be tried for civil contempt in his absence);
Robinson v. Robinson, 487 So. 2d 67, 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (according
Alabama contempt order full faith and credit notwithstanding contemnor's
failure to attend contempt hearing); Adams v. Epperly, 27 Ohio App. 3d 51, 52,
499 N.E.2d 374, 374, 376 (1985) (stating that if contempt were civil, defendant
could be held in contempt notwithstanding his absence from hearing). At
least one court has questioned whether "criminal due process requirements,"
including the right to be present in person at the contempt hearing, must be
met "in a purely civil constructive contempt." Ex parte Trevino, 665 S.W.2d
227, 230 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
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a subpoena and then fails to show cause may suffer a "default"
civil contempt judgment, which may involve a fine or
imprisonment. 38 0
If the civil contempt judgment includes a coercive mone-
tary fine and the mounting fines fail to coerce the prospective
witness into testifying, the party seeking to hold the recalci-
trant witness in contempt may ask the court to enter a judg-
ment in the amount of the accrued fines.38' Like a civil
contempt judgment that seeks to compensate the party who
called the recalcitrant witness for damages suffered and costs
incurred, this money judgment for accrued fines will be enti-
tled to full faith and credit in the state where the prospective
witness resides and has property.382 Even standing alone, the
risk of a civil contempt proceeding and judgment should induce
the nonresident witness to honor the extraterritorial subpoena.
A subpoenaed witness faces the risk of additional sanctions,
which should increase the likelihood of compliance. The civil
contempt judgment may require imprisonment until the con-
temnor agrees to testify. Although this order of civil commit-
ment cannot be enforced outside the issuing court's territory,383
380. See Adams, 27 Ohio App. 3d at 52, 499 N.E.2d at 375 (stating that "if
the contempt were civil, [the alleged contemnor] was entitled to only those
due process rights afforded in a civil action"); Shrader v. Huff, 8 Ohio App. 3d
111, 111, 456 N.E.2d 587, 588 (1983) (same).
381. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Township of Lower Southampton, 101 Pa.
Commw. 483, 484, 516 A.2d 834, 835 (1986).
382. Gedeon v. Gedeon, 630 P.2d 579, 582 (Colo.), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S.
1050 (1981) (holding that New Mexico civil contempt judgment for accrued co-
ercive fines was entitled to full faith and credit in Colorado); Roosa v. Roosa,
519 So. 2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that "[a] foreign order
of contempt is entitled to full faith and credit in Florida if it is valid in the
state in which it was issued"); Robinson, 487 So. 2d at 68 (reasoning that Ala-
bama contempt order was entitled to full faith and credit in Florida).
383. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dexter, 244 F. 926, 930 (1st Cir. 1917) (holding that
writ of attachment issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin, which found Dexter guilty of civil contempt, could not
be executed in Massachusetts); Graber v. Graber, 93 F. Supp. 281, 282 (D.D.C.
1950) (stating that "an order of commitment for civil contempt of court issued
by this court may not be executed outside of the District of Columbia"); In re
Graves, 29 F. 60, 69-70 (N.D. Iowa 1886) (holding that writ of attachment is-
sued by United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
which found Graves in civil contempt and sentenced him to jail until he
obeyed court order, could not be executed in Iowa); Nehring v. Taylor, 266
Ark. 253, 256, 583 S.W.2d 56, 58 (1979) (holding that Texas contempt judgment
ordering contemnor's 90 day imprisonment unless he purged himself was not
entitled to full faith and credit in Arkansas); Stilley v. Stilley, 219 Ark. 813,
815, 244 S.W.2d 958, 959 (1952) (emphasizing that no court has authority to
punish a contempt against another court); Frank v. Reese, 594 S.W.2d 119, 121
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it remains enforceable in the trial state during the trial's pen-
dency and threatens the nonresident witness with arrest upon
entry into the state. If the witness really is "just across the
river" from the courthouse and has occasion to enter the trial
state with any regularity, the threat of arrest and incarceration
in the trial state may force compliance with the extraterritorial
subpoena.38 4
2. Criminal Contempt
A subpoenaed witness who fails to appear is subject to cita-
tion for criminal contempt, even in a civil action.3 8 5 Unlike
civil contempt, which is intended to coerce compliance, criminal
contempt is intended to punish noncompliance and to vindicate
the court's authority.386 The court itself may initiate a criminal
contempt proceeding, which a government attorney or a private
attorney appointed by the court may prosecute.38 7 A criminal
contempt proceeding is a separate action.38 8
Again, the recalcitrant witness's act of contempt gives ju-
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (stating that "[o]ther jurisdictions are reluctant to give
full faith and credit to an order of contempt due to its punitive nature"); cf.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (providing for service of order of commitment for civil con-
tempt "at all places outside the state but within the United States that are not
more than 100 miles from the place in which the action commenced, or to
which it is assigned or transferred for trial"); see generally 17 C.J.S. Contempt
§ 51 (1963) (stating that "no court is authorized to punish a contempt against
another court").
384. Of course, if the would-be witness enters the trial state with regular-
ity, the party seeking her attendance at trial should be able to serve her with a
subpoena while she is physically present in the state.
385. Cf. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 443 (1911) (rea-
soning that a contempt proceeding was undertaken to punish the completed
action and vindicate the court's authority, the proceeding would be for crimi-
nal contempt).
386. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1966) (noting that
civil contempt may in fact punish, but criminal contempt's purpose is to pun-
ish); accord Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1966); In re
Merchants' Stock and Grain Co., 223 U.S. 639, 641 (1912); Gompers v. Bucks
Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441, 448 (1911).
387. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793
(1987); Louisiana Educ. Ass'n v. Richland Parish School Bd., 421 F. Supp. 973,
975 (W.D. La. 1976), aff'd mem., 585 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1978); 3 C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 711 (1982); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 10, § 2960; Dobbs, Contempt of Court A Survey, 56 CORNELL L.
REV. 183, 221 n.148 (1971) (citing Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965)).
388. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 445; Lu v. Betancourt, 116 A.D.2d 492, 494, 496
N.Y.S.2d 754, 756 (App. Div. 1986) (mem.); Department of Hous. Preservation
& Dev. v. Arick, 131 Misc. 2d 950, 954-56, 503 N.Y.S.2d 489, 491-93 (Civ. Ct.
1986) (equating service in an independent special proceeding with service re-
quired for criminal contempt).
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risdiction to the court that issued the subpoena.38 9 To com-
mence the contempt proceeding, one merely serves an order to
show cause upon the alleged contemnor.390
Courts disagree about whether the witness who fails to ap-
pear and show cause may be held in criminal contempt in ab-
sentia. Some courts, including the Supreme Court in Blackmer,
have concluded that because a criminal contempt proceeding is
sui generis and not a "criminal prosecution" within the scope of
the sixth amendment, a person may be tried for criminal con-
tempt in absentia if the alleged contemnor receives adequate
notice of the hearing.3 9 1 Other courts, heeding the Supreme
Court's post-Blackmer conclusion that "criminal contempt is a
crime in every fundamental respect, 3 92 have held that an al-
leged contemnor may not be tried for contempt in absentia.3 93
389. See supra note 378.
390. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 686 F.2d 334, 344-45 (5th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Powers, 629 F.2d 619, 625 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that
"[s]imple notice is all that is required"); In re Abrams, 108 Cal. App. 3d 685,
691, 166 Cal. Rptr. 749, 753 (Ct. App. 1980) (dicta); 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note
387, § 710.
391. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 440 (1932). See, e.g., Gedeon
v. Gedeon, 630 P.2d 579, 582 (Colo.), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1050 (1981)
(holding New Mexico judgment imposing fine for "wilful failure" to honor
court order entitled to full faith and credit in Colorado notwithstanding con-
temnor's failure to appear personally at hearing); In re Hayden, 101 N.J. Eq.
361, 366, 139 A. 328, 331 (Ch. 1927) (stating that "the court may condemn a
man on a prosecution for a criminal contempt, if, after being duly served, he
remains absent from the court, and may assess a fine upon him"); see also
Grohman v. Maryland, 258 Md. 552, 567, 267 A.2d 193, 201 (1970) (alleged con-
temnor was present at evidentiary hearing on contempt charge, but he was not
present when court rendered decision and found him in contempt; although
Maryland rules require the presence of the accused at every stage of trial, in-
cluding return of verdict and imposition of sentence, court did not "look at this
unqualifiedly as a criminal case"), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 982 (1971); 17 AM. JUR.
2d Contempt § 93 (1964) (noting that presence is not required to punish for
contempt); 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 85(2) (1963) (stating that there is no constitu-
tional right to confront witnesses in contempt proceedings).
392. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968).
393. The Texas Supreme Court has stated this proposition most forcefully,
declaring that "persons charged with criminal contempt... are constitution-
ally guaranteed the right to be present at trial and confront witnesses." Ex
Parte Johnson, 654 S.W.2d 415, 421 (Tex. 1983). Johnson has been followed by
lower courts in Texas and Ohio. See Adams v. Epperly, 27 Ohio App. 3d 51, 52,
499 N.E.2d 374, 376 (1985); Ex Parte Johnson, 669 S.W.2d 869, 869-70 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding that presence is required); Ex Parte Byram, 662 S.W.2d
147, 150 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that contemnor may not be tried in ab-
sentia); see also Kilgarlin & Ozmun, Contempt of Court in Texas - What You
Shouldn't Say to the Judge, 38 BAYLoR L. REv. 291, 308 (1986) (discussing
Johnson). One reading of Johnson would limit the right to be present to cases
where the contemnor faces confinement as a possible penal sanction. See
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Although defensible arguments can be made on both sides of
this issue, one need not resolve it to conclude that criminal con-
tempt is a viable mechanism for enforcing extraterritorial
subpoenas.
If an alleged criminal contemnor may not be tried in ab-
sentia, the court that issued the dishonored subpoena and order
to show cause may issue a warrant, writ of attachment, or ca-
pias authorizing arrest.394 If found within the state, the alleged
contemnor may be arrested, tried for criminal contempt, and
fined or imprisoned if convicted. More likely, if the alleged
contemnor is not found within the state, the warrant or writ
will remain outstanding and the alleged contemnor will risk
arrest upon entering the state. This risk alone may coerce com-
pliance with the underlying subpoena. If, for some reason, the
state really wants to punish the recalcitrant witness, it may
seek extradition.3 95 Although quite remote, the risk of this se-
rious disruption of one's life may provide the recipient of an ex-
traterritorial subpoena with additional incentive to honor the
subpoena.
If, however, an alleged contemnor may be tried for crimi-
nal contempt in absentia, the question then becomes whether
the sanction imposed can be enforced in the state where the re-
calcitrant witness is found. A criminal contempt judgment im-
posing imprisonment can be enforced against a nonresident
only by recourse to extradition and interstate rendition. 396
Again, although the likelihood of a state going to the trouble of
Johnson, 654 S.W.2d at 421 (stating-that "[w]e perceive no meaningful distinc-
tion between an individual's rights which are at stake in a constructive crimi-
nal contempt hearing . .. and those at stake in an ordinary criminal trial
where confinement is a possible penal sanction") (emphasis added); Adams,
499 N.E.2d at 376.
394. Johnson, 654 S.W.2d at 422.
395. The United States Constitution, federal statutes, and the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act, which has been adopted by 47 states,. all authorize
interstate rendition or extradition. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2; 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3182, 3194-95 (1982); UNIF. CRni. EXTRADITION AcT § 6, 11 U.L.A. 51, 166
(1974 & 1988 Supp.). The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act specifically au-
thorizes the extradition of a person charged with the commission of an act that
intentionally resulted in a crime in the trial state even if she "was not in that
state at the time of the commission of the crime, and has not fled therefrom."
Id § 6, at 166. This provision appears to authorize the extradition to the trial
state of a person who commits criminal contempt by wilfully refusing to honor
a trial state subpoena served on the alleged contemnor in another state.
396. See supra note 383 (discussing the court's reluctance to give full faith
and credit to contempt judgments); see also City of Philadelphia v. Austin, 86
N.J. 55, 63, 429 A.2d 568, 572 (1981) (citing Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of
Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARv. L. REV. 193, 196 (1932)).
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seeking extradition in this situation is slim, the threat of such
grave inconvenience should have some coercive effect.
Whether a criminal contempt judgment imposing a fine is
entitled to full faith and credit in the state where the contem-
nor is found is an unsettled question.397 Although courts have
long refused to accord the "penal laws" of other states full faith
and credit,398 and the United States Supreme Court has defined
"penal law" so broadly as to include all laws designed "to pun-
ish an offence against the public justice of the State,"399 some
courts nevertheless have accorded judgments imposing penal-
ties full faith and credit. 40 0 Even if the full faith and credit
397. See Austin, 86 N.J. at 66 n.1, 429 A.2d at 573 n.1 (Schreiber, J., concur-
ring) (citing H. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 213 (3d ed.
1949)). The United States Supreme Court has never squarely decided whether
a money judgment based on a penal claim is entitled to full faith and credit.
Id at 60, 429 A.2d at 570 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 120 comment d (1971)).
398. See, e.g., Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229 (1970); Huntington v. At-
trill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290
(1888); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825) (stating that "the
courts of no country execute the penal laws of another"); Arkansas v. Bowen,
3 App. D.C. 537, 542 (1894).
399. Huntington, 146 U.S. at 673-74.
400. See, e.g., Gedeon v. Gedeon, 630 P.2d 579, 582 (Colo.) (holding judg-
ment including contempt fine for wilful failure to obey court order entitled to
full faith and credit), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1050 (1981); Schuler v. Schu-
ler, 209 Ill. 522, 526, 71 N.E. 16, 18 (1904) (stating that "where a court of a sis-
ter state ... has taken cognizance and rendered judgment in a sum of money
for the penalty prescribed . . ., the judgment so rendered is entitled to full
faith and credit"); Austin, 86 N.J. at 63, 429 A.2d at 572 (stating that the "[f]ull
Faith and Credit Clause requires enforcement of the Pennsylvania judgment
for fines for failure to file tax returns"); City of Philadelphia v. Smith, 82 N.J.
429, 430, 413 A.2d 952, 952 (1980) (according full faith and credit to Penn-
sylvania judgment that included civil penalty for failure to pay taxes); see also
Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 279 (1935) (stating that
"[w]e intimate no opinion whether a suit upon a judgment for an obligation
created by a penal law . .. is within the jurisdiction of the federal district
courts, or whether full faith and credit must be given to such a judgment")
(citation omitted).
Further support for the proposition that criminal contempt judgments im-
posing monetary fines should be entitled to full faith and credit may be found
by analogizing to federal statutes and rules. Title 18, § 3565(a)(1) of the
United States Code provides that judgments imposing payment of a fine or
penalty may be enforced by execution against the defendant's property "in
like manner as judgments in civil cases." 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(1) (1982). Be-
cause civil judgments may be executed upon property in states other than the
rendering state, this statute would support the argument that criminal con-
tempt judgments should receive full faith and credit in other states. See also
FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(b)(5) (stating that "these rules are not applicable to ...
the collection of fines and penalties"); 3A C. WRIGHT, supra note 387, § 873
(citing FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b)(5)).
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clause does not require enforcement of criminal contempt judg-
ments, states may honor them as a matter of comity.40 1
The criminal contempt proceeding may not provide a per-
fect means of enforcing the extraterritorial subpoena. It does,
however, constitute a real threat to the recipient of the sub-
poena and should encourage compliance.
3. Civil Suit by Party Who Called the Recalcitrant Witness
Failure to honor a subpoena constitutes not only contempt,
but an actionable tort. Unlike contempt proceedings, which
must be commenced before the court whose subpoena has been
dishonored, these private civil actions may be brought wherever
personal jurisdiction over the recalcitrant witness exists. Thus,
these actions are particularly well-suited to enforcing extrater-
ritorial subpoenas.
In addition to common law actions for failure to honor a
subpoena, many states have enacted statutes that create an
express cause of action in favor of the party who called the re-
calcitrant witness. 402 Although such statutes are rarely in-
voked,40 3 they provide additional weapons against contumacy.
The mere threat of a civil action may induce the recipient of a
subpoena to honor it.
In sum, civil and criminal contempt and civil damage ac-
tions for failure to honor a subpoena all are viable means of en-
forcing subpoenas served on out-of-state witnesses. Although
not perfectly tailored to enforcing extraterritorial subpoenas,
these procedures threaten the recipient of a subpoena with
fines, imprisonment, and civil damage judgments. Perhaps
more important, these procedures promise the recalcitrant wit-
ness significant inconvenience, protracted litigation, and addi-
tional expense. The mere risk of these consequences should
encourage most recipients of extraterritorial subpoenas to ap-
pear and testify. Thus, the perceived inability to enforce extra-
territorial subpoenas does not justify failure to exercise such
power.
401. Austin, 86 N.J. at 63-64, 429 A.2d at 572.
402. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1992 (West 1983); IDAHO CODE § 9-708
(1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 102 (1983); MASS. GEN. ANN. LAWS ch.
233, § 4 (Law. Co-op. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-2-105 (1987).
403. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2195f, at 108 n.1; Annotation, Tort or
Statutory Liability for Failure or Refusal of Witnesses to Give Testimony, 61
A.L.R.3d 1297 (1975) (collecting cases).
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V. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
A. "INDIRECT" SOLUTIONS
The states should alleviate the problems that arise from
their failure to assert subpoena power over out-of-state wit-
nesses. "Indirect" solutions exist that would not involve the di-
rect assertion of extraterritorial subpoena power. For example,
the states could enter into an interstate compact, by which they
would agree to honor the subpoenas of other states.40 4 They
could enact uniform legislation, such as the Uniform Act to Se-
cure Attendance, which would enable courts in one state to re-
quest the assistance of courts in other states to compel the
404. As the United States Supreme Court noted in New York v. O'Neill:
[Compulsion to travel across State boundaries to testify in sister
States antedates the United States Constitution. See Laws of Mary-
land, November 1785, Chapter I, An ACT to approve, confirm and rat-
ify, the compact made by the commissioners appointed by the general
assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the commissioners
appointed by this state, to regulate and settle the jurisdiction and nav-
igation of Patow-mack and Pocomoke rivers, and that part of Chesa-
peake bay which lieth within the territory of Virginia: 'And in all
cases of trial in pursuance of the jurisdiction settled by this compact,
citizens of either state shall attend as witnesses in the other, upon a
summons from any court or magistrate having jurisdiction, being
served by a proper officer of the county where such citizen shall
reside.'
359 U.S. 1, 7 n.* (1959); see also In re Waterfront Comm'n, 39 N.J. Super. 33,
39-43, 120 A.2d 504, 506-09 (Law Div. 1956) (New York and New Jersey en-
acted, and Congress approved, the Waterfront Compact, which created a com-
mission to regulate waterfront labor practices; court upheld the commission's
power to issue subpoenas throughout both states).
The Constitution restricts the ability of the states to enter into compacts
with one another by providing that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of
Congress .... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Congressional consent is required only if the compact
affects "the political power or influence" of particular states or "encroach[es]
... upon the full and free exercise of Federal authority." Virginia v. Tennes-
see, 148 U.S. 503, 520 (1893) (holding that an interstate agreement did not fall
within the scope of the compact clause and would not be invalidated for lack
of congressional consent unless the agreement tended to increase states' polit-
ical power and encroach upon supremacy of the federal government); see also
Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438-42 (1981) (holding that Congress can give its
consent in advance on an interstate agreement the interpretation of which
presents a question of federal law); United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 459-78 (1978) (holding that the Multistate Tax Compact
was not invalid under Virginia, 148 U.S. at 520); Heron, The Interstate Com-
pact in Transition: From Cooperative State Action to Congressionally Coerced
Agreements, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 12-24 (1985) (discussing compact clause
and inherent sovereign power of states to enter into compact agreements with
one another subject only to congressional consent).
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appearance of material witnesses for trial in civil actions.40 5
Although these indirect solutions would produce the de-
sired result - the presence of live witnesses at civil trials -
they pose at least three problems. First, they would be cumber-
some to enact and use. To make an interstate compact, each
state would need to enact appropriate legislation, which would
be considered only an offer to enter into a compact.40 6 All
other states would have to indicate their acceptance of the offer
by enacting identical legislation.40 7 Thus, all fifty states would
have to participate in the negotiation and drafting of the initial
legislation to ensure their willingness to enact it. The United
States Constitution would require congressional and presiden-
tial approval of the compact. 40 8
Although less cumbersome to enact than an interstate com-
pact, uniform legislation modeled after the Uniform Act to Se-
cure Attendance would be cumbersome to use. For each
subpoena of an out-of-state witness, two judges in two different
states, often with the assistance of counsel for two parties,
would have to determine whether the witness's testimony is
material and necessary, whether the witness would suffer un-
due hardship if required to testify, and whether the other statu-
tory requirements were satisfied.40 9  The expense and
cumbersome nature of this process militate against enactment
of uniform legislation.
Second, both the interstate compact and uniform legisla-
tion solutions would require cooperation from other states at
the outset. A state could not even hope to subpoena a witness
found in another state unless it entered into a compact with
that other state, or unless both states enacted uniform legisla-
tion. No state acting independently could effect a change.
405. To date, only Wisconsin has enacted such a statute. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 887.25(1) (1987-88). See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text for a more
thorough discussion of the Wisconsin statute.
406. Heron, supra note 404, at 9.
407. i
408. See supra note 404. For a discussion of the enactment process for an
interstate compact, see Heron, supra note 404, at 9-17. In light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982), see supra Part II. E., one could argue that a com-
pact allowing for extraterritorial subpoena power would not require congres-
sional approval because it would not affect "the political power or influence"
of the states vis-a-vis one another. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 520
(1893).
409. For a discussion of the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance, see supra
Part III. B. 4.
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Although even "direct" solutions410 occasionally might require
cooperation from other states to enforce extraterritorial sub-
poenas against recalcitrant witnesses, they would allow a state
to adopt unilaterally a subpoena statute authorizing unilateral
assertions of extraterritorial subpoena power.
Third, these indirect solutions would not resolve the doctri-
nal inconsistency or political anomaly that exists when the law
allows a state to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant who has sufficient contact with the state, but prohib-
its it from asserting subpoena power over a nonresident witness
with the same amount of state contact. This doctrinal disso-
nance, or misunderstanding about state power, would remain
even if the adoption of an interstate compact or uniform legisla-
tion alleviated the practical problem of the nonresident
witness.
B. "DIRECT" SOLUTIONS
State statutes authorizing direct assertions of extraterrito-
rial subpoena power would avoid these difficulties. Any state
could enact a statute unilaterally and use it without the assis-
tance of any other state. Simplicity and expediency thus coun-
sel in favor of a direct solution. Furthermore, a direct solution
would recognize implicitly that constitutional constraints on
state court personal jurisdiction and subpoena power derive
from the same source, and that these constraints, rather than
eighteenth century ideals, should determine the scope of both
jurisdictional and subpoena powers.
The states would have a fair degree of latitude in drafting
extraterritorial subpoena statutes. Just as some states pres-
ently allow for statewide subpoena power and others allow a
witness to be compelled to travel no more than 100 miles to tes-
tify,411 the states would be free to determine for themselves the
degree of inconvenience they were willing to impose on pro-
spective nonresident witnesses.412 Given the value in retaining
410. For a discussion of "direct" solutions, see infra Part V. B.
411. See supra Part III. A.
412. They may well decide, for example, that extraterritorial subpoena
power should be available to compel witnesses to appear and testify only at
trial, not at depositions. This decision would be a sensible one, at least as to
nonparty witnesses. Because a deposition transcript or videotape is equally
useful regardless of where the deposition is taken (at least within the United
States), the parties, who have a stake in the litigation (or their lawyers),
rather than the nonparty witnesses, should suffer the inconvenience of travel-
ling to conduct the deposition.
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this flexibility and maintaining fifty state "laboratories, 413 this
Article does not attempt to dictate the precise terms of an
"ideal" extraterritorial subpoena statute. Instead, it sketches
three models, which define the spectrum along which the states
could place their statutes. Like the present-day model for as-
sessing the constitutionality of assertions of personal jurisdic-
tion, the first two models employ contact-based tests. The third
model imposes no "minimum contacts" requirement.
1. The "Weak" Model
At a minimum, the states should assert subpoena power
over persons over whom they could obtain personal jurisdic-
tion. Put another way, if a nonresident witness has sufficient
contact with a trial state to be subject to suit there, she should
be subject to the state's subpoena power as well. Three exam-
ples illustrate.
First, a nonresident domiciliary can be sued in her state of
domicile on any matter because the state has general jurisdic-
tion.414 The universal differential in such cases is slight, given
the high degree of ongoing contact the nonresident defendant
has with the state. Moreover, imposing state-specific burdens
on the domiciliary defendant is fair because she can influence
the forum's political processes if "disadvantaged" by its laws.415
Under the weak model for extraterritorial subpoena
power, the nonresident domiciliary would be subject to the
state's subpoena power as well. Just as the nonresident domi-
ciliary could be sued in-state on any matter, she would be sub-
ject to subpoena to testify there on any matter. The
justifications would be similar. Given the high degree of con-
tact the nonresident domiciliary witness has with the trial
state, the universal differential should be very small; it should
not cause meaningful inconvenience to the witness to return
home and testify. Likewise, to the extent the nonresident dom-
iciliary witness would suffer any state-specific burdens - as
might occur if the trial state's law provided only modest reim-
bursement for travel expenses - the witness could be rele-
gated to her "home" state's political processes. In short, there
413. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
414. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1940). See supra note 133 and
accompanying text.
415. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
1989]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
would be nothing unfair about requiring a nonresident domicili-
ary to testify in the state of domicile.
Second, if a nonresident transacts business in the forum
state and causes injury there, even if not a domiciliary of the
forum state, she can be sued there on any claim arising out of
or relating to her business with the forum; the state has specific
jurisdiction.416 Her contacts with the forum state make it fair
and reasonable to impose the burdens of defending in the fo-
rum state. By causing injury in the forum state, the nonresi-
dent exposes herself to its regulatory authority; by purposefully
availing herself of the benefits of forum law by conducting
business there, she impliedly consents to suit there on claims
arising out of or relating to that business.417
Under the weak model of extraterritorial subpoena power,
if the nonresident engaged in business in the trial state and
caused injury there, she would be subject to the trial state's
subpoena power with respect to matters arising out of or relat-
ing to her business there regardless of whether she was actually
sued there. For example, if a nonresident, A, tortiously inter-
fered with X's contract with Y (by actions taken in the trial
state), she would be subject to suit there for tortious interfer-
ence. If for some reason, X chose to sue only Y and not A,
under the weak model A would nevertheless be subject to the
trial state's subpoena power.
Again, the rationales are similar for imposing the burdens
of testifying on the nonresident witness and defending on the
nonresident defendant. By causing injury in the trial state, the
nonresident witness exposed herself to the state's regulatory
authority, including its authority to compel her to testify re-
garding her wrongful conduct. By purposefully availing herself
of the benefits of trial state law, the witness impliedly con-
sented to testify there on matters relating to activities there.
Again, requiring a nonresident to return to a state to testify
about an injury she caused there is neither unfair nor
unreasonable.
Third, if a nonresident is domiciled in a state other than
the forum, rarely visits the forum, and happens to witness an
416. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-90 (1984) (holding that re-
porter who knew his article would harm plaintiff's reputation in California
could be sued there); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-81
(1984) (holding that publisher circulating allegedly libelous magazine in the fo-
rum would be subject to suit there on libel claim).
417. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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accident involving others while transiently present in the fo-
rum, she is not subject to suit there on any matter. As a non-
domiciliary, she is not subject to the forum's general
jurisdiction, so she cannot be sued on claims unrelated to her
minimal contact with the forum.4 18 Because she has not com-
mitted a tortious act in the state, or even transacted any busi-
ness there, no claims arising out of or relating to her contact
with the forum exist, so she is not subject to its specific juris-
diction either. Under the present-day "minimum contacts" test,
it would be unreasonable to require a nonresident defendant
who had only minimal contact with the forum to defend a suit
there on a claim unrelated to that contact. 419
Under the weak model of extraterritorial subpoena power,
the nonresident, non-domiciliary witness who happened to ob-
serve an accident while transiently present in the trial state
would not be subject to its subpoena power.420 Simply stated,
because she could not be sued there, she could not be subpoe-
naed to testify there.
This model is "weak" for three reasons. First, by looking
to the witness's contacts with the trial state in the first in-
stance, it assumes without inquiry that the witness would suf-
fer "meaningful inconvenience," in terms of universal burdens,
state-specific burdens, or both, if subpoenaed to testify there.
Some nonresident witnesses who lack contact with the trial
state, however, would not be unduly inconvenienced by asser-
tions of subpoena power over them.421 Yet the weak model
fails to require them to appear and testify.
Second, the weak model not only assumes that the witness
418. She certainly would not be subject to its general jurisdiction if she
were not served with process while transiently present there. Even if she
were served with process while transiently present there (presumably on a
claim unrelated to her presence in the forum), it is questionable whether the
forum would have general jurisdiction over her. See supra note 263.
419. This hypothetical highlights a problem with the present-day "mini-
mum contacts" test: it assumes that the nonresident defendant, who lacks con-
tact with the forum, would suffer "meaningful inconvenience" if forced to
defend a claim there, and concludes that an assertion of jurisdiction over her
would be unconstitutional. If the nonresident defendant would not suffer
meaningful inconvenience if sued in the forum, there is no reason to conclude
that the forum would exceed its authority in requiring her to defend there
(even though she has no contacts). See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
420. Again, if the witness were served with a subpoena while still physi-
cally present in the trial state, she might be subject to its subpoena power.
Ironically, "tag" jurisdiction, which is presently the most vulnerable prong of
personal jurisdiction, historically has been the sole source of subpoena power.
421. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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will suffer "meaningful inconvenience" if subpoenaed to testify
in a state with which she lacks "minimum contacts," but also
assumes she will suffer as much inconvenience as a nonresident
defendant compelled to defend in a forum with which she lacks
"minimum contacts." This second assumption is faulty because
nonparty witnesses rarely suffer any state-specific burdens,422
and state-specific burdens rather than universal burdens typi-
cally impel defendants to contest jurisdiction.42 3 Nonresident
witnesses also are likely to suffer far fewer universal burdens
than nonresident defendants. 424 Thus, by affording nonparty
witnesses as much protection as nonresident defendants, the
weak model "overprotects" witnesses.
The model's third weakness derives from the first two: be-
cause it "overprotects" witnesses who may not need any protec-
tion at all, it seriously limits the availability of extraterritorial
subpoena power. Only two discrete classes of nonresident wit-
nesses may be compelled to testify: nonresident domiciliaries,
and nonresident tortfeasors who, for some reason, have not
been sued in the trial state. As to the first group, extraterrito-
rial subpoena power really should not be necessary, because
such witnesses probably return to the trial state often enough
to be served with subpoenas while physically present there.
The second group is likely to be very small, for in all likeli-
hood, the tortfeasors will be named as parties to the action.
Despite these "weaknesses," the weak model of extraterri-
torial subpoena power has two advantages. Because it uses the
same "minimum contacts" test that courts presently use to
gauge assertions of personal jurisdiction, it could "piggyback"
on existing jurisdictional analysis. Courts faced with due pro-
cess challenges to assertions of extraterritorial subpoena power
would be familiar with the analysis, and would have ready ac-
cess to a vast body of law.
In addition, the weak model protects all nonresident wit-
nesses from the meaningful inconvenience that could result
from assertions of extraterritorial subpoena power. The
model's overprotectiveness assures that all potential victims of
undue inconvenience are adequately protected.
2. The "Semi-strong" Model
The "semi-strong" model would allow a state to assert sub-
422. See supra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
423. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 241-45 and 301 and accompanying text.
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poena power over any person subject to its subpoena power
under the weak model and over any person regarding any mat-
ter that the prospective witness observed or caused to occur in
the trial state. Although the semi-strong model would require
that the prospective witness have some contact with the trial
state - the person must have observed or caused something to
happen there - it would not require that the nonparty witness
have the same amount of contact that a nonresident defendant
would need to be subject to suit there. In other words, it would
not require that the witness have caused injury in the trial
state. The semi-strong model therefore differs from the weak
model because it considers even innocent observance of events
sufficient contact with the trial state to allow it to assert extra-
territorial subpoena power over the witness.
Two examples will help define the semi-strong model's
reach. First, if a nonresident non-domiciliary were to witness
an accident while transiently present in the trial state, she
would be subject to a trial state subpoena requiring her to ap-
pear and testify about the accident even after she returned to
her home state, although she would not be subject to suit in the
trial state.
This assertion of extraterritorial subpoena power would be
consistent with a "contract" theory of "minimum contacts," at
least if one construed the nonresident witness's voluntary en-
trance into the trial state in the first place as "purposeful avail-
ment."4 25 By entering the trial state voluntarily, the witness
impliedly consented to testify there on matters relating to her
visit.42 6 Put another way, the witness would be hard-pressed to
argue that the state-specific burdens she might suffer if com-
pelled to testify in the trial state would be so great as to render
an assertion of subpoena power over her unconstitutional, given
that she voluntarily assumed at least some of those burdens
when she travelled to the trial state in the first place.
Second, if the nonresident were to witness an accident in
her home state, and a suit arising out of that accident was
brought "just across the river" in the trial state, the witness
would not be subject to the trial state's subpoena power unless
she had sufficient contact with the trial state to be subject to
425. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
426. The assertion of subpoena power here would not be consistent with a
tort-like theory of "minimum contacts" since the witness has committed no
tort, or engaged in any other misconduct that would subject her to the regula-
tory authority of the trial state. See supra note 132.
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suit there. Even under the semi-strong model, if the witness
never entered the trial state or caused effects there, she would
not be subject to the trial state's subpoena power even though
such an assertion would not cause her "meaningful inconven-
ience," at least in terms of universal burdens.
Like the weak model, the semi-strong model looks to the
witness's contacts with the trial state in the first instance; it as-
sumes without inquiry that the witness would suffer "meaning-
ful inconvenience" if subpoenaed to testify in a state with
which she lacked contact. As the last hypothetical demon-
strates, however, the mere intervention of a state line does not
necessarily result in "meaningful inconvenience" to the non-
party witness. To the extent, then, that the semi-strong model
protects some witnesses who need no protection, it is "weak."
The semi-strong model is "stronger" than the weak model,
however, because it recognizes that the burdens imposed on a
nonparty witness are substantially less onerous than those im-
posed on a defendant, 427 and would authorize assertions of ex-
traterritorial subpoena power over witnesses who have quite
limited contact with the trial state. It thereby acknowledges
the lesson of Phillips Petroleum,428 and greatly expands the
universe of nonresident witnesses over whom courts could as-
sert extraterritorial subpoena power.
The semi-strong model would be relatively simple to use
because it would require only a single inquiry: whether the wit-
ness is being subpoenaed to testify about something that she
witnessed or caused to happen in the trial state. The witness
would be subject to the trial state's subpoena power only when
the required testimony related to the witness's actions or obser-
vations in the trial state.
3. The "Strong" Model
The "strong" model is the simplest of the three: it would
allow a state to assert extraterritorial subpoena power over any
resident of the United States, regardless of her contact with the
trial state. The strong model makes three assumptions. First,
it assumes that unless a witness would suffer "meaningful in-
convenience," a state could subpoena her regardless of her con-
tact with the trial state. Although never stated explicitly in
any Supreme Court decision, this assumption certainly is defen-
427. See supra Part IV. A. 2. e.
428. Hd.
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sible in light of Ireland and Phillips Petroleum.429
Second, the strong model assumes that the nonparty wit-
ness would suffer no state-specific burdens of a constitutional
dimension. This assumption is sound because the nonparty wit-
ness rarely would care about the content of the trial state's law,
except to the extent it provides for compensation to the wit-
ness. Any state that adopted a "strong" subpoena statute could
avoid constitutional challenges based on the state-specific dif-
ferential by providing for more adequate compensation to non-
party witnesses. 430
Nonparty witnesses may "care" about the content of other
trial state laws regarding privilege and other procedural or evi-
dentiary matters, but these concerns are unlikely to rise to a
constitutional level. To the extent that they do, they could be
handled through constitutional limits on choice-of-law rather
than subpoena power.43 '
Third, the strong model assumes that even the universal
differential should not rise to a constitutional dimension. In an
age of supersonic air travel, a witness can get from any part of
the country to any other part in a matter of hours. If it is con-
stitutional to require a witness to travel from Pittsburgh to
Philadelphia - a six hour trip by car - it should be constitu-
tional to require the same witness to travel to San Francisco,
less than six hours away by plane. In 1789, when witnesses
travelled by horse-and-buggy, federal district courts could sub-
poena witnesses from 100 miles away.4 32 Certainly the incon-
venience suffered by a witness required to travel 100 miles in
429. See supra note 128.
430. Such provisions would be wise in all events because parties required to
compensate fully witnesses for their time and expenses should be less likely to
subpoena witnesses who are not really necessary to the case. See supra note
243. The strong model, then, ultimately could result in greater concern for the
convenience of nonparty witnesses. The states might consider increasing the
allowance for trial expenses at least to the amounts authorized under the Uni-
form Act to Secure Attendance. See supra note 216 and infra Appendix Part
V. B.
431. There is an obvious inconsistency between this rather cavalier attitude
regarding the state-specific burdens imposed on nonparty witnesses and the
more serious approach taken with respect to the state-specific burdens im-
posed on nonresident defendants. See supra note 116. State-specific burdens
on defendants must be considered in jurisdictional analysis because they are so
common and potentially so great; state-specific burdens on witnesses can be as-
sumed away or relegated to choice-of-law analysis because they are so rare and
relatively insignificant.
432. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 88; Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, 1
Stat. 335.
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colonial times would exceed the inconvenience suffered by a
witness subpoenaed to testify in any part of the country today.
The strong model has two obvious advantages. It would be
simple to apply and would allow a court to subpoena any do-
mestic witness. It therefore would greatly enhance the courts'
ability to obtain live testimony of witnesses at trial in civil ac-
tions. The risk also is obvious: if the decision to subpoena wit-
nesses remains in the hands of lawyers, as all three models
suggest, zealous advocates may misuse the power and force in-
nocent witnesses to travel across the country to provide cumu-
lative or immaterial testimony. States should alleviate this risk
by increasing the cost of calling witnesses by affording better
compensation. A court also could impose a direct sanction
against the attorney for misuse of the subpoena. 433
CONCLUSION
Regardless of the model they adopt, the states are free to
impose additional limits or conditions on the availability of ex-
traterritorial subpoena power. The point of this Article is not
that the states should adopt one model or another, or that they
should assert as much subpoena power as the Constitution al-
lows. Rather, the point is that states are not absolutely barred
from asserting extraterritorial subpoena power, and should de-
cide whether, and to what extent, to assert this power based on
considerations of fairness, convenience, and need - not on an
antiquated vision of state power.
433. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38
N.Y.2d 397, 406, 343 N.E.2d 278, 284, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 644 (1975) (holding that
misuse of subpoena power constitutes actionable tort); MODEL RULES OF PRO.
FESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 4.4 (1987) (stating that "in representing a client, a
lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to em-
barrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence
that violate the legal rights of such a person"); cf FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (imposing
sanctions for frivolous use of pleadings, motions, and other papers).
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APPENDIX
I. STATUTES AUTHORIZING THE ASSERTION OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
NONRESIDENT DEFENDANTS
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted
long-arm statutes authorizing assertions of personal jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants in specified circumstances. See
ALA. R. Civ. P. 4.2; ALASKA STAT. § 9.05.015 (1983); ARiz. R.
CIV. P. 4(e)(2); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-58-120 (1987); CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-1-124
(1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-59b (West Supp. 1989); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104 (Supp. 1988); D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-421
(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193 (West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-10-91 (Supp. 1989); HAw. REV. STAT. § 634-35 (1985);
IDAHO CODE § 5-514 (Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para.
2-209 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. R. Civ. P. 4.4; IOWA CODE
ANN. § 617.3 (West Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308
(Supp. 1988), amended by Act of April 13, 1989, ch. 178, 1989
Kan. Sess. Laws 1197; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:3201 (West Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 704A
(1980); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-103 (1984); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3 (Law. Co-op. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.1913 (West 1981); MINN. STAT. § 543.19 (1988); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 506.192
(Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. R. CIv. P. 4B; NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-536 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.065 (1988); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 510:4 (1983); N.J. R. Crv. P. 4:4-4; N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 38-1-16 (1987); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 302 (McKinney
Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (1983); N.D. R. CIV. P. 4b;
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382 (Baldwin 1987); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 2004F (West Supp. 1989); OR. R. Civ. P. 4; 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322 (Purdon 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33
(1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 15-7-2 (Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-
214 (Supp. 1988); TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041
to -.065 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-
24 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 913 (1973); VT. R. Civ. P. 4;
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.28.185 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 56-3-33 (Supp. 1989); WIS.
STAT. § 801.05 (1987-88); WYo. STAT. § 5-1-107 (1977).
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II. STATUTES AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF
SUBPOENAS TO COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE
OF WITNESSES AT CIVIL TRIALS
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted
subpoena statutes authorizing the issuance of subpoenas to
compel the attendance of witnesses at civil trials or proceed-
ings. See ALA. R. CIv. P. 45; ALASKA R. CIv. P. 45; ARIZ. R.
Civ. P. 45; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-43-201 (1987); ARK. R. Civ. P.
45; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1987 (West Supp. 1989); COLO. R.
CIV. P. 45; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-143 (West Supp. 1989);
DEL. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 45; D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 45; FLA.
R. CIv. P. 1.410; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-10-20 (1982); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 621-1 (1985); HAW. R. CIV. P. 45; IDAHO R. CIv. P. 45;
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1101 (Smith-Hurd 1983); IND. R.
CIv. P. 45; IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.63 (West Supp. 1989); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-245 (Supp. 1988); Ky. R. Civ. P. 45.05; LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1351 (West 1984); ME. R. Civ. P. 45;
MD. R. CIv. P. 2-510; MAss. R. Civ. P. 45; MCH. R. Civ. P. 2.506;
MINN. R. CIv. P. 45; MisS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-93 (1972); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 491.090 (Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. R. Civ. P. 45;
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-535 to -540 (1985); NEV. R. Civ. P. 45;
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:1 (Supp. 1988); N.J. R. CIv. P. § 1:9-
1; N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-045; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 2302 (McKin-
ney 1974 & Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-59 (1986); N.C. R.
Civ. P. 45; N.D. R. Civ. P. 45; OHIO R. Civ. P. 45; OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 2004.1(E) (West Supp. 1989); OR. R. Civ. P. 55; 42
PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5905 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 9-17-2 (1985); R.I. R. Civ. P. 45; S.C. R. Civ. P. 45; S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 15-6-45(a) (1984); TENN. R. Civ. P. 45; TEX.
R. Civ. P. 176; UTAH R. Civ. P. 45; VT. R. CIV. P. 45; VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-407 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.56.010 (Supp.
1989); WASH. R. Civ. P. 45; W. VA. R. Civ. P. 45; WIs. STAT.
§ 805.07 (1987-88); WYo. R. Civ. P. 45.
A. STATUTES AUTHORIZING LESS THAN STATEWIDE SUBPOENA
POWER
Although most states empower their courts to require a
witness to attend a civil trial anywhere in the state, several
states define their courts' subpoena power more narrowly. See
LA. CODE Civ. PROC. ANN. art. 1352 (West 1984) (witness can-
not be compelled to attend trial more than 25 miles from resi-
dence or outside of parish of residence unless fees and expenses
are paid); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-99 (1972) (witness cannot be
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compelled to attend a trial more than 100 miles from place of
residence or place of service); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1227 (1985)
(witness cannot be compelled to attend a trial more than 100
miles from place of residence or place of service unless within
the same county, or unless the court otherwise orders and the
witness's fees and expenses are paid); OR. R. Civ. P. 55(E) (wit-
ness is not obliged to attend a trial outside the county in which
she resides or is served with a subpoena unless her residence is
within 100 miles of the courthouse, or unless she is paid a mul-
tiple of the regular attendance fee, based on the distance be-
tween the witness's residence and the courthouse); TEx. R. Civ.
P. 176 (clerk may issue subpoena for witness who resides or
may be found within 100 miles of the courthouse where the suit
is pending); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.56.010 (Supp. 1989)
(person may be compelled to attend as a trial witness anywhere
in the state if fees and expenses are paid, but a court order is
required if the witness resides outside the county in which the
action is pending or more than 20 miles from the courthouse).
B. STATUTES AUTHORIZING STATEWIDE SUBPOENA POWER
A substantial majority of states empower their trial courts
to issue subpoenas to witnesses found anywhere within the
state. See ALA. R. CIV. P. 45(e); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 45(e); ARIZ.
R. Civ. P. 45(f); ARK. R. CIV. P. 45(e); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 1989 (West 1983); COLO. R. CIV. P. 45(e); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-
10-21 (1982); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 45(e); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-1101 (Smith-Hurd 1983); IND. R. Civ. P. 45(E); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 622.66 (West Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
245(f) (Supp. 1988); KY. R. Civ. P. 45.05(1); LA. CODE Civ.
PROC. ANN. art. 1352 (West 1984); ME. R. CIV. P. 45(e); MASS. R.
Civ. P. 45(e); MICH. R. Civ. P. 2.506(G)(1); MINN. R. Civ. P.
45.05; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.090 (Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. R.
Civ. P. 45(e); NEv. R. Civ. P. 45(e); NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.365
(1987); N.J. R. CiV. P. 1:9-4; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-16 (West
1976); N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-045(E); N.D. R. Civ. P. 45(f); OHIO R.
Civ. P. 45(E); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2004.1(E) (West Supp.
1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5905 (Purdon 1982); R.I. R.
CIv. P. 45(c); S.C. R. Civ. P. 45(e); TENN. R. Civ. P. 45.05(1);
UTAH R. Civ. P. 45(e); VT. R. Civ. P. 45(e); VA. R. Civ. P.
3A:13(c); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.56.010 (Supp. 1989); W.
VA. R. Civ. P. 45(c).
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1. Statutes Authorizing the Issuance of Subpoenas into Any
County of the State
Some of the states permitting statewide subpoena power
explicitly provide that their trial courts may issue subpoenas
into any county of the state. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1989
(West 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1101 (Smith-Hurd
1983); LA. CODE CIv. PROc. ANN. art. 1352 (West 1984); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 491.090 (Vernon Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:81-16 (West 1976); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5905 (Purdon
1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.56.010 (Supp. 1989).
2. Statutes Providing for Statewide Service of Trial
Subpoenas
Many states authorize statewide subpoena power by pre-
scribing the entire state as the territory in which the subpoena
may be served. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 45(e); ALASKA R. Civ. P.
45(e); ARIz. R. CIv. P. 45(f); ARK. R. Civ. P. 45(e); COLO. R.
Civ. P. 45(e); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-10-21 (1982); IDAHO R. CIv. P.
45(e); IND. R. CIV. P. 45(E); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-245(f) (Supp.
1988); Ky. R. Civ. P. 45.05(1); ME. R. Civ. P. 45(e); MASS. R.
Civ. P. 45(e); MICH. R. CIv. P. 2.506(G)(1); MINN. R. Civ. P.
45.05; MONT. R. Civ. P. 45(e); NEV. R. CIV. P. 45(e); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 174.365 (1987); N.J. R. Civ. P. 1:9-4; N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-
045(E); N.D. R. Civ. P. 45(f); OHIO R. Civ. P. 45(E); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2004.1(E) (West Supp. 1989); R.I. R. Civ. P.
45(c); S.C. R. Civ. P. 45(e); TENN. R. Civ. P. 45.05(1); UTAH R.
Civ. P. 45(e); VT. R. Civ. P. 45(e); VA. R. Civ. P. 3A:13(c); W.
VA. R. Civ. P. 45(c).
III. STATUTES AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF
SUBPOENAS TO COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE
OF WITNESSES AT DEPOSITIONS IN
CIVIL CASES
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted
deposition subpoena statutes authorizing the issuance of sub-
poenas to compel in-state witnesses to appear for depositions in
connection with civil actions pending in the state. See ALA. R.
CIV. P. 45(d); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 45(d); ARIz. R. CIV. P. 45(e);
ARK. R. CIv. P. 45(d); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 2020 (West Supp.
1989); COLO. R. Civ. P. 45(d); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-148e
(West Supp. 1989); DEL. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 45(d); D.C. SUPER.
CT. R. Civ. P. 45(d); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.410(d); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-11-45(a) (1982); HAw. REV. STAT. § 624-24.5(a) (1985); HAw.
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R. Civ. P. 45(d); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 45(d); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
11OA, para. 204(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. R. CIV. P.
45(d); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.84 (West Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-245(e) (Supp. 1988); KY. R. CIV. P. 45.04; LA. CODE
Civ. PROC. ANN. art. 1430 (West 1984); ME. R. CIV. P. 45(d); MD.
R. CIV. P. 2-510(a); MASS. R. Civ. P. 45(d); MICH. R. Civ. P.
2.305; MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04; MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-95 (1972);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 492.270 (Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. R. CIV.
P. 45(d); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1225 (1985); NEV. R. Cr. P.
45(d); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:4 (1974); N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:14-
7; N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-045(D); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R. 3106(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1989); N.C. R. Civ. P. 45(d); N.D. R. Civ. P.
45(e); OHIO R. Civ. P. 45(D); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2004.1(D) (West Supp. 1989); OR. R. Civ. P. 55(F); PA. R. Civ.
P. 4018; R.I. R. CIV. P. 45(d); S.C. R. Civ. P. 45(d); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 15-6-45(d) (1984); TENN. R. Civ. P. 45.04;
TEx. R. Civ. P. 201(1); UTAH R. CIv. P. 45(d); VT. R. CIv. P.
45(d); VA. S. CT. R. 4:5(a); WASH. R. Civ. P. 45(d); W. VA. R.
Civ. P. 45(d); WIs. STAT. § 804.05 (1987-1988); Wyo. R. Civ. P.
45(d).
A. STATUTES LIMITING DEPOSITION SUBPOENA POWER BY
COUNTY LINE
Many states and the District of Columbia use county lines
to restrict the distance witnesses can be compelled to travel,
even within the state, to attend a deposition. See ALA. R. Civ.
P. 45(d)(2); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); ARiz. R. Civ. P.
45(e)(2); ARK. R. Civ. P. 45(d); COLO. R. CIv. P. 45(d)(2); D.C.
SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.410(d)(2); GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-11-45(b) (1982); HAW. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); IDAHO
R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 203 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. R. Civ. P. 45(D)(2); KY. R. Civ. P.
45.04(3); LA. CODE Civ. PROC. ANN. art. 1436 (West 1984); ME.
R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); MD. R. Civ. P. 2-413(a)(1); MICH. R. Civ. P.
2.305(C)(1); MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04(3); MONT. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1227(1) (1985); NEV. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2);
N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:14-7(b); N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-045(D)(2); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & R. 3110 (McKinney 1970); N.D. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(4);
OHIO R. Civ. P. 45(D)(2); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3207(B)(1)
(West Supp. 1989) ("a witness shall be obligated to attend to
give his deposition only in the county of his residence, a county
adjoining the county of his residence or the county where he is
located when the subpoena is served upon him") (emphasis
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added); OR. R. Civ. P. 55(F)(2); S.C. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-6-45(d)(2) (1984); TENN. R. CIV. P.
45.04(2); TEx. R. Civ. P. 201(5); UTAH R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); WASH.
R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); W. VA. R. CIv. P. 45(d)(2).
B. STATUTES LIMITING DEPOSITION SUBPOENA POWER BY
COUNTY LINE AND DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN
RESIDENT AND NONRESIDENT WITNESSES
The District of Columbia and some states that limit deposi-
tion subpoena power by county line also distinguish between
residents of the state and nonresidents who happen to be
served with a subpoena while in the state. See ALA. R. CIV. P.
45(d)(2); ALASKA R. CIv. P. 45(d)(2); ARiz. R. CIv. P. 45(e)(2);
COLO. R. CIv. P. 45(d)(2); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2);
HAW. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); IND. R. Civ.
P. 45(D)(2); KY. R. Civ. P. 45.04(3); ME. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); MD.
R. Civ. P. 2-413(a)(1); MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04(3); MONT. R. Civ.
P. 45(d)(2); NEV. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); N.J. R. CIV. P. 4:14-7(b);
N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-045(D)(2); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 3110 (Mc-
Kinney 1970); N.D. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(4); OR. R. Civ. P. 55(F)(2);
S.C. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-6-
45(d)(2) (1984); TENN. R. Civ. P. 45.04(2); TEx. R. Civ. P. 201(5);
UTAH R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); WASH. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2).
C. STATUTES LIMITING THE NUMBER OF MILES A DEPONENT
MAY BE COMPELLED TO TRAVEL
Some state statutes provide that a witness may not be com-
pelled to travel more than a specified number of miles to at-
tend a deposition. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2) (nonresident can
be compelled to attend only in the county wherein she is
served, or at a place within Alabama that is not more than 40
miles from the place of service); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-45(b)
(1982) (deponent may be required to attend anywhere in county
wherein she resides, is employed, is served, or transacts busi-
ness in person, or "[a]t any place which is not more than 30
miles from the county seat of the county wherein the witness
resides, is employed, or transacts his business in person"); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-245(e)(2) (Supp. 1988) (50 mile limit); ME. R.
Civ. P. 45(d)(2) (deponent cannot be compelled to travel
outside county, or 50 miles, whichever is greater); MD. R. CIv.
P. 2-413(a)(1); MASS. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); NEV. R. Civ. P.
45(d)(2); N.J. R. CIV. P. 4:14-7(b); N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-045(D)(2);
N.D. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(4); TEx. R. Civ. P. 201(5); UTAH R. Civ. P.
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45(d)(2); VT. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(2) (50 mile limit); WASH. R. CIV.
P. 45(d)(2); WIS. STAT. § 804.05(3)(b)(4) (1987-88) (nonparty wit-
ness may be compelled to attend a deposition within 100 miles
of the place where the witness resides, is employed, transacts
business, or is served).
IV. STATUTES AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF
SUBPOENAS TO COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE
OF WITNESSES AT CRIMINAL TRIALS
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted
criminal subpoena statutes authorizing the issuance of subpoe-
nas to compel the attendance of witnesses at criminal trials or
proceedings. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-246(a) (1986); ALASKA R.
CRiM. P. 17(e); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4071 (Supp. 1988);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-43-208 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1330
(West Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-9-101 (1986); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-2a (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 5102 (1987); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 17(a); D.C. SUPER. CT.
R. CRIM. P. 17(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 914.001(1) (West 1985); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-7-191 (1982); HAw. R. PENAL P. 17; IDAHO
CODE § 19-3004 (1987); IDAHO CRIM. R. 17(a); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 155-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-37-5-2 (Burns 1985); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 14(1), 19(2); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-3214 (1988); Ky. R. CRIM. P. 7.02; LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 731 (West 1981); ME. R. CRIM. P. 17; MAD.
R. CRIM. PROc. 4-266; MASS. R. CRIM. P. 17; MIcH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 767.3 (West 1982); MINN. R. CRiM. P. 22.01, 22.06; MISS.
CODE ANN. § 99-9-11 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 545.320, 545.330
(Vernon 1987); Mo. S. CT. R. CRIM. P. 26.02; MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-15-102(3) (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1901 (1985); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 174.305 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 592-A:11
(1986); N.J. GEN. PROC. R. 1:9-1; N.M. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 5-
613(A)(following N.M. DIST. CT. R. CIV. P. 1-045); N.Y. CRim.
PROC. LAW § 610.10 (McKinney 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-59
(1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-801 (1988); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 17;
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 17(F); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 707 (West
1969); OR. REV. STAT. § 136.557 (1984); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5905 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-2 (1985); R.I. S. CT.
R. CRIM. P. 17; S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-7-60 (Law. Co-op. 1985);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-14-6 to -7 (1988); TENN. R.
CRiM. P. 17; TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 24.01 (Vernon
1989); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 14; VT. R. CRIM. P. 17; VA. CODE ANN.§ 8.01-407 (1984); VA. S. CT. R. 3A:12; WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
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§ 10.52.040 (Supp. 1989); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.8; W. VA.
R. CRIM. P. 17; Wis. STAT. §§ 885.01, 972.11 (1987-88); WYo. R.
CRIM. P. 20.
V. THE UNIFORM ACT TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE
OF WITNESSES FROM WITHOUT A STATE IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted
the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance, which authorizes trial
courts in the state in which a criminal trial is pending to re-
quest that the state in which a material witness resides sub-
poena the witness to leave the state and testify in the trial
state. See ALA. CODE §§ 12-21-280 to -285 (1986); ALAsKA STAT.
§§ 12.50.010 to -.080 (1984); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4091 to
-4096 (Supp. 1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-43-402 to -409 (1987);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1334 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-9-
201 to -205 (1986 & Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-82i
(West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3521-3526 (1987); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-1501 to -1504 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 942.01
to -.05 (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-10-90 to -97 (1982 &
Supp. 1989); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 836-1 to -4 (1985); IDAHO CODE
§ 19-3005 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 156-1 to -11
(Smith-Hurd 1973 & Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-37-5-1
to -9 (Burns 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 819.1 to -.5 (West 1979 &
Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4201 to -4206 (1988); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.230 to .270 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972);
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 741-745 (West 1981); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1411-1415 (1980); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. §§ 9-301 to -307 (1984) (§ 9-307 repealed 1974);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, §§ 13A-13D (Law. Co-op. 1986);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 767.91 to -.95 (West 1982); MINN.
STAT. §§ 634.06 to -.09 (1988); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-9-27 to -35
(1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 491.400 to -.450 (Vernon Supp. 1989);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-111 to -114 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 29-1906 to -1911 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 174.395 to -.445
(1987 & 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 613:1 to -:6 (1986); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:81-18 to -23 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 31-8-1 to -6 (1984); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 640.10 (McKin-
ney 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-811 to -816 (1988); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 31-03-25 to -26 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2939.25 to -.29 (Baldwin 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,§§ 721-727 (West 1969 & Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 136.623
to -.637 (1984); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-5961-5965 (Purdon
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1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-16-1 to -13 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 19-9-10 to -130 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 23A-14-14 to -24 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-17-201 to -210
(1982); TEX. CODE CRim. PRoc. ANN. art. 24.28 (Vernon 1989);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-21-1 to -5 (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 6641-6649 (1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-272 to -282 (1983 &
Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.55.010 to -.130 (1980);
W. VA. CODE §§ 62-6A-1 to -6 (1989); WIS. STAT. § 976.02 (1987-
88); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11405 (1987).
A. STATUTES PROTECTING WITNESSES FROM PROCESS IN ALL
STATES THROUGH WHICH THEY MUST PASS
Some states and the District of Columbia authorize their
trial courts to compel a witness to leave the state to testify else-
where only if she will be protected from process in both the
trial state and any other state through which she may be re-
quired to pass in the ordinary course of travel. See COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-9-202(2) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-82i(b)
(West 1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1502(b) (1981); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 836-2 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 19-3005(1) (1987); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 156-2 (Smith-Hurd 1973); MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-302(b) (1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233,
§ 13A (Law. Co-op. 1986); MICH. COmP. LAWS ANN.
§ 767.92(3)(c) (West 1982); MINN. STAT. § 634.06(b)(3) (1988);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.410(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:81-19 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-8-2 (1984);
OR. REV. STAT. § 136.625(2) (1984); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5963(b) (Purdon 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-204 (1982);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 24.28(3)(b) (Vernon 1989);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-21-2 (1982); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-274
(1983); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-404(b) (1987).
B. STATUTES INCREASING THE WITNESS FEES AND MILEAGE
ALLOWANCES
Several states have increased the amounts allowed by the
Uniform Act to Secure Attendance for witness fees and mile-
age, or have substituted the cost of round-trip airfare for the
mileage compensation. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-283(c) (1986) (15
cents per mile and $15 per day); ALASKA STAT. § 12.50.020(b)
(1984) (round-trip airfare and $20 per day); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1334.3 (West Supp. 1989) (airfare and $20 per day); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 16-9-203 (Supp. 1988) (airfare and $20 per day);
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-10-94(b) (1982) (12 cents per mile and $25
19891
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per day); HAW. REV. STAT. § 836-3 (1985) (airfare and $60 per
day); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 1414 (1980) ($15 per day); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 491.420(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989) ($15 per day);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-21-3 (1982) (20 cents per mile and $30
per day); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6647 (1974) ($10 per day).
C. STATUTES INCORPORATING BY REFERENCE OTHER
PROVISIONS FOR WITNESS FEES AND MILEAGE
ALLOWANCES
Some states and the District of Columbia incorporate by
reference other statutory provisions for witness fees and mile-
age allowances. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1503(b) (1981); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-4203(2) (Supp. 1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1908
(1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 718(B) (West Supp. 1989);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-208 (1982); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 24.28(4)(b) (Vernon 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-278
(1983).
VI. STATUTES AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF
SUBPOENAS TO COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE
OF WITNESSES AT DEPOSITIONS IN
CRIMINAL CASES
Many of the states and the District of Columbia have
adopted criminal deposition subpoena statutes authorizing the
issuance of subpoenas to compel witnesses to attend depositions
in criminal cases. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-260 (1986); ALASKA R.
CRIM. P. 17(f); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.3(a); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1342 (West 1982); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 17(f); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-86(a) (West 1985); DEL. R. CRIM. P. 17(f); D.C. R.
CRIM. P. 17(f); FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.220(d)(1); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 24-10-130 (1982); HAW. R. CRiM. P. 17(e); IDAHO R. CRIM. P.
17(e); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 414(a) (Smith-Hurd 1985);
IOWA R. CRiM. P. 14(4); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3211(1) (1988);
Ky. R. CRIM. P. 7.02(6)(a); ME. R. CRIM. P. 15(a), 17(f); MD. R.
CRIM. P. 4-261(d); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 35; MINN. R. CRim. P.
22.01(1); MO. R. CRiM. P. 26.02(a); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-201
(1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1917 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 174.375 (1987); N.J. R. CRIM. P. 3:13-2(a); N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-
503; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 660.20 (McKinney 1984); N.D. R.
CRIM. P. 17(f); OHIo R. CRIM. P. 17(E); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 762 (West Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 768
(West 1969); PA. R. CRIM. P. 9015; R.I. R. CRIM. P. 17(f); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-14-9 (1988); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 17(f);
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TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.04 (Vernon 1979); UTAH R.
CRim. P. 14(h); VT. R. CRim. P. 17(f); WASH. R. CR m. P. 4.6; W.
VA. R. CRIM. P. 17(f); WIs. STAT. § 967.04(1) (1987-88); Wyo.
STAT. § 7-11-407 (1987).
VII. STATUTES AUTHORIZING THE TAKING OF
DEPOSITIONS IN ANOTHER STATE FOR USE
IN A CIVIL TRIAL
Most states and the District of Columbia have enacted stat-
utes authorizing the taking of depositions outside the state for
use in civil actions by identifying the parties before whom a
deposition may be taken. See ALA. R. CIV. P. 28(a); ALASKA R.
CiV. P. 28(b); ARIz. R. Civ. P. 28(a); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-44-
118(a) (1987); ARK. R. Civ. P. 28(a); COLO. R. Civ. P. 28(a);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-148C(b) (West Supp. 1989); DEL. R.
CIV. P. 28(a); D.C. R. CIV. P. 28(a); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.300(a); GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-11-28(a) (1982); HAw. R. Civ. P. 28(a); IDAHO R.
CIV. P. 28(a); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 205(a) (Smith-
Hurd 1985); IND. R. CIV. P. 28(a); IOWA R. Civ. P. 153(b); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-228(a) (1983); Ky. R. CIV. P. 28.02; LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13: 3823(A)(1) (West 1968); ME. R. Civ. P. 28(b);
MD. R. Civ. P. 2-414(b); MASS. R. Civ. P. 28(a); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 223A, § 10(a) (Law. Co-op. 1986); MIcH. R. CIV. P.
2.304(A); MINN. R. CrV. P. 28.01; MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-228(a)
(Supp. 1989); Mo. R. CIV. P. 57.05(b); MONT. R. CIV. P. 28(a);
NEV. R. Civ. P. 28(a); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:2 (1974); N.J.
R. Civ. P. 4:12-2; N.M. R. CIV. P. 1-028(A); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. &
R. 3113(a)(2) (McKinney 1970); N.C. R. CIV. P. 28(a); N.D. R.
CIV. P. 28(a); OHIO R. Civ. P. 28(B); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 3205(A) (West Supp. 1989); OR. R. CIV. P. 38(B); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5325 (Purdon 1981); PA. R. CIv. P. 4015; R.I. R.
Civ. P. 28(b); S.C. R. Civ. P. 28(a); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 15-6-28(a) (Supp. 1989); TENN. R. CIV. P. 28.01; TEX. CIV.
PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 20.001(b) (Vernon 1986); TEX. R.
CIV. P. 188(1); UTAH R. CIV. P. 28(a); VT. R. CIV. P. 28(b); VA.
R. Civ. P. 4:3(b); WASH. R. Civ. P. 28(a); W. VA. CODE §§ 57-4-1
to -2 (1966); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 28(a); WIS. STAT. § 804.03(1)
(1987-88); WYo. R. CIV. P. 28(a).
A. STATUTES AUTHORIZING THE TAKING OF DEPOSITIONS
BEFORE OFFICERS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER
OATHS BY THE LAWS OF THE TRIAL STATE
Many of the states that have modeled their "commission"
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provision on Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have modified it to allow a deposition to be taken before an of-
ficer authorized to administer oaths by the laws of the trial
state (rather than, or in addition to, the laws of the United
States). See ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(a); ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 28(a); ARK.
R. CIv. P. 28(a); COLO. R. CIv. P. 28(a); HAw. R. CIV. P. 28(a);
IDAHO R. Civ. P. 28(a); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 205(a)
(Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. R. Civ. P. 28(A); Ky. R. CIv. P. 28.02;
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3823(A)(1) (West 1968); MICH. R. Civ.
P. 2.304(A)(1); MONT. R. Civ. P. 28(a); N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:12-2;
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 3113(a)(1) (McKinney 1970); N.C. R.
CIv. P. 28(a); N.D. R. Civ. P. 28(a); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5325(a)(1) (Purdon 1981); PA. R. Civ. P. 4015(a); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAws ANN. § 15-6-28(a) (Supp. 1989); TEX. R. Civ. P.
188(1)(1); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 28(a); Wis. STAT. § 804.03(1) (1987-
88); WYo. R. Civ. P. 28(a). But see ALASKA R. Civ. P. 28(b);
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 2026(c) (West Supp. 1989); DEL. R. Civ.
P. 28(a); D.C. R. Civ. P. 28(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-28(a)
(1982); IOWA R. CIv. P. 153(b); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-228(a)(2)
(1983); ME. R. CIV. P. 28(b); MD. R. Civ. P. 2-414(b); MASS. R.
Civ. P. 28(a); MINN. R. Civ. P. 28.01; Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-
228(a) (Supp. 1989); Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.05(b); NEV. R. Civ. P.
28(a); N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-028(A); OHIO R. Civ. P. 28(B); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3205(A) (West Supp. 1989); OR. R. Civ. P.
38(B); R.I. R. Civ. P. 28(b); S.C. R. Civ. P. 28(a); TENN. R. Civ.
P. 28.01; UTAH R. Civ. P. 28(a); VT. R. CIV. P. 28(b); VA. R. Civ.
P. 4:3(b); WASH. R. CiV. P. 28(a).
B. STATUTES PROVIDING FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A COMMISSION
BY THE TRIAL STATE
Some states and the District of Columbia have enacted
statutes that explicitly provide for the issuance of a commission
by the trial state to take a deposition in the home state. See
UNIF. PROC. ACT § 3.01(b), 13 U.L.A. 355, 388 (1986); ARiz. R.
Civ. P. 28(a); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-204(a) (1987); CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 2026(c)(2) (West Supp. 1989); COLO. R. Civ. P.
28(d); DEL. R. CIv. P. 28(d); D.C. R. Civ. P. 28-I(a); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 14-104 (1989) ("examiner" appointed upon motion);
HAw. REV. STAT. § 624-24.5(b) (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. cl. 110A,
para. 205(c) (Smith-Hurd 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-228(a)
(1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3823(B) (West 1968); ME. R.
Civ. P. 28(b)(3); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 223A, § 10(b) (Law. Co-
op. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 492.110 (Vernon 1949); Mo. R. Civ.
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P. 57.06; NEV. R. Civ. P. 28(a); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:15
(1974); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3108 (McKinney 1970) (for dep-
ositions on written questions); OR. R. CIV. P. 38(B); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5325(b) (Purdon 1981); R.I. R. CIv. P. 28(b);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-18-9 (1985); S.C. R. Civ. P. 28(a); TEx. R.
CIV. P. 188(1)(2); VT. R. CIV. P. 28(b); Wis. STAT. § 887.26(4)
(1987-88).
C. STATUTES PROVIDING FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A COMMISSION
BY THE TRIAL STATE ONLY WHEN THE DEPOSITION IS
TO BE TAKEN ABROAD
Several states authorize the issuance of a commission only
when the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country. See
ALASKA R. CIv. P. 28(c); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.300(b); GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-11-28(b) (1982); MD. R. CIV. P. 2414(c); MICH. R. CIV.
P. 2.304(B); MINN. R. CIV. P. 28.02; MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-
228(b) (Supp. 1989); Mo. R. CIv. P. 57.05(c); MONT. R. CIv. P.
28(b); N.J. R. CIV. P. 4:12-3; N.M. R. CIv. P. 1-028(B); N.C. R.
CIV. P. 28(b); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3205(B) (West Supp.
1989); S.C. R. CIV. P. 28(b); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-6-
28(b) (1984); TENN. R. CIV. P. 28.02; UTAH R. CIV. P. 28(b);
WASH. R. CIV. P. 28(b); W. VA. R. CIV. P. 28(b); WYO. R. CIV. P.
28(b).
VIII. STATUTES AUTHORIZING THE TAKING OF
DEPOSITIONS IN ANOTHER STATE FOR USE
IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL
Many states have authorized taking depositions outside the
state for use in criminal cases. See ALA. CODE §§ 12-21-260 to -
261 (1986); ARLz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 134111 to -4116 (Supp.
1988); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1349-1354 (West 1982); IDAHO CODE
§ 19-3201 (1987); MINN. R. CRim. P. 22.06; N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-
503(E)(2); N.Y. CRim. PROC. LAW § 680.10 (McKinney 1984)
(deposition on written questions); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 15(d)(1);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.50 (Baldwin 1987); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, §§ 781-793 (West 1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-18-9
(1985); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 39.04, 39.09 (Vernon
1979); VT. R. CRIM. P. 15(h); W. VA. CODE § 62-3-1 (1989).
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IX. STATUTES AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF
SUBPOENAS TO COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE
OF WITNESSES AT DEPOSITIONS FOR
USE IN OTHER STATES
The District of Columbia and all of the states except Ne-
braska have enacted statutes allowing their courts to issue the
process necessary to compel witnesses found within their terri-
tory to appear for a deposition to be used in proceedings pend-
ing in another state. See ALA. R. CIV. P. 28(c); ALAsKA R. CIV.
P. 27(c); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 30(h); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-44-114
(1987); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2029 (West Supp. 1989); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-90-111 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-
148e to -155 (West Supp. 1989) (§§ 52-149, -153 to -154 repealed
1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4311 (1975); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 14-103 (1989); D.C. R. Civ. P. 28-I(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.251
(West 1979); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-10-110 to -112 (1982); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 624.27 (1985); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 28(e); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110A, para. 204(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. R.
CIV. P. 28(E); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.84 (West Supp. 1989);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-228(d) (1983); KY. R. CIV. P. 28.03; LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:3821, 13:3824 (West 1968); ME. R. CIV. P.
30(h); MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-401 (1984); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 11 (Law. Co-op. 1986); MICH. CoMP.
LAws ANN. § 600.1852 (West 1981); MICH. R. CIV. P. 2.305(E);
MINN. R. CiV. P. 45.04; Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-3-97 (1972); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 492.100 (Vernon 1949); MO. R. CIV. P. 57.08;
MONT. R. CIV. P. 28(d); NEV. REV. STAT. § 53.060 (1987); NEV. R.
CIv. P. 45(d)(3); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:18 (1974); N.J. R.
CiV. P. 4:11-4; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-1 (1987); N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
L. & R. § 3102(e) (McKinney 1970); N.C. R. CIV. P. 28(d); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 31-05-22 (1976); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2319.08,
2319.09 (Baldwin 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 462 (West
1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1703.02 (West 1980); OR. R.
CIV. P. 38(c); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5326 (Purdon 1981);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-18-11 (1985); S.C. R. CIV. P. 28(d); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 19-5-4 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-9-103
(Supp. 1988); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 20.002
(Vernon 1986); UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(h); VT. R. CIV. P. 28(d); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1248 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01411 to
-412 (1984 & Supp. 1989); WASH. R. CiV. P. 45(d)(4); W. VA. R.
CIv. P. 28(d); WIS. STAT. § 887.24 (1987-88); WYo. STAT. § 1-12-
115 (1988).
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A. THE UNIFORM DEPOSITION ACT
The Uniform Deposition Act is presently in place in only
ten states. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.251 (West 1979); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 24-10-110 to -112 (1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3821
(West 1968); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-401 (1984);
NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 53.050 to .070 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2319.09 (Baldwin 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 19-54
(1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-9-103 (Supp. 1988); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01411 (Supp. 1989); WYO. STAT. § 1-12-115 (1988).
Although New York and South Carolina have not officially
adopted the Uniform Deposition Act, they have enacted similar
statutes. See N.Y. CiV. PRAc. L. & R. § 3102 (McKinney 1970);
S.C. R. Civ. P. 28(d).
B. THE UNIFORM PROCEDURE ACT
Four states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Is-
lands have adopted all or part of the Uniform Procedure Act.
See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-4-101 to -108 (1987); D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 13-421 to -434 (1989); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 223A, §§ 1-14
(Law. Co-op. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.1852 (West
1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.2114a, 600.2118a (West
1986); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5321-5329 (Purdon 1981); 5
V.I. CODE ANN. §§ 49014943 (1967). Although Indiana has not
officially adopted the Uniform Procedure Act, it has enacted a
helping statute that mirrors the language of the Act. See IND.
R. Civ. P. 28(E).
C. HELPING STATUTES AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF
SUBPOENAS UPON PROOF OF NOTICE OR AGREEMENT
A notice of deposition or agreement between the parties is
enough to obtain a subpoena under the laws of several states
and the District of Columbia. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(c); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4311 (1975); D.C. R. CIV. P. 28-I(b); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 92.251 (West 1979); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 28(e); MINN.
R. Civ. P. 45.04; MONT. R. Civ. P. 28(d); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-
1 (1987); N.C. R. CIv. P. 28(d); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-05-22
(1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2319.09 (Baldwin 1987); S.C. R.
CIv. P. 28(d)(1); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-9-103 (Supi,. 1988);
UTAH R. CIv. P. 26(h).
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D. HELPING STATUTES REQUIRING THAT THE PARTY SEEKING
THE DEPOSITION PETITION THE COURT
Statutes in several other states and the District of Colum-
bia require that the person seeking a deposition in the home
state petition the court there for a subpoena. See ALA. R. CIV.
P. 28(c) (judge issues subpoena); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 27(c) (court
issues subpoena upon motion); ARIZ. R. CIv. P. 30(h) (separate
action must be commenced in home state); ARK. R. CiV. P.
28(c) (judge issues subpoena); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-155
(West Supp. 1989) (application to judge, justice of peace, notary
or commissioner for a subpoena); CONN. S. CT. RULE § 245(g)
(deposition can be taken upon application); D.C. R. CIV. P. 28-
I(b) (clerk issues upon judge's approval); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 624.27 (1985) (presentation of verified petition required); ILL.
S. CT. R. 204(b) (petition required); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
228(d) (1983) (ex parte petition); KY. R. CIV. P. 28.03 (judge is-
sues subpoena); MICH. R. CIV. P. 2.305(E) (petition); N.J. R.
CIV. P. 4:11-4 (court may issue subpoena upon ex parte peti-
tion); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-1 (1987) (order by any judge);
N.C. R. CIV. P. 28(d)(1) (judge issues subpoena); VT. R. CIV. P.
28(d) (judge may issue subpoena upon petition); WASH. R. CIV.
P. 45(d)(4) (judge or justice of the peace may issue subpoena).
X. STATUTES AUTHORIZING THE INTRODUCTION OF
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS INTO EVIDENCE
AT CIVIL TRIALS
The District of Columbia and all states except Nebraska
have adopted statutes permitting the introduction of deposition
transcripts of witnesses deposed out-of-state into evidence at
civil trials. See ALA. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(3)(B); ALASKA R. CIv. P.
32(a)(3)(B); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(3)(B); ARK. R. Civ. P.
32(a)(3)(B); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 2025(u)(3)(A) (West Supp.
1989) (if deponent resides more than 150 miles away); COLO. R.
CIV. P. 32(a)(3)(B) (if deponent is more than 100 miles away);
CONN. S. CT. R. § 248(1)(d)(2) (if deposed witness is unlikely to
return before termination of trial or hearing); DEL. R. CIV. P.
32(a)(3)(B); D.C. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(3)(B); FLA. R. CIV. P.
1.330(a)(3)(B); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-32(a)(3)(B) (Supp. 1989)
(if out of county); HAw. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(3)(B); IDAHO R. CIV. P.
32(a)(3)(B); ILL. S. CT. R. 212(b)(2); IND. R. CIV. P. 32(A)(3)(b);
IOWA R. CIv. P. 144(c); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-232(a)(3)(B)
(Supp. 1988); KY. R. CIv. P. 32.01(c)(i); LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
ANN. art. 1450B (West Supp. 1989) (if taken in prior dismissed
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action involving same subject matter and parties); ME. R. CIV.
P. 32(a)(3)(B); MD. R. Civ. P. 2-419(a)(3)(B); MASS. R. Civ. P.
32(a)(3)(B); MICH. R. Civ. P. 2.308(A)(1)(c)(iii) (if witness is
more than 50 miles away); MiNN. R. Civ. P. 32.01(3)(B); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 13-1-232(1)(3)(B) (Supp. 1989); Mo. R. CIV. P.
57.07(a)(3)(D); MONT. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B) (following federal
100-mile minimum); NEV. R. CIv. P. 32(a)(3)(B); N.H. R. EVID.
804(b)(1); N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:16-1(c); N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-
032(A)(3)(B) (following federal 100-mile minimum); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & R. 3117(a)(3)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1989); N.C. R.
Civ. P. 32(a)(4) (following federal 100-mile minimum); N.D. R.
Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B); OHIo R. Civ. P. 32(A)(3)(B) (if out of
county); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3209(A)(3)(b) (West Supp.
1989) (if out of county); OR. REV. STAT. § 45.250(2)(b) (1988);
PA. R. Civ. P. 4020(a)(3)(B); R.I. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(3)(ii); S.C. R.
Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 15-6-32(a)(3)
(Supp. 1989); TENN. R. Crv. P. 32.01(3)(B); TEx. R. Civ. P. 207;
UTAH R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B) (following federal 100-mile mini-
mum); VT. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(E)(g) (if proponent of deposition
is unable to procure witness's attendance "by process or other
reasonable means"); VA. S. CT. R. 4:7(a)(4)(B); WASH. R. Civ. P.
32(a)(3)(B) (if out of county and more than 20 miles away); W.
VA. CODE § 57-4-4 (1966); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B); WIS.
STAT. § 804.07(1)(c)(2) (1987-88); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B) (if
out of county).
A. USE STATUTES MODELED AFTER FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)
Most of the "use of deposition" statutes are modeled after
Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See ALA. R.
Civ. P. 32(a)(3); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3); ARiz. R. Civ. P.
32(a)(3); ARK. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3); COLO. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3);
CONN. S. CT. R. § 248(1)(d)2; DEL. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3); D.C. R.
Civ. P. 32(a)(3); FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.330(a)(3); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-
11-32(a)(3) (Supp. 1989); HAw. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3); IDAHO R. CiV.
P. 32(a)(3); IND. R. Civ. P. 32(A)(3); KAN. R. Civ. P. 60-
232(a)(3); KY. R. Civ. P. 32.01(c); ME. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3); MD. R.
Civ. P. 2-419(a)(3); MASS. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3); MICH. R. Civ. P.
2.308(a)(1)(c); MINN. R. Civ. P. 32.01(3); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-
1-232(1)(c) (Supp. 1989); Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.07(a)(3); MONT. R.
Civ. P. 32(a)(3); NEV. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3); N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:16-1;
N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-032(A)(3); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 3117(a)(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1989); N.C. R. Civ. P. 32(a); N.D. R. Civ. P.
32(a)(3); OHIo R. Civ. P. 32(A)(3); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
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§ 3209(A)(3) (West Supp. 1989); PA. R. CIV. P. 4020(a)(3); S.C.
R. CIV. P. 32(a)(3); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-6-32(a)(3)
(Supp. 1989); TENN. R. CIV. P. 32.01(3); UTAH R. Civ. P.
32(a)(3); VT. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(3); VA. S. CT. R. 4:7(a)(4); WASH.
R. CrV. P. 32(a)(3); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3); WIs. STAT.
§ 804.07(1)(c) (1987-88); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3).
B. STATUTES AUTHORIZING THE INTRODUCTION OF DEPOSITION
TRANSCRIPTS INTO EVIDENCE IF THE WITNESS IS
OUTSIDE THE TRIAL STATE
Most states that have followed FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B)
have adapted it to permit the use of a deposition transcript if
the witness is more than 100 miles away or outside the state.
See ALA. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B);
ARiz. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B); (50 mile limit); ARK. R. Civ. P.
32(a)(3)(B); CONN. S. CT. R. § 248(1)(d)(2) (30 mile limit); FLA.
R. Civ. P. 1.330(a)(3)(B); HAw. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B) (witness
resides in another state or on another island); IDAHO R. Civ. P.
32(a)(3)(B); IND. R. Civ. P. 32(A)(3)(b); KAN. R. Civ. P. 60-
232(a)(3)(B); KY. R. CIV. P. 32.01(c)(i); MASS. R. Civ. P.
32(a)(3); MINN. R. Civ. P. 32.01(3)(b); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-
232(1)(3)(B) (Supp. 1989); NEV. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B); N.Y. CIV.
PRAC. L. & R. 3117(a)(3)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1989); N.D.
R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B); PA. R. Civ. P. 4020(a)(3)(b); S.C. R. Crv.
P. 32(a)(3)(B); TENN. R. Civ. P. 32.01(3)(B); VA. S. CT. R.
4:7(a)(4)(B); WIS. STAT. § 804.07(1)(c)(2) (1987-88) (30 mile
limit).
C. STATUTES AUTHORIZING THE INTRODUCTION OF DEPOSITION
TRANSCRIPTS INTO EVIDENCE IF THE WITNESS IS
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
Some states and the District of Columbia have enacted
statutes that follow FED. R. CIv. P. 32(a)(3)(B) so closely that
they actually allow deposition transcripts to be offered into
evidence if the witness is more than 100 miles from the place of
trial, or outside the United States. See COLO. R. Civ. P.
32(a)(3)(B); D.C. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(3) (25 mile limit); ME. R.
Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B); MICH. R. Civ. P. 2.308(A)(1)(c)(iii) (50 mile
limit); MONT. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B); N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-
032(A)(3)(b); N.C. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4); UTAH R. Civ. P.
32(a)(3)(B).
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D. STATUTES AUTHORIZING THE INTRODUCTION OF
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPrS INTO EVIDENCE IF THE
WITNESS IS AN "IMPORTANT" PERSON
Several states have expressed special consideration for cer-
tain classes of "important" people, such as doctors, judges, law-
yers, and experts, by authorizing the use of their deposition
transcripts as evidence without regard to their distance from
the courthouse. See ALA. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(3)(D) (deposition of
licensed physician or dentist admissible); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-149a(a) (West Supp. 1989) (all depositions of medical
witnesses admissible); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.330(a)(3)(F) (deposi-
tions of expert or skilled witnesses admissible); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-11-32(a)(3)(F) (Supp. 1989) (deposition of member of Gen-
eral Assembly admissible if General Assembly session conflicts
with trial); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 212(b) (Smith-Hurd
1985) (deposition of a physician or surgeon admissible); KY. R.
CIV. P. 32.01(c) (deposition of governor, postmaster, bank clerk,
lawyer, member of military, or a range of other persons admis-
sible); MD. R. Civ. P. 2-419(a)(4) (videotape deposition of expert
admissible if the notice of deposition specified that it would be
used at trial); MICH. R. Civ. P. 2.308(A)(1)(c)(i) (deposition of
expert witness admissible); Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.07(a)(3)(C) (depo-
sition of judge, attorney, or physician admissible); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & R. 3117(a)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1989); N.C. R. CIV.
P.32(a)(4) (videotape deposition of expert admissible); OHIO R.
Civ. P. 32(A)(3)(e) (deposition of attending physician or medi-
cal expert may be used by any party for any purpose); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3209(A)(3)(e) (West Supp. 1989) (deposi-
tion of expert witness admissible); PA. R. Civ. P. 4017.1(g), 4020
(videotape or oral deposition of medical witness or videotape
deposition of other expert admissible); R.I. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(3)
(videotape deposition of medical witness or other expert admis-
sible); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-6-32(a)(3)(C) (Supp. 1989)
(deposition transcript admissible if witness cannot attend be-
cause of occupational commitments and the deposition was
taken for use at trial); VA. R. Civ. P. 4:7(a)(4)(E) (deposition of
judge, medical expert, or superintendent of hospital for the in-
sane more than 30 miles from place of trial admissible); Wis.
STAT. § 804.07(1)(c) (1987-88) (deposition of medical expert
admissible).
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XI. STATUTES AUTHORIZING THE INTRODUCTION OF
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS INTO EVIDENCE
AT CRIMINAL TRIALS
Many states and the District of Columbia authorize the in-
troduction of deposition transcripts into evidence in criminal
trials in specified circumstances. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-262
(1986); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 15(d); ARiz. R. CRim. P. 15.3(e);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-44-201(c) (1987); DEL. R. CRIM. P. 15(e);
D.C. R. CRIM. P. 15(e); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-10-135 (1982); RAW.
R. PENAL P. 15(e); IDAHO CODE § 19-3111 (1987); IDAHO R.
CRIM. P. 15(e); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-3 (Burns 1985); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-3211(8) (1988); ME. R. CRIM. P. 15(e); MD. R.
CRim. P. 4-261(h); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 768.26 (West
1982); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 21.06; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-204
(1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1917(4) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 174.215 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13 (Supp. 1988);
N.J. R. CRIM. P. 3:13-2(c); N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-503(N); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 680.80 (McKinney 1984); OHIO R. CRIM. P.
15(F); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.49(A) (Baldwin 1987);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 770 (West 1969); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 136.100 (1984); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5919 (Purdon 1982);
R.I. R. CRIM. P. 15(e); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 15(e), (h); TEx. CODE
CRiM. PROC. ANN. arts. 39.01, 39.12 (Vernon 1979); VT. R. CRIM.
P. 15(e), (g); WASH. R. CRIM. P. 4.6(d); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.52.060 (1980); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 15(e); WIS. STAT.
§ 967.04(5) (1987-88); Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 17(e).
XII. THE AUTHOR'S SURVEY REGARDING
OUT-OF-STATE WITNESSES
The questionnaire asked the following questions:
1. Have you ever been involved as an attorney in a civil law
suit where the attendance of a witness could not be obtained by
subpoena because the witness resided out of the state where
the trial was being held?
2. If the answer to question 1 is yes, please answer parts (a) -
(f).
a. Please describe the circumstances. Please indicate how
far from the place of trial the witness resided.
b. Please indicate whether or not you had taken the depo-
sition of the witness in advance of trial.
c. Please indicate whether or not you sought to obtain the
voluntary attendance of the witness at trial even though you
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were authorized by statute to offer the deposition transcript
into evidence at trial.
d. If yes, please describe the circumstances and explain
why you sought to obtain the attendance of the witness at trial.
Please indicate how far from the place of trial the witness
resided.
e. Please indicate whether or not you offered the deposi-
tion transcript into evidence at the trial.
f. If a statute had authorized the issuance of subpoenas to
witnesses residing out-of-state, would you have preferred to
subpoena the witness to testify in court, or would you have nev-
ertheless offered the witness's deposition testimony at trial?
Why?
3. Have you ever been involved as an attorney in a criminal
law suit where the attendance of a witness could not be ob-
tained by subpoena because the witness resided out of the state
where the trial was being held?
4. If the answer to question 3 is yes, please answer parts (a) -
(i).
a. Please describe the circumstances. Please indicate how
far from the place of trial the witness resided.
b. Please indicate whether or not you utilized the Uniform
Act to Secure the Attendance of Out-of-State Witnesses in
Criminal Actions.
c. If yes, please indicate why you chose to employ the Uni-
form Act, and describe your experience with it.
d. If the answer to part (b) is no, please indicate why you
chose not to utilize the Uniform Act.
e. Please indicate whether or not you had taken the depo-
sition of the witness in advance of trial.
f. Please indicate whether or not you sought to obtain the
voluntary attendance of the witness at trial even though you
were authorized by statute to offer the deposition transcript
into evidence at trial.
g. If yes, please describe the circumstances and explain
why you sought to obtain the attendance of the witness at trial.
Please indicate how far from the place of trial the witness
resided.
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h. Please indicate whether or not you offered the deposi-
tion transcript into evidence at the trial.
i. If a statute had authorized the issuance of subpoenas to
witnesses residing out-of-state, would you have preferred to
subpoena the witness to testify in court, or would you have nev-
ertheless offered the witness's deposition testimony at trial?
Why?
5. If you have had any other experiences as an attorney that
might have bearing on the issues I am studying, please describe
those experiences.
